Report on the unannounced inspections of five non-residential short-term holding facilities:

**Queen's Building and Terminals 1-4, Heathrow Airport**

10-13 October 2005
by HM Chief Inspector of Prisons
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Introduction

This is our first report into the short-term holding facilities at Heathrow, including that in the Queen's Building, which handles the greatest number of forced removals from the UK.

The good news from these inspections is that we found, at all five Heathrow facilities, that custody staff who were looking after detainees were caring and respectful, alert to their particular vulnerabilities and anxieties. We also commend the management oversight provided by both the escort contract manager and Group 4 Securicor, who run the facilities; noting, for example, that managers regularly and without warning observed the difficult final stage of removal to aircraft.

Nevertheless, in spite of the efforts of staff, we found that none of the five facilities was fit to hold detainees overnight, or, in their present state, to hold children. Families and single men were held together, and staff lacked child protection training or adequate criminal records checks. Basic requirements for overnight stays — blankets to keep warm, toiletries, places to stretch out — were not available in all centres; though all held detainees overnight and sometimes for up to 36 hours. This requires urgent action.

However, the worst feature that emerges from these inspections is the dehumanising aspects of the immigration removal process itself. Some of those we observed in detention had been dealt with by the immigration authorities as though they were parcels, not people; and parcels whose contents and destination were sometimes incorrect. At Queen's Building, two of the files we examined contained paperwork belonging to a different person. We observed detainees asking for, and failing to get, legal advice and basic information about the reasons for their detention or removal. We came across two detainees, one a pregnant young woman and the other a young man summarily taken from a removal centre without his own clothes, who had been passed around various places of detention without any appropriate care or attention to their individual needs. In the latter case, it emerged that he could not in any event be removed that day as the paperwork was in the wrong place.

Poor paperwork was not the only inefficiency in the system. At Queen's Building, there were many instances of force being used on reluctant returnees who caused disruption: sometimes in public places, and always with risks to the safety of themselves and staff. Yet it was rarely possible to effect a removal in these circumstances, as airlines refused to carry disruptive detainees. The process could and should be better managed in dignity and safety: first, by ensuring that detainees have had full information about their situation, and the opportunity to seek advice; and second by carrying out risk assessments on those challenging removal and ensuring that in-flight security staff are available for those assessed as posing a risk. The work of the small removals facilitation unit showed how care, discussion and understanding could both persuade reluctant detainees to comply, and prevent ill-considered, ill-prepared and ultimately unsuccessful removals.

Heathrow's short-term holding facilities need improvement if they are to continue to hold detainees overnight, and to hold women and children. But overall, we were impressed by on-site staff's approach to detainees and concern for their welfare. By contrast, there was little evidence of individual care within the immigration removal system itself, where decision-makers appeared to be focused on cases, files and targets, rather than people. This is neither humane nor, in the end, effective.

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February 2006
Background

HM Inspectorate of Prisons inspects short-term holding facilities, residential and non-residential, which are under the control of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND). An inspection programme of these places of short-term custody began during the summer of 2004. Reports on the inspections of non-residential facilities will usually be published in groups of four. The reports on residential facilities will be published in groups of three.

Heathrow is the busiest airport in the world. Its four terminals deal with 67 million passengers a year, serving 180 destinations in 90 countries.

IND has five short-term holding facilities at the airport, one at each of the four terminals and a removals holding room at Queen’s Building. Nearly all the detainees at the four terminals were passengers who had just arrived there. They were detained by immigration officers pending further investigation of whether to allow them to enter the country or, if they were refused entry, pending removal on the next available return flight. The purpose of the holding room at Queen’s Building was also used to accommodate detainees arriving from other places of detention all over the country, due to be removed from Heathrow Airport.

All five facilities were open 24 hours a day but were non-residential, with no provision for people to sleep there or for prolonged detention. IND contracted with Group 4 Securicor Limited to manage the holding rooms.
The healthy custodial establishment

HE.1 The concept of a healthy prison was introduced in our thematic review *Suicide is Everyone’s Concern* (1999). The healthy prison criteria have been modified to fit the inspection of short-term holding facilities, both residential and non-residential. The criteria for short-term holding facilities are:

**Safety** – detainees are held in safety and with due regard to the insecurity of their position

**Respect** – detainees are treated with respect for their human dignity and the circumstances of their detention

**Activities** – detainees are able to be occupied while they are in detention

**Preparation for release** – detainees are able to keep in contact with the outside world and are prepared for their release, transfer or removal.

HE.2 Inspectors kept fully in mind that, although these were custodial facilities, detainees were not held because they had been charged with a criminal offence and had not been detained through normal judicial processes.

HE.3 Each facility was run on a daily basis by shift supervisors, either on site or remotely, and managed by a service delivery manager. The management and monitoring in the five facilities was impressive, and an example for the rest of the short-term detention estate.

HE.4 IND had recently appointed a Heathrow escorts monitor who visited all facilities frequently and oversaw movements, in particular the escorting of detainees from holding rooms to aircraft.

HE.5 A removals facilitation unit (RFU) had also been set up to deal with practical arrangements for some removals, and to identify and remove obstacles in their cases. It dealt with removals from Terminals 1, 2 and 4 and assisted some other removals, including IND’s criminal casework team, responsible for deporting foreign national prisoners at the end of custodial sentences. It also provided a valuable but informal resource to the Queen’s Building holding room. Custodial staff said that the monitor and the immigration staff in the RFU were of great assistance because they were prepared to help with the many queries that came up, which the officers could not resolve, often defusing anxieties. One detainee said that it was the first time an immigration officer had taken the trouble to explain his situation and options to him. These initiatives illustrated the value of on-site, knowledgeable and effective immigration staff.

HE.6 There was no independent monitoring in any of the holding rooms. However, there had been recent developments to set up visits by Independent Monitoring Board members from nearby immigration removal centres. The National Secretariat of Independent Monitoring Boards has now agreed in principle to a system of regular monitoring of short-term holding facilities.
Safety

HE.7 Detainee custody officers in all the short-term holding facilities inspected provided good standards of care and were aware of detainees’ immediate needs. Each of the centres appeared to be well managed, although staff shortages were a cause of concern. Staff in the terminals liaised with the corresponding immigration team. The escort monitor provided some routine IND daily oversight. Immigration service managers visited some of the rooms regularly but visits were not recorded.

HE.8 Queen’s Building and Terminals 1, 2 and 3 were not suitable for holding single men and women or families together. The holding room in Terminal 4 had serious security deficiencies that needed to be remedied urgently.

HE.9 There was a lack of information in all centres and detainees did not receive individual written reasons for their detention in a language they could understand. In all four terminals, many of the detainees who we spoke to had arrived as visitors. While a written summary of reasons for refusal was issued, written information about relevant immigration rules generally was not. Detainees often did not understand the reasons for refusal. Information about legal advice was deficient.

HE.10 There was a high level of use of force at Queen’s Building, compared to other short-term facilities. The escort monitor and the service delivery manager regularly, and without warning, observed the final stages of removal. Most of the incidents occurred when detainees became violent, or otherwise caused serious disturbance, as they were being taken to aircraft, sometimes in public places, and sometimes having already informed staff that they would seek to disrupt the process. In such cases, airlines almost always refused to carry them, and the removal failed. We considered that there were better ways of managing, and seeking to prevent, such incidents, which put both detainees and officers at risk of injury. The provision of better information and advice to those facing removal, along with risk assessments and the provision of in-flight escorts for those identified as at-risk cases, could reduce the incidence of disruptive behaviour and the number of failed removals.

HE.11 All staff had received some training in the management of suicide and self-harm but there were no suicide and self-harm policies to guide staff.

HE.12 There were no fire instructions to detainees in any language in most of the holding rooms. There were deficiencies in health and safety policies and procedures in all of them.

HE.13 Families with children were detained regularly in all holding rooms. Separated children arriving without carers were not generally detained, although young people whose age was unconfirmed were. There were designated immigration staff at all terminals to deal with separated children. They had developed positive relationships with local social services and the Refugee Arrivals Project (RAP), a voluntary group with an office at Heathrow, which included a young person’s advice project. However, none of the holding rooms had the necessary policies on child protection, and the custody staff had not been vetted to the appropriate levels or trained in child protection procedures. Only the Terminal 4 facility had two holding rooms with the potential to hold women and families with children separately.
Respect

HE.14 Queen's Building was run down and very grubby and needed refurbishment to be fit to continue to hold detainees. All holding rooms were cleaned more than once daily but showed the wear and tear of 24-hour use. All holding rooms held detainees overnight, although none were suitable for that purpose.

HE.15 The custody staff in all five holding rooms provided a caring and good quality service in very difficult circumstances. They were managing very high numbers of detainees with constant throughput. In addition, they were not always given full cooperation from some other security officers (employed by other contractors) in departure waiting areas prior to the embarkation of detainees from the Heathrow terminals.

HE.16 There was no information available to detainees about the function of the holding rooms or the facilities within them, but notices about a newly implemented complaints system were displayed in all the facilities. The notices were in English only and detainees were not given information about how to report racist incidents. There was very little reading material available in languages other than English in any of the facilities.

HE.17 None of the holding rooms had a disability policy or disabilities officer who was known to custody staff.

HE.18 There were no race relations or diversity policies and there were no common standards for faith and religious books. No assessments were made of the impact of policies on different religious, ethnic and cultural groups.

HE.19 Medical treatment was inadequate. No healthcare professional saw detainees routinely during their stay or after the use of force.

HE.20 All holding rooms allowed detainees to use their own mobile phones, provided they had no camera. This had improved detainees’ access to families, friends or legal representatives for those who had a telephone. However, none of the holding rooms had adequate payphone facilities.

HE.21 All holding rooms provided pre-packed good quality sandwiches, crisps and hot and cold drinks, but little account was taken of diverse dietary needs. Some baby food was available but there was little for young children.

Activities

HE.22 There were insufficient activities to alleviate boredom in all of the holding centres. Detainees had no access to outside exercise and very little reading material in any facility, although they could sometimes be held for 24 hours or more.

Preparation for release

HE.23 There was very little opportunity for detainees to prepare for release, transfer or removal. None of the facilities were able to admit visitors, due to the lengthy process of clearing people to be allowed into the secure area of the airport. Many detainees
had to leave issues unresolved before their removal, leading to considerable and understandable anxiety as some had been detained unexpectedly.

**HE.24** There was a lack of welfare provision to allow those facing removal after living in this country to close their affairs and recover any property that was not with them at Heathrow.

**General recommendations**

**To the Home Secretary**

**HE.25** The Independent Monitoring Board National Council should be enabled to implement a mechanism for regular, independent monitoring of short-term holding centres as soon as possible.

**To the Director General of the Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND)**

**HE.26** IND should take steps to reduce the use of force and the number of failed removals, by

- ensuring that those about to be removed have access to information and advice about their removal
- requiring risk assessments to be carried out on each detainee about to be removed, and ensuring in-flight escorts for those identified as a risk.

**HE.27** All holding facilities holding children should have a comprehensive child protection policy agreed with the local area child protection committee. Staff in contact with children should receive appropriate training, and all staff should undergo enhanced Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) checks.

**HE.28** On-site senior immigration managers should document supervision visits to the holding rooms.

**HE.29** All detainees claiming to be under 18 should be treated as such until independent professional examination confirms otherwise.

**HE.30** Detainees should not be held for substantial periods or overnight in accommodation that lacks adequate sleeping, washing, exercise and dining facilities.

**HE.31** Women and families with children should be held in appropriate accommodation separate from unrelated male detainees.

**HE.32** The IS91 (authority to detain form) and related documentation should be fully completed. It should include information about risk or special needs known to detaining authorities, including medication, and details of all successive places of detention, including police stations.

**HE.33** Written reasons for detention should be provided at the time of detention in a language the detainee can understand.
HE.34 Detainees should always be examined medically after every incident of control and restraint, and any injuries should be recorded. IND should monitor trends and, where necessary, commission investigations.

HE.35 Detainees should receive written information about the place of detention and what will happen next in a language they understand.

HE.36 There should be arrangements to allow detainees to recover or arrange for the disposal of their property. Detainees should be given correct information, at an early stage, about these arrangements and any limitations that apply at each destination.

To the facility manager

HE.37 Custodial staff should receive refresher training in anti-bullying and suicide and self-harm prevention, and adequate policies and procedures should be in place.

HE.38 All detainees should have healthcare checks within 24 hours of arrival, and a healthcare practitioner should visit the facility every day.

HE.39 General information about legal rights, including how to apply for bail and how to find competent and qualified legal advice, should be available to detainees in a range of common languages.

HE.40 Information available in terminal holding rooms should include immigration rules relating to people seeking to enter the UK as visitors.

HE.41 Every holding room should have a race relations and diversity policy.

HE.42 Holding rooms should contain newspapers, books, notices and other reading material in different languages, including basic information on the facility, health and safety procedures, and fire instruction notices.

HE.43 Health and safety risk assessments should be produced and copies kept in each facility.

HE.44 Copies of all control and restraint incident reports should be kept in every holding room.

HE.45 Detainees should be informed of the availability of holy books and other religious artefacts.

HE.46 Detainees should be aware of how to make a racist incident complaint and assisted to do so.

HE.47 There should be an assessment of the impact of policies on different religious, ethnic and cultural groups.

HE.48 The range of available food should be expanded to meet detainees' different cultural or dietary needs.
HE.49 There should be a disability policy and a designated disabilities officer for every holding room.

HE.50 Staff should receive regular refresher training in diversity issues.

HE.51 Detainees should be able to contact legal representatives without charge.

HE.52 Detainees should be offered a free telephone call on arrival.

HE.53 All detainees should be able to use a payphone, in privacy, and there should be arrangements to change money or provide cards.

HE.54 Multi-SIM non-camera mobile phones should be available for detainees not able to use a personal mobile.

HE.55 All holding rooms should be deep cleaned and redecorated regularly.

HE.56 Holding rooms should have a minimum of two staff on duty when detainees are present, and a female detainee custody officer should always be on duty when women or children are detained.

Good practice

HE.57 The management and monitoring of all the facilities by the on-site service delivery manager was impressive.
Section 1

Queen's Building

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Inspected:</th>
<th>10 October 2005</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Inspectors:</td>
<td>Jim Gomersall</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Eileen Bye</td>
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<td>Rachel Worsley</td>
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Overview

1.1 Queen's Building, one of the airport's older blocks, was originally the administration, restaurant and viewing building. It is located beside Terminal 2, which was Heathrow's first terminal.

1.2 The non-residential short-term holding facility was developed in what is still an administrative corridor. It is used to hold men, women and children with removal directions from Heathrow, and those arriving from other places of detention all over the country, including prisons. The contracted senior manager and Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND)'s escort monitor visit frequently but the visits are not recorded. At the start of the inspection, a dozen people occupied the holding rooms but detainees came and went all the time.

Escort vans and transfers

Expected outcomes:
Detainees under escort are treated courteously, provided with refreshment and comfort breaks as required and transported safely.

1.3 As well as managing the holding rooms, Group 4 Securicor was IND's main escort contractor. As the majority of IND's removals were arranged via Heathrow Airport, the Queen's Building holding facility was always busy. It stopped receiving people around 9pm, when night flights ceased, but people could still be held overnight awaiting flights the next day. This was to avoid the risk that, if moved, they might not be returned in time for their flight. Since it was non-residential, many were lodged immediately before removal at nearby Harmondsworth or Colnbrook immigration removal centres (IRCs). Women and families often came from Tinsley House or Yarl's Wood IRCs, which were slightly further away.

1.4 Escort vehicles and detainee custody officers (DCOs) had to be airside approved, which often meant that detainees had to be transferred from one vehicle to another before crossing the airport perimeter. The vehicle access point was not near the holding room and escort staff had to walk detainees to and from the arrival area. After a period in the holding room they were escorted to the flight, usually by Securicor, again using one of their airside vehicles. Several DCOs were usually based in Queen's Building for this purpose. Sometimes, DCOs working for RSI Immigration Services Ltd were contracted to collect detainees and escort them on the flight to their destination country. In some cases, carriers responsible for the removal of refused passengers under carriers' liability legislation used their own in-flight escorts.
1.5 We observed two overseas escorts in preparation. Both involved escorting officers from RSI. In each case, the escort officers arrived at the holding rooms early and sat with the detainee they were to escort, talking to them and asking about their situation, although they did not necessarily share a common language. They also encouraged the detainees to telephone friends or relatives before they took them to the departure area.

1.6 During the inspection, a Jamaican woman had been handed over to Jamaican security staff for removal on an Air Jamaica aircraft. There had been an incident after the handover that resulted in the custody staff being asked to take her back into the holding rooms. During her escort back to Queen's Building, she alleged that she had been assaulted by the Jamaican security officers, evidently working for the carrier. Queen's Building custody staff were attentive to her needs and spent time with her when she was returned. They called the emergency paramedic service, although there were no visible injuries, and they also advised her how to make a formal complaint using the complaints procedure.

### Arrival and accommodation

**Expected outcomes:**

*Detainees taken into custody are treated politely and courteously, given reasons for this course of action in a language they understand and kept in safe and decent conditions.*

1.7 Staff told us that two of the main problems they had when detainees arrived were lack of information and misinformation. Documentation accompanying detainees often did not record necessary information about medication, although all had been detained elsewhere and all immigration removal centres routinely conducted health checks and issued medication if appropriate. No health professionals visited the facility on a routine basis. If in doubt, staff had to call the emergency services. When the paramedics arrived they asked to see any medical records, but there was rarely any information to show them.

1.8 Staff told us that the misinformation given to people when they were first detained included them being told that visitors could see them at the airport or bring property and money to hand over. Airport security did not allow for either situation. One custody officer, tired of having to break this bad news and deal with the consequences, suggested that some detaining officers would say anything ‘to get them in the van’.

1.9 The detention facility, in an old building, was not purpose-built and did not provide a comfortable environment for detainees or staff. The two main holding rooms were to the left of a small reception area. To the right were a series of small rooms off a corridor. Most were staff offices but two were used as supplementary holding rooms: as an unofficial segregation area, or as a possible family room. At the end of the corridor was an alternative entrance/exit.

1.10 The two main holding rooms were connected, with smoking allowed only in the first. The accommodation and furniture looked old and tired and needed replacing. The atmosphere was depressing, with no natural light, dim artificial lighting and a ventilation system loud enough to drown out the sound of the television but unable to clear the smoke in the room. There was no air conditioning but there were heaters, although staff said it still got very cold at night.

1.11 The first room measured approximately 14 metres by 4.26 metres. One wall was opaque plastic screening separating it from the external corridor. Twenty chairs were ranged along the walls with a couple of small tables and ashtrays. There was a television and a free hot and cold drinks machine. Leading off one side of the room were a small staff room, a small kitchen and toilets. The kitchen had a sink and fridge for sandwiches. A broken freezer and broken
microwave were still there, relics of the days when detainees were offered hot meals. Alongside two small male and female toilets was a small shower. The sanitary area was not dirty but it was shabby and uninviting.

1.12 Small tablets of soap and paper towels were available, but packs of essential hygiene items were not normally issued. Staff were sometimes willing to provide toothbrushes, shower gel, and a change of underwear, which they bought themselves. They also foraged around the airport for other items to improve detainees’ situation, such as blankets, abandoned clothing and suitcases, and reading material.

1.13 At the end of the first room, an open door led into the second, non-smoking room, which measured approximately nine metres by six metres. This room contained 15 chairs around the walls and two tables, each surrounded by four chairs, in the middle. Two payphones in the room were usable only if callers had the right coins. Arriving detainees were not offered a free telephone call.

1.14 The only information displayed were a few small notices, in English, on how to complain, an advertisement on money transfer, and the telephone number of the Immigration Advisory Service.

1.15 The corridor on the other side of reception included two small rooms, both occupied by detainees during the inspection. The rooms were approximately three metres by five metres. One, occupied by two men, contained nothing more than an old, damaged mattress on the floor. The two men had refused to board flights and, on return to Queen’s Building, were kept separate from the main holding room. The occupants of the second similar room, a mother and her 10-year old son, had also refused to board a flight and were isolated on return. Their room had two old, stained mattresses on the floor, four chairs, and a playpen of toys. They were subsequently allowed to rejoin the main holding area. Overnight stayers could be allowed to sleep on the mattresses in the separate small rooms.

1.16 Although people could be detained for many hours, including overnight, blankets were not provided routinely. Staff had obtained some, because they too complained that the holding room was cold overnight. As there was no laundry, they said they took the blankets home to wash.

See general recommendations

Legal rights

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are able to obtain expert legal advice and representation from within the facility. They can communicate with legal representatives without difficulty to progress their cases efficiently.

1.17 There was negligible explanation of legal rights. It was expected that information would have been provided, with decision documents, at the time of detention. There were indications that this did not always happen. Staff said that they sometimes saw documents on the custody file that they knew should have been given to the detainee, which they handed over. Some detainees did not have their own removal directions.

1.18 There was little information about how to get legal advice, apart from a small notice in English only with the telephone number of the Immigration Advisory Service. Detainees were not
allowed a free telephone call. During the previous month, 38 people had been brought direct from police stations to Queen's Building for removal, and several from a reporting centre. These were also places where detainees could not necessarily get access to a telephone.

**See general recommendations**

### Casework

*Expected outcomes:*

*Detention is carried out on the basis of individual reasons that are clearly communicated.*

*Detention is for the minimum period necessary.*

1.19 Responsibility for what happened to detainees being removed from Queen's Building was dispersed among IND case holding offices around the country. Staff shared detainees' frustration about the difficulty in finding someone to resolve queries. For example, some case holding offices were staffed during normal working hours only. Sometimes, the contact number had not been inserted on the pro forma paperwork. Staff gave an example where removal directions had been cancelled but the case holder had not told them, and they discovered this only by chance just before putting the detainee on the flight.

1.20 Two of the files we examined contained paperwork relating to a different person, with a different name and reference number. In one case, it seemed likely that documents about two people detained at the same police station had been mixed up, but in the second case no reason was apparent. One young woman in the holding room had been left in a Leeds police station on the morning of 4 October 2005 and not moved until 11.50pm on 5 October, when she was starting her second night there. She had had no change of clothing, no shower, no exercise and no telephone call. At her next destination, Yarl's Wood IRC, a reception health check confirmed that she was 16-20 weeks pregnant and described nausea, vomiting and occasional abdominal pain. Her partner was not detained with her.

1.21 Lack of direct access to knowledgeable immigration staff was a significant problem. People frequently arrived confused and scared, particularly if their detention history involved a number of short stops, starting with a police station and ending with Queen's Building, with little opportunity for them to get advice or explanation. The removals facilitation unit (RFU), which had been set up in an office next door to the holding rooms, was of considerable assistance. It was staffed by experienced immigration officers. Although handling Queen's Building queries was not their primary remit, they were responsive to requests for help, saw detainees personally, explained their situation and options and, in some cases, intervened with the case holding port to correct mistakes. RFU confirmed that it had persuaded some reluctant detainees to comply with removal directions, following face-to-face explanation, and had also stopped some ill-considered and ill-prepared removals.

1.22 We examined Queen's Building occurrence registers for 33 days in September and the beginning of October 2005 (some day sheets were not in the bundle given to us). These detailed 1,591 entries. In most cases, people were removed as planned. Of the minority who were not removed on the first occasion, where reasons were recorded they were more likely to be administrative rather than detainee obstruction. From the registers:

- An average of just over 48 people were detained in the facility per day.
- Women made up 25% of the population.
- Minors had been detained on 25 of the 33 days – that is, most days – and made up 5% of the population, with an age range from five weeks to 17 years.
- The average duration of detention was five and a half hours, with a wide range from nil (straight to flight) to 25 hours
- Six detainees spent more than 20 hours in Queen's Building
- There were people detained overnight on most nights
- More than two-thirds of detainees were removed
- 9% (139) were transferred without a reason recorded for failure to remove
- 7% (112) were recorded as refusing to go
- 6% (95) were recorded as documentation problems (no ticket, no travel document, wrong name on ticket, wrong destination, removal directions sent in error)
- 4.5% (71) were held back because of continuing legal proceedings or MP intervention
- 2.6% (41) arrived too late for removal or no staff or vehicle could take them

**Recommendations**

1.23 The Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) should expand the work of the removals facilitation unit (RFU) so that it is available to all those facing removal at Heathrow, and consider replicating it at other relevant ports and airports.

1.24 IND should ensure that all detainees have the opportunity of effective contact with knowledgeable immigration staff before their removal.

See also general recommendations

**Duty of care**

*Expected outcomes:*

The centre exercises a duty of care to protect detainees from risk of harm.

**Bullying**

1.25 Staff did not feel that bullying was an issue at Queen's Building. Detainees stayed in the holding rooms for relatively short periods, and there was CCTV coverage in residential areas and the search area. The regular staffing levels were one supervisor and three custody officers. The Securicor boarding escort staff also used the holding rooms as a base between escorting detainees to aircraft. Residential staff spent much of their time in the residential areas. There were apparently good levels of physical control, but there were no anti-bullying policies or procedures in the facility.

**Self-harm and suicide**

1.26 All staff were first aid trained and all custody staff working in Queen's Building had been trained in the prevention and management of self-harm and suicide during their initial training. However, none had been refresher trained. There were relatively regular incidents of self-harming, usually related to the individual not wanting to be removed from the country. In the three months before the inspection, there had been 13 instances of self-harm in Queen's Building or during an attempted removal. All appeared to relate to disruption of the removal process. Some of the metal exposed on heaters in the holding rooms could be used by detainees to self-harm or to assault others.
Use of force

1.27 All staff were trained and regularly refreshed in the use of control and restraint (C&R). Custody officers used C&R regularly, and use was high, compared to other holding rooms inspected. As the facility was used as the last place of detention before embarkation to flights out of the country, most use of force was during the escort from the holding room or departure gate in the airport to the aircraft, which was people’s last opportunity to avoid removal.

1.28 There had been 32 occasions between 1 July and 27 September 2005 when C&R had been used on detainees. Many of these incidents had involved detainees moving compliantly from Queen’s Building to the departure area, but becoming disruptive and refusing to fly when they reached the departure area or, on several occasions, the aircraft. In many of those cases, the detainee had used violence to prevent their onward journey. In some cases, they had tried to self-harm, removed all their clothing or just made excessive noise. In almost all cases, the disruption had resulted in the aircraft captain or an airline official refusing to transport the detainee.

1.29 Some of these incidents had happened in the full view of other passengers and had apparently caused concern because of the C&R techniques used. DCOs were instructed that those detainees who were to be removed must leave on the arranged flight, even if reasonable force had to be used. DCOs are authorised to use reasonable force where necessary when exercising custodial functions (Schedule 11, paragraph 2, Immigration and Asylum Act 1999). Reasonable force must consist of lawful C&R techniques. C&R techniques are designed to cause no more than short duration pain to the subject to ensure compliance and to prevent injury to all involved, including and especially the detainee.

1.30 Detainees who had disrupted their transfer were transferred with in-flight escorts, using restraints if necessary. We examined all the incident reports produced by custody staff at all the Heathrow holding facilities for the previous three-month period. In some of the failed removal incidents recorded, detainees had told staff that they refused to travel while they were in the Queen’s Building holding area. The removal had been stopped and arrangements made for an escorted removal. However, in most cases, where detainees had told staff they would not travel and would cause disruption, staff tried to get the detainee to comply and explained that they would be removed by force if they did not. When that failed, staff were instructed to use C&R to get the detainee to the plane. The inevitable result was that the airline refused to transport the individual and another failed removal was recorded.

1.31 There appeared to be no reason why some removals were abandoned at an early stage and others were forced through to the inevitable refusal of the airline to proceed. Those who had succeeded in upsetting a removal attempt were able to tell other detainees who could then use the same technique to delay their removal from the country. We considered that any detainee giving an indication that they would not travel willingly and would resist should be the subject of a formal risk assessment and, if indicated, removed with an in-flight escort.

1.32 During a meeting with managers in the recently established removals facilitation unit – which vetted documentation and casework and attempted to streamline the removal process, mainly in Terminals 1, 2 and 4 – it appeared that most removals involving C&R were in cases outside their control.

1.33 Other examples of recorded reasons for failed removals were: the non-arrival of tickets; bookings not made correctly; uncooperative airline check-in staff; or lack of cooperation from other contracted security staff in other areas of the airport.
In most of the cases we examined, the custody staff had recorded the use of de-escalation techniques in very difficult circumstances before force had been used. However, detainees who had been subjected to C&R were not seen by a professional healthcare worker as a matter of routine. We were told that detainees were asked if they had any injuries and, if they said they had, the ambulance service was called. The local Securicor senior manager and the IND escort monitoring officer had begun to observe the airside escorts on a regular basis. The Securicor manager conducted 10 such observations and the escort monitor over 25 observations a month. Some of these observations were performed covertly.

There was a relatively new formal complaints procedure, and signs about this were displayed in the holding room. The signs were in English only, and detainees had to ask for a form. The complaints were sent to the local senior manager who sent them, with other documentation, to the contactor's headquarters.

### Health and safety

All residential areas of the facility were checked daily for defects. Deficiencies were reported to the supervisor and passed on to the British Airports Authority (BAA) maintenance team, who were responsible for accommodation. Most areas of the facility were shabby and needed renovation. Staff also told us that they regularly got bitten by unseen insects or bugs. There was an obvious need for deep cleaning and regular fumigation. There were no health and safety policies, risk assessments or safe systems of work available to staff. No disabilities policy or designated disabilities officer were known to custody staff.

Fire equipment was maintained by the airport fire service and all statutory checks had been completed. There were basic fire instructions for staff in the office but, other than a directional sign in English saying 'fire escape', there were no fire instructions for detainees.

### Recommendations

1.38 Heaters in the holding rooms should be made safe.

1.39 The holding rooms and other areas should be deep cleaned and professional fumigation advice sought.

See general recommendation HE25

### Childcare and child protection

**Expected outcomes:**

*Children are detained only in exceptional circumstances. Children’s rights and needs for care and protection are respected and met in full.*

The holding rooms regularly held men, women and parents with children. There were no child protection or welfare policies or procedures in the facility. A flow chart in the corridor showed the procedure for staff to report child protection issues. One supervisor had received some child protection training but that had lapsed. No other staff had received any form of child protection training and none were checked to Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) enhanced level. There were some smaller rooms that could be used to separate families with children from the primary holding areas, but only when the total number in the facility was low.
1.41 There was no exclusive non-smoking area for parents with children. There were no activities available for children, apart from some toys in one of the smaller rooms occasionally used by a family. Although nappies and baby food were available, the limited range of food on offer did not take account of the needs of young children. The comment 'ate crisps all day' was noted on the record of one family, a woman with four children aged between three and 11, detained for 11 hours and 20 minutes in Queen's Building just before the inspection.

1.42 During the inspection, we noted several small children with parents mixing with single detainees. Staff were very attentive to the needs of the children but the lack of procedural policy and its layout made Queen's Building totally inappropriate for the detention of children.

Recommendation

1.43 Children should not be detained in the existing holding facility in Queen’s Building.

See also general recommendations

Staff–detainee relationships

Expected outcomes:
Those detained are treated respectfully by staff, throughout the duration of their stay.

1.44 All staff wore name badges and some introduced themselves to detainees on arrival. They addressed detainees by their full names or their given name. Staff were attentive to the needs of all detainees during the inspection, and we saw much positive interaction between groups of detainees and staff and some intensive individual support. Although the atmosphere, noise and numbers of people held in the confined space created a very poor working environment, we were impressed with the dedication, care and enthusiasm that the custody staff displayed.

Diversity

Expected outcomes:
There is understanding of the diverse backgrounds of detainees and different cultural norms. Detainees are not discriminated against on the basis of race, nationality, gender or religion and there is positive promotion and understanding of diversity.

1.45 All staff had received training in race relations during their initial training but none had had refresher training in diversity issues since then. A Bible and Koran were available for detainee use. A small room was used for prayer and a prayer mat was available if needed. There was a general complaint system, which could also be used for racist complaints. There were no notices to detainees about making racist complaints. Staff told us that they did not recall any complaints in the recent period.

See general recommendations
Facility rules

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are able to feel secure in a predictable and ordered environment.

1.46 There were no facility rules available to detainees or staff. There was good observation in the facility but there was no means for staff or detainees to raise the alarm in an emergency or in the case of an incident just out of sight of the CCTV cameras. Some of the heaters/radiators were not secure and needed attention as they were a risk to detainees and staff. The toilet doors had been upgraded but they did not allow staff easy access in an emergency. The doors could be kept locked by the occupant and could only be forced open by breaking them, which would be extremely difficult given the solid build. There were very large reinforced glass panels down one side of the facility next to the external corridor. In their current form, they presented a risk of possible injury to desperate detainees who attempted to escape through them.

1.47 There were two smaller rooms (called ‘seg rooms’ by the staff) that could be used to separate single or multiple detainees from the rest of the residents, although these were not classed as single separation rooms. They contained only foam mats, had no sanitation and were totally inadequate for holding violent or aggressive detainees, as the doors were weak. If detainees were locked in the room there was no means to call staff for help. These rooms were used for segregation purposes without authorisation from a senior manager.

Recommendations

1.48 There should be an electronic means of raising the alarm in an emergency in the holding rooms.

1.49 The semi-secure rooms used to hold violent detainees should be made fit for purpose.

1.50 Toilets should be easily accessible by staff in an emergency.

1.51 Detainees should not be isolated in the two semi-secure rooms without authorisation from a senior Immigration and Nationality Directorate manager.

Services

Expected outcomes:
Services available to detainees allow them to live in a decent non-punitive environment in which their everyday needs are met freely and without discrimination.

1.52 A reasonable variety of sandwiches and a choice of crisps were served at every meal time but there was no provision to meet diverse dietary needs. Hot meals were not available, although staff had access to a kitchenette that could be used to heat frozen meals. Hot and cold drinks were available free of charge from a dispensing machine in the main holding room. However, the dispenser served some very hot drinks and children had ready access to it.

1.53 There were two coin-operated telephones in the smaller, non-smoking holding room. The telephones could also take incoming calls. These telephones were inadequate for the number of detainees who could be held. Staff were not able to change money so that detainees without small change could not use the telephones. Detainees were allowed to use their own mobile
phones provided there was no camera. Unfortunately, many of the mobile phones brought in by detainees did have cameras (see general recommendation HE54).

1.54 Sanitary products and nappies were available on request.

**Recommendations**

1.55 If children are detained, they should not have access to the hot drink dispensing machine.

1.56 A change machine should be installed.

See also general recommendations

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**Activities**

*Expected outcomes:*

*The facility encourages activities and provides facilities to preserve and promote the mental and physical well being of detainees.*

1.57 A few English newspapers and some old books were available. There was only one television and that was in the smoking holding room. There were no children’s games. Staff photocopied some word games from newspapers for detainee use. We were told that there was a plan to get more international newspapers from an airport shop.

**Recommendations**

1.58 If children are detained, children’s games should be available.

1.59 A television should be available in a non-smoking room.

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**Preparation for release**

*Expected outcomes:*

*Detainees are able to maintain contact with family, friends, support groups, legal representatives and advisers, and are given notice of their release, transfer or removal.*

1.60 Visitors were not allowed into the holding rooms but they could telephone detainees if detainees were able to pass on the number. All property that came with the detainees was returned on departure.

1.61 There was a sign displaying a telephone number for an advisory service and another advertising an international money transfer company. There was no other support for detainees to prepare for removal or, on rare occasions, release from the facility.

See general recommendations
Section 2

Heathrow Terminal 1

Overview

2.1 The holding room is airside in Terminal 1 and consists of a single holding area, staff office and toilets. It is used mainly to hold people recently arrived at the terminal. Six detainees were present at the start of the inspection.

Escort vans and transfers

Expected outcomes:
Detainees under escort are treated courteously, provided with refreshment and comfort breaks as required and transported safely.

2.2 As the holding room was used almost exclusively for Terminal 1 passengers, detainees were brought there by immigration officers from the nearby control. Those not released awaited a return flight in the holding room or were transferred to another place of detention. Group 4 Securicor was responsible for escorting detainees to further detention.

Arrival and accommodation

Expected outcomes:
Detainees taken into custody are treated politely and courteously, given reasons for this course of action in a language they understand and kept in safe and decent conditions.

2.3 The Terminal 1 holding area was divided into a small staff and reception room, large holding room and small smoking cubicle. There were also some immigration interview cubicles nearby.

2.4 Detainees were brought by immigration staff, with the IS91 (authority to detain form), into the small staff room. This was partitioned into an office at the front and a search and store room at the back. Generally, two detainee custody officers (DCOs), male and female, were on duty. The office had a fridge, for sandwich stock, and CCTV monitor. It faced the holding room through a semi-glazed partition. The door in the partition was often left open, partly to alleviate stuffiness in the poorly-ventilated area, and partly to allow communication with detainees.

2.5 The holding room had fixed rows of 37 seats, plus eight in the smoking cubicle at the end of the room. The disabled toilet had a baby change shelf. CCTV oversaw the area. Male, female
and disabled toilets had a small sink and soap dispenser. There was a television and a free hot
and cold drinks machine. The single payphone took cards only. Staff said it was rare for
detainees, arriving from abroad, to have a usable telephone card with them. Two detainees
told us they had not been able to telephone people who were expecting them as they had no
mobile and no telephone card. Incoming calls could be received and we noticed staff trying to
help a distressed young Chinese woman make a reverse charges call. It did not succeed and
the young woman and DCO could not understand each other well enough to resolve the
matter.

2.6 Although the holding room had no natural light, it was well lit. It was cleaned more than once
daily, but there were signs of wear and tear and it needed deep cleaning and redecoration.
There was little information of use to detainees – a Securicor complaints notice, a sign
showing orientation for Muslims, and a note that books were available.

2.7 The holding room had no regular healthcare adviser. If a detainee arrived with medication, it
was withheld until an immigration officer had cleared it with the port medical inspector.

2.8 The facility did not cater for people held for long periods or overnight, although this did happen.
Staff allowed people to recover extra clothing from their luggage, but there were no adequate
washing facilities.

2.9 A named chief immigration officer had responsibility for liaison with custodial staff in the
holding room, although contacts were not routinely recorded.

Recommendation

2.10 The holding room should be redecorated.

See also general recommendations

Legal rights

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are able to obtain expert legal advice and representation from within the facility.
They can communicate with legal representatives without difficulty to progress their cases
efficiently.

2.11 Immigration officers interviewed detainees, using interpreters if necessary. Some standard
translated information was available, mainly for asylum seekers. A young Canadian woman
who planned to visit Ireland had been refused permission to transit the UK and had spent more
than 24 hours awaiting removal. She said the immigration officer contacted the Irish
authorities, who refused in line with their UK colleagues. She thought she should have been
given more detailed explanation of the respective rules and how she failed to meet them, and
information about getting legal advice. She was not sure how to bring herself within applicable
rules next time she wanted to travel, and the extent to which this refusal, marked in her
passport, would prejudice future travel plans.

See general recommendations
Casework

Expected outcomes:

Detention is carried out on the basis of individual reasons that are clearly communicated. Detention is for the minimum period necessary.

2.12 Immigration officers on site had a minimal casework role. They gave or refused permission to enter and arranged removal. They managed detention, or released detainees on temporary admission subject to a reporting requirement, usually over a short period. Cases that took longer to determine, such as asylum claims, were transferred to other casework offices in IND following preliminary steps or screening interviews at the port.

2.13 Staff alerted immigration staff to any detainee who had been in the holding room for 12 hours, and at 18 and 24 hours, when the situation was reviewed at an increasingly higher level.

2.14 Records for September 2005 indicated that the holding room was occupied every day, and most nights, with an average of more than 17 people each day. Those held overnight were logged on both days. Of 518 entries during the month, 216 (42%) were women and 42 (8%) were children. The average period of detention was just over eight hours, ranging from 20 minutes to more than 30 hours. We noted 15 people held for 20 hours or more. One of the detainees we met had spent more than 20 hours in Terminal 1 holding room and was then transferred to Terminal 4 to await removal from there after a further few hours.

See general recommendations

Duty of care

The centre exercises a duty of care to protect detainees from risk of harm.

Bullying

2.15 Staff believed that bullying was not a concern as detainees were held for relatively short periods and there was CCTV coverage in the holding room and in the office search area. The regular staffing levels were two custody officers throughout a 24-hour period. Custody staff spent much of their time in the holding area and engaged with detainees. An anti-bullying policy was displayed on the notice board in the office but this was intended for escorting staff.

Self-harm and suicide

2.16 All staff were first aid trained, and custody staff working in the holding room had been trained in the prevention and management of self-harm and suicide during their initial training. Nobody had been refresher trained since that time. The incidence of self-harm was low but staff often took extra care with some detainees considered to be at risk because of their demeanour. They said observations were recorded on the detainee’s IS91 (authority to detain form), but none were available for examination during the inspection. There was good CCTV coverage of the detainee areas.
Use of force

2.17 All staff were trained and regularly refreshed in the use of control and restraint (C&R). C&R was not used regularly in the Terminal 1 holding room, and there were no instances in the three months before the inspection.

2.18 Detainees who had been subjected to C&R were not seen routinely by a professional healthcare worker. They were asked if they had any injuries, and if they said they had the emergency paramedic service was called.

Health and safety

2.19 The facility was checked daily for defects, and deficiencies were reported to a supervisor and passed on to the British Airports Authority (BAA) maintenance team. Most areas were grubby and needed redecoration. The smoking area in a separate small room was excessively dingy and needed urgent remedial cleaning and decoration. There were no health and safety policies, risk assessments or safe systems of work available to staff. There was an HSE notice on health and safety in the staff office, which was inadequate. There was no disabilities policy or designated disabilities officer known to custody staff.

2.20 The airport fire service maintained the fire equipment, and all statutory checks had been completed. There were basic fire instructions for staff in the office but there were no fire instructions for detainees.

See general recommendations

Childcare and child protection

Expected outcomes:
Children are detained only in exceptional circumstances. Children’s rights and needs for care and protection are respected and met in full.

2.21 The holding room regularly held men, women and parents with children. There were no child protection or welfare policies or procedures in the facility. A flow chart in the office showed the procedure for staff to report child protection issues. None of the staff had received any child protection training and none were checked to Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) enhanced levels. There were no additional rooms that could be used to separate families with children from the mixed population of the primary holding area. There were no activities available for children. Terminal 1 holding room was unsuitable for detaining women and children.

Recommendation

2.22 The smoking room should be cleaned and redecorated.

See also general recommendations
Staff–detainee relationships

**Expected outcomes:**
Those detained are treated respectfully by staff, throughout the duration of their stay.

2.23 Two custody staff were on duty at all times. Although one male and one female officer were required, this was not always achieved as there was a shortage of female officers. All staff wore name badges and introduced themselves to detainees on their arrival. They addressed detainees by their full names or their given name at all times. Staff were very attentive to the needs of the detainees during the inspection and we noted positive interaction between detainees and staff. The holding room was calm and well controlled.

See general recommendation HE56

Diversity

**Expected outcomes:**
There is understanding of the diverse backgrounds of detainees and different cultural norms. Detainees are not discriminated against on the basis of race, nationality, gender or religion and there is positive promotion and understanding of diversity.

2.24 All staff had received training in race relations or diversity during their initial training course but none had had refresher training in diversity issues since then. A Bible and Koran were available for detainee use. An interview room was used for prayer and a prayer mat was available if needed. A general complaints system was also used for racist incident complaints, but there were no notices to detainees about making complaints about racism. Staff said they could not recall any such complaints recently.

2.25 The holding room had a purpose-built toilet for disabled people. It was properly equipped and had an emergency call system. It was clean and well maintained.

Facility rules

**Expected outcomes:**
Detainees are able to feel secure in a predictable and ordered environment.

2.26 No facility rules were available to detainees or staff. There was good observation throughout the residential area. Alarm bells were installed in the interview rooms in the case of an incident out of sight of the CCTV cameras. Although there was an emergency exit out of the holding room for detainees, there was no secondary exit in the office. This was a risk for staff and detainees in the office.

2.27 There was a relatively new formal complaints procedure and signs about it had been displayed in the holding room. The signs were in English only, and detainees had to ask for a form. The complaints were sent to the local senior manager who then sent them with other documentation to the contactor’s headquarters.
Recommendation

2.28 There should be a secondary exit from the office.

See also general recommendations

Services

Expected outcomes:
Services available to detainees allow them to live in a decent non-punitive environment in which their everyday needs are met freely and without discrimination.

2.29 A variety of sandwiches and a choice of crisps were served on request. There was no provision for diverse dietary needs. Hot and cold drinks were available free of charge from a dispensing machine in the holding room but, as in Queen’s Building, children could use these and risked scalding.

2.30 There was one card telephone in the holding room but this was not sufficient when the room held a lot of people. Staff could sometimes buy telephone cards for detainees on request, although they were not required to do this. Detainees were allowed to use their own mobile phones provided there was no camera. Unfortunately, many of the mobile phones brought in by detainees did have cameras (see general recommendation HE54).

2.31 Sanitary products and nappies were available on request.

Recommendation

2.32 If detained, children should not have access to the hot drink dispensing machine.

See also general recommendations

Activities

Expected outcomes:
The facility encourages activities and provides facilities to preserve and promote the mental and physical well being of detainees.

2.33 Some novels were available but no newspapers or magazines. There was a plan to get more international newspapers from an airport shop. There was a television in the holding room but no children’s games.

Recommendation

2.34 If children are detained, children’s games should be available.

See also general recommendations
Preparation for release

**Expected outcomes:**

*Detainees are able to maintain contact with family, friends, support groups, legal representatives and advisers, and are given notice of their release, transfer or removal.*

2.35 Visitors were not allowed into the holding rooms but they could telephone detainees, if detainees were able to pass on the number. The storeroom for detainees’ property was small and cramped, so staff stored luggage in the rear of the office area. There were no other facilities for detainees to prepare for transfer to immigration removal centres or, on rare occasions, release from the facility.

**Recommendation**

2.36 An appropriately sized property store should be available.

See also general recommendations
Section 3

Heathrow Terminal 2

Inspected: 11 October 2005
Inspectors: Jim Gomersall
Eileen Bye
Rachel Worsley (Researcher)

Overview

3.1 The holding room is airside in Terminal 2 and consists of a single holding area, staff office and toilets. The holding room is used primarily to hold people from recent arrivals to the terminal. The Terminal 2 holding room had been open for only a few months, following alteration, but it was not suitable for overnight accommodation. During the inspection, several people were detained, including a family with two children, and a number came and left.

Escort vans and transfers

Expected outcomes:
Detainees under escort are treated courteously, provided with refreshment and comfort breaks as required and transported safely.

3.2 The holding room held passengers who had recently arrived at Terminal 2 and were detained. An immigration officer brought them to the holding room. If they were not subsequently released or returned to the country from where they had come, they were transferred to a removal centre by Group 4 Securicor staff, the principal escort contractor.

Arrival and accommodation

Expected outcomes:
Detainees taken into custody are treated politely and courteously, given reasons for this course of action in a language they understand and kept in safe and decent conditions.

3.3 Immigration officers brought detainees directly into the staff reception area from the corridor. Detainees were searched and their property was stored, and they were offered a free drink before they were put in the holding room. As the door between reception and corridor was usually open, the door between reception and the holding room was kept shut. Detainees approached the glazed partition if they wanted something.

3.4 The drinks machine was in the staff office and, while this avoided the risk of children getting scalded, staff noted that detainees were less likely to use it than when the machine was at their disposal.
3.5 The holding room had 29 chairs in fixed rows and a table with four chairs. A small smoking room had six chairs. The area had a television, bin, water fountain, and one payphone, which took sterling, Euro coins and credit cards and could receive incoming calls. Male and female toilets each had two toilets and small sinks with soap dispensers. There was a baby change shelf and a notice, in English, advising that women’s sanitary items were available. Information for detainees was minimal. A small notice in English in the smoking cubicle gave the telephone numbers of the Immigration Advisory Service and the Refugee Legal Centre.

3.6 The room had only artificial lighting, but was adequately lit. Although it was not uncomfortable during the inspection, staff said that ventilation and temperature control was poor. It was cold at night, when it often still had detainees. There were no blankets.

3.7 Although the room was cleaned more than once a day, it was grubby, a sign of its frequent use.

3.8 Custody staff contacted a designated chief immigration officer if they wished to raise any problems, but his visits were not recorded.

See general recommendations

Legal rights

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are able to obtain expert legal advice and representation from within the facility. They can communicate with legal representative without difficulty to progress their cases efficiently.

3.9 Immigration officers served decisions with the help of an interpreter. As space was limited, sometimes this took place in the corridor or at the entrance of the busy holding room reception.

3.10 We observed one young man, who had come to attend a conference and had been refused entry, repeatedly ask for legal advice. He was told to use the payphone but not given any information about whom he could ring. He asked how he could get a solicitor but got no response. Custody staff said they left this to immigration staff. We also noticed that no reasons for detention were indicated on his IS91R (summary of reasons for detention form).

See general recommendations

Casework

Expected outcomes:
Detention is carried out on the basis of individual reasons that are clearly communicated. Detention is for the minimum period necessary.

3.11 As passengers were generally released or removed within a day, casework by Terminal 2 immigration staff was generally limited to these arrangements.

3.12 Holding records for September 2005 had 329 entries, an average of 11 detainees per day. People were detained most nights; those held overnight were recorded on both days. A third (113) were women and 29 (9%) were minors, aside from a few age dispute cases. The
average duration of detention was eight and a half hours, ranging from nil to 32 hours 50 minutes.

See general recommendations

Duty of care

*Expected outcomes:*

_The centre exercises a duty of care to protect detainees from risk of harm._

Bullying

3.13 Staff believed that bullying was not a concern as detainees were held in the room for relatively short periods, and the area was covered by CCTV. The regular staffing level was two custody officers throughout a 24-hour period. Custody staff spent some of their time in the residential area. There was good physical control of the environment, although no anti-bullying policy was available.

Self-harm and suicide

3.14 All staff were first aid trained. Staff working in the holding room had been trained in the prevention and management of self-harm and suicide during their initial training but there had been no refresher training since that time. The incidence of self-harm was low but staff took extra care with some detainees whom they considered to be at risk. Observations could be recorded in the detainee’s IS91 (authority to detain form).

Use of force

3.15 All staff were trained and regularly refreshed in the use of control and restraint (C&R). C&R was not used regularly in the Terminal 2 holding room and there were no instances in the three months before the inspection.

3.16 Detainees subjected to C&R were not routinely seen by a professional healthcare worker. They were asked if they had any injuries and the emergency paramedic service was called if they said they had.

Health and safety

3.17 The facility was checked daily for defects and deficiencies were reported to a supervisor and passed on to the British Airports Authority (BAA) maintenance team. There were no health and safety policies, risk assessments or safe systems of work available to staff. There was an HSE notice on health and safety in the staff office, which was inadequate. There was also no disabilities policy or designated disabilities officer known to custody staff.

3.18 The airport fire service maintained the fire equipment, and all statutory checks had been completed. There were basic fire instructions for staff in the office but no fire instructions for detainees.

See general recommendations
Childcare and child protection

Expected outcomes:
Children are detained only in exceptional circumstances. Children’s rights and needs for care and protection are respected and met in full.

3.19 The holding room regularly held men, women and parent with children. There were no child protection or welfare policies or procedures in the facility. None of the staff had received child protection training and they were not checked to Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) enhanced level. There were no additional rooms to separate families with children from the mixed population of the primary holding area. There were no activities available for children. Terminal 2 holding room was unsuitable for detaining women and children.

See general recommendations

Staff–detainee relationships

Expected outcomes:
Those detained are treated respectfully by staff throughout the duration of their stay.

3.20 Two custody staff were on duty at all times. Although one male and one female officer were required, this was not always achieved as there was a shortage of female officers. All staff wore name badges and introduced themselves to detainees on their arrival. They addressed detainees by their full names or their given names. Staff were attentive to the needs of the detainees and we noted positive interaction between detainees and staff.

See general recommendation HE56

Diversity

Expected outcomes:
There is understanding of the diverse backgrounds of detainees and different cultural norms. Detainees are not discriminated against on the basis of race, nationality, gender or religion and there is positive promotion and understanding of diversity.

3.21 All staff had received training in race relations or diversity during their initial training course but none had been refresher trained in diversity issues since then. A Bible and Koran were available for detainee use. The smoking room could be used for prayer and a prayer mat was available if needed. A general complaints system was also used for racist complaints, but there were no notices to detainees about making such complaints. Staff said they could not recall any such complaints recently.

See general recommendations
Facility rules

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are able to feel secure in a predictable and ordered environment.

3.22 No facility rules were available to detainees or staff. There was good observation of the holding area.

3.23 There was a relatively new formal complaints procedure and signs about it were displayed in the holding room, in English only. Detainees had to ask for a form. The complaints were sent to the local senior manager who then sent them with other documentation to the contractor’s headquarters.

Services

Expected outcomes:
Services available to detainees allow them to live in a decent, non-punitive environment in which their everyday needs are met freely and without discrimination.

3.24 A variety of sandwiches and a choice of crisps were served on request. There was no provision to meet diverse dietary needs. Hot and cold drinks were available free of charge on request from a dispensing machine in the holding room office.

3.25 There was a coin/card card telephone in the holding room but this was not sufficient when the room held a lot of people. Staff could sometimes buy telephone cards or get change for detainees although they were not required to do this. Detainees were allowed to use their own mobile phones provided there was no camera. Many of the mobile phones brought in by detainees did have cameras (see general recommendation HE54).

3.26 Sanitary products and nappies were available on request.

See general recommendations

Activities

Expected outcomes:
The facility encourages activities and provides facilities to preserve and promote the mental and physical well being of detainees.

3.27 Staff shared their personal newspapers or magazines with detainees, and some novels were available. There was a plan to get more international newspapers from an airport shop. There was a television in the holding room but no dedicated children’s television and no children’s games.

See general recommendations
Preparation for release

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are able to maintain contact with family, friends, support groups, legal representatives and advisers, and are given notice of their release, transfer or removal.

3.28 Visitors were not generally allowed into the holding room due to airport security restrictions but they could telephone detainees. There were no other facilities for detainees to prepare for removal, transfer to immigration removal centres or release from the facility.

See general recommendations
Section 4

Heathrow Terminal 3

Inspected: 12 October 2005
Inspectors: Jim Gomersall
Eileen Bye
Rachel Worsley (Researcher)

Overview

4.1 The holding room is airside in Terminal 3 and consists of a single holding area, staff office and toilets. The holding room is used mainly to hold people recently arrived at the terminal and some, detained elsewhere, in the process of removal. The room was used to detain people overnight but it was not suitable for that purpose.

Escort vans and transfers

Expected outcomes:
Detainees under escort are treated courteously, provided with refreshment and comfort breaks as required and transported safely.

4.2 Most occupants of the Terminal 3 holding room were brought there by immigration officers following their arrival at the terminal. A few were brought from other places of detention to catch a flight from Terminal 3, which handled the largest number of long haul flights at Heathrow. Group 4 Securicor staff escorted those transferred from other places of detention.

4.3 Because of the destinations served by Terminal 3, some detainees were there for removal following detention elsewhere in the country. We asked a young Chinese man why he had no socks. He had been held in a northern police station on the morning of 10 October, two days previously. He had asked to see a solicitor and a doctor but had seen neither there. After more than 13 hours he was transferred, during the night, to Manchester Airport short-term holding facility, where he spent 18 hours before being brought south to nearby Harmondsworth immigration removal centre (IRC), arriving the previous evening. This was his first opportunity to have a shower and, as the IRC was able to offer him some clothes, he put the clothing he had been wearing for more than two days and nights into the laundry. Unfortunately, although he had an afternoon flight, he was collected at 6.35am for transfer to Heathrow, before the laundry was open, so he had only the insubstantial clothing he was wearing. His socks were still at Harmondsworth. He had not managed to contact any legal adviser and he said no one ever told him where he was going.

4.4 Extra detainee custody officers (DCOs) were sometimes allocated to escort people with removal directions to their flights. Terminal 3 holding room had a particular problem because it was at a distance from departure gates. Because of British Airports Authority (BAA) restrictions, the route used was through public areas, including the duty free zone. This meant that not only were escorting DCOs a long time absent, sometimes leaving only one DCO overseeing the holding room, but the journey was also an obstacle course. On the way, they
passed a cash point and, approaching some gates, a currency exchange, of which detainees wanted to take advantage.

**Recommendations**

4.5 Detainees transferred from one short-term holding facility to another over a period of days should have the opportunity to shower, change and launder clothing.

4.6 Detainees should not be removed without adequate clothing.

4.7 Detainees should be given advance notice of transfer with information about where they are going.

4.8 The holding room should be staffed by a minimum of two detainee custody officers at all times.

See also general recommendations

**Arrival and accommodation**

*Expected outcomes:*

*Detainees taken into custody are treated politely and courteously, given reasons for this course of action in a language they understand and kept in safe and decent conditions.*

4.9 The Terminal 3 holding area had recently been extended. It was now brighter and in better condition, as well as larger. As at other terminals, the holding room was staffed generally by two DCOs, male and female, subject to availability of female staff. They met immigration officers and detainees in the reception area, where detainees were searched. The free drinks machine was in the staff area. A semi-glazed screen separated staff from the holding room, where detainees sat on rows of seats, totalling 42, around the room. Other chairs were chained around a couple of tables. As seats were in rows of three or six, without arms, it was possible for detainees to stretch out on them. Two male staff were on duty during the night.

4.10 There was one payphone taking coins or cards. Male and female toilets, with baby care facilities, led off the room. The toilet had only a uniwash, designed for hand washing. A notice warned asylum seekers that support would be affected if they did not claim that status on arrival.

4.11 One young man who had spent the night in the room said it was uncomfortable. When he fell asleep, he fell off the seats. He had a jacket but, without blankets, was cold when the temperature dropped overnight. Staff were not able to control the temperature. The detainee said five or six people had spent the night there, men and women, and everyone was cold. Although he had been there more than 15 hours, he had eaten only crisps as he did not like any of the sandwiches on offer and was not feeling well. He wanted a cigarette but the area was no smoking. For a long time, he had not been able to contact his father to tell him of his likely return, as he had neither coins nor telephone card for the payphone. Eventually, staff bought cards for him, but these had been used up quickly during his long-distance call, and he was again unable to contact family about return arrangements.
Recommendation

4.12 People detained for long periods should have access to an area where they can smoke.

See also general recommendations

Legal rights

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are able to obtain expert legal advice and representation from within the facility. They can communicate with legal representatives without difficulty to progress their cases efficiently.

4.13 No free telephone call was offered and we saw no information about legal rights, apart from Immigration Advisory Service and Refugee Legal Centre telephone numbers, in small print and English only, on the back of the IS91R (summary of reasons for detention form). One detainee had no IS91R and her detention authority noted that she refused to accept the document. We saw no information in the holding rooms.

4.14 An articulate American woman demanded to see relevant immigration rules following refusal of leave to enter as a visitor, and the immigration officer produced these. However, written information about law, procedure and any legal rights was not generally available. The same young woman expressed concern that her photo had been taken without explanation of why or for how long such personal information would be kept.

See general recommendations

Casework

Expected outcomes:
Detention is carried out on the basis of individual reasons that are clearly communicated. Detention is for the minimum period necessary.

4.15 There was little casework. Passengers arrived at the terminal and, after a short period of consideration, were admitted or removed as quickly as possible. Cases involving long-term detention were usually transferred to other IND offices.

4.16 Immigration officers at the terminal were on hand to respond to any queries raised by passengers. However, they were likely to be unaware of other port removals. Consequently, those detainees sometimes remained uninformed. The young Chinese detainee whose journey we described above (see paragraph 4.3) had been told that he was being removed during the afternoon we saw him. However, he was sure that he had not been given any written removal directions specifying when. He showed us the contents of his pockets – the sum total of his accompanying property. He had only a property receipt. In fact, because necessary documents were still with the case holder in Liverpool, his removal that day had been cancelled but nobody had yet told him.

4.17 Of 730 entries in the detainee log for September 2005, an average of just over 24 per day, 255 (35%) were women and 26 (4%) were minors. There were only two possible age dispute
cases, young people who could be either side of 18. There was evidence that Terminal 3 immigration staff strove to avoid detaining children in the holding room. For example, one family who arrived in the early hours were moved to Tinsley House IRC and brought back that evening for processing, following which they were released on temporary admission subject to reporting and residence requirements. In another case, a 16-year old, apparently travelling alone, was kept separately.

4.18 Detainees were in the holding room on most nights. Any held overnight were recorded in the log on both days. These included a 68-year old man held for 21.5 hours before he was released on temporary admission, with residence and reporting requirements.

4.19 Average duration of detention was just over seven hours, ranging from five minutes to 25.5 hours.

**Recommendation**

4.20 Removal directions should be served on detainees, and any change notified, at an early stage.

*See also general recommendations*

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**Duty of care**

*Expected outcomes:*

*The centre exercises a duty of care to protect detainees from risk of harm.*

**Bullying**

4.21 Staff were not overly concerned about bullying as detainees were held in the room for short periods. CCTV coverage had recently been installed and covered the holding room and the office search area. The staffing level was two custody officers throughout a 24-hour period. There was an anti-bullying procedure flowchart in the office.

**Self-harm and suicide**

4.22 All staff were first aid trained and custody staff working in the holding room had been trained in the prevention and management of self-harm and suicide during their initial training. Nobody had been refresher trained since that time. The incidence of self-harm was low but staff took extra care with any detainee who they considered to be at risk. Observations could be recorded on the detainee’s IS91 (authority for detention form). There was good, recently installed, CCTV coverage of all the holding area.

**Use of force**

4.23 All staff were trained and regularly refreshed in the use of control and restraint (C&R). C&R was not used regularly in the Terminal 3 holding room, and there had been no instances reported in the three months before the inspection.
Detainees who had been subjected to C&R were not routinely seen by a professional healthcare worker, but they were asked if they had any injuries and if they said they had the ambulance service was called.

Health and safety

The holding room was checked daily for defects, which were reported to a supervisor and then passed on to the BAA maintenance team. Most areas of the facility were well decorated and in a good state of repair. A no smoking area was available to detainees. There were no health and safety policies, risk assessments or safe systems of work available to staff. There was only an HSE notice on health and safety in the staff office, which was inadequate. There was also no disabilities policy or designated disabilities officer known to custody staff.

The airport fire service maintained the fire equipment, and all statutory checks had been completed. There were basic fire instructions for staff in the office and there were fire instructions in the holding room, but these were in English only.

See general recommendations

Childcare and child protection

Expected outcomes:
Children are detained only in exceptional circumstances. Children’s rights and needs for care and protection are respected and met in full.

The holding room regularly held men, women and parents with children. There were no child protection policies or procedures in the facility. A flow chart in the office showed the procedure for staff to take to report child protection issues. None of the staff had received child protection training and none were checked to Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) enhanced levels. There were no additional rooms to separate families with children from the primary holding area. Some soft toys were available for children, held in the staff office. Terminal 3 holding room was unsuitable for detaining women and children together with other detainees.

Some separated minors, without carers, arrived at Terminal 3 in most weeks. They were not put in the holding room but waited in the secondary examination area, under the eye of immigration or airline staff. A member of the Terminal 3 immigration team set up to deal with minors described a good working relationship with Hillingdon social services and the Refugee Arrivals Project (RAP) a voluntary group with an office at Heathrow. RAP had received temporary funding for a young persons’ adviser project, which had been beneficial in supporting many arriving minors.

See general recommendations

Staff–detainee relationships

Expected outcomes:
Those detained are treated respectfully by staff, throughout the duration of their stay.

Two custody staff should have been on duty at all times. The requirement for one male and one female officer was not always achieved, as there was a shortage of female officers.
Indeed, during the inspection, the woman custody officer had to assist with a removal and the single male officer was left on his own for 20 minutes, in which time he admitted a woman detainee.

4.30 All staff wore name badges and introduced themselves to detainees on their arrival. They addressed detainees by their full names. Staff were attentive to the needs of the detainees and we noted positive interaction between detainees and staff. The holding room was calm and well controlled.

See general recommendation HE56

Diversity

Expected outcomes:
There is understanding of the diverse backgrounds of detainees and different cultural norms. Detainees are not discriminated against on the basis of race, nationality, gender or religion and there is positive promotion and understanding of diversity.

4.31 Custody staff had received training in race relations or diversity during their initial training course but none had had refresher training in diversity issues since then. A Bible and Koran were available for detainee use. Detainees had to pray on the floor of the holding room and a prayer mat was available if needed. The floor of the holding room had a very large inbuilt compass to aid Muslim detainees to face Mecca, which was close to the television. A general complaints system was also used for racist complaints.

Facility rules

Expected outcomes:
Detainees are able to feel secure in a predictable and ordered environment.

4.32 No facility rules were available for detainees or staff use. There was good observation in the holding area.

4.33 There was a relatively new formal complaints procedure and signs had been displayed about the procedures to be followed, in English only. Detainees had to ask for a form. The complaints were sent to the local senior manager who then sent them with other documentation to the contactor’s headquarters.

See general recommendations

Services

Expected outcomes:
Services available to detainees allow them to live in a decent non-punitive environment in which their everyday needs are met freely and without discrimination.

4.34 A variety of sandwiches and a choice of crisps were served on request. There was no provision to meet diverse dietary needs. Hot and cold drinks were available free of charge from a dispensing machine in the staff office.
4.35 There was a card/coin telephone in the holding room but this was not sufficient when the room held a lot of people. Staff were not allowed to buy telephone cards or provide change for detainees. Detainees could use their own mobile phones, provided there was no camera. Many of the mobile phones brought in by detainees had cameras (see general recommendation HE54).

4.36 Sanitary products and nappies were available on request.

**Activities**

*Expected outcomes:*

The facility encourages activities and provides facilities to preserve and promote the mental and physical well being of detainees.

4.37 No books, newspapers or magazines were available at the time of the inspection. Staff let detainees borrow their personal newspapers. There was a plan to get international newspapers from an airport shop. There was a television in the holding room but no children's games.

**Recommendation**

4.38 If children are detained, children's games should be available.

**Preparation for release**

*Expected outcomes:*

Detainees are able to maintain contact with family, friends, support groups, legal representatives and advisers, and are given notice of their release, transfer or removal.

4.39 Visitors were not allowed into the holding rooms but they could telephone detainees, if detainees could pass the number to them. There were no other facilities for detainees to prepare for removal, transfer to immigration removal centres or, on rare occasions, release from the facility.

See general recommendations
Section 5

Heathrow Terminal 4

Inspected: 12 October 2005
Inspectors: Jim Gomersall
            Eileen Bye
            Rachel Worsley (Researcher)

Overview

5.1 The holding facility is airside in Terminal 4 and consists of two separate holding rooms, staff office area and toilets. The holding rooms are used to hold people recently arrived at the terminal and some en route to removal from the country. One of the rooms is used for asylum seekers, the other room for all other detainees. The Terminal 4 holding room was not suitable for overnight accommodation. There were four detainees in the rooms during the inspection, although the number fluctuated as they came and went. The rooms were used to detain overnight but they were not suitable for overnight accommodation.

Escort vans and transfers

Expected outcomes:
Detainees under escort are treated courteously, provided with refreshment and comfort breaks as required and transported safely.

5.2 Passengers arriving at Terminal 4 who were detained were brought to the holding room by immigration officers, usually to be released or returned to their country of embarkation within hours. Group 4 Securicor escorts escorted the minority transferred to long-term detention to the airside vehicle access point, and then to a removal centre.

Arrival and accommodation

Expected outcomes:
Detainees taken into custody are treated politely and courteously, given reasons for this course of action in a language they understand and kept in safe and decent conditions.

5.3 Two detainee custody officers (DCOs), male and female, were on duty in the Terminal 4 holding area, and others came and went escorting detainees. Although there had been some recent improvements, the facility still needed deep cleaning and redecoration.

5.4 Terminal 4 differed from the other three terminals in that it had two separate holding rooms, on each side of the entrance and reception. The facilities included non-locking doors. The entrance door had a coded lock fitted but it was not yet operating. The open doors between holding rooms and reception made it seem less intimidating, and improved observation and ventilation, but had some security implications. However, the open doorways did allow
detainees free access to the free drinks machine and the single payphone, which were in the staff reception area.

5.5 The payphone had no privacy hood and the area was neither quiet nor private. The payphone accepted coins or cards. A sign, in English only, stated: ‘The officers in this holding room will not provide change to use the telephone. Requests for change or a telephone card should be made to the immigration officer who conducts your interview and will be at their discretion and convenience. The UK Immigration Service is not required or obliged to provide change for the use of the telephone.’

5.6 Although the temperature was not uncomfortable during the afternoon of the inspection, staff said it frequently got very hot during the day and was usually very cold at night. A temperature control attached to the reception wall was notional rather than effective. The ceiling vents just blew dust about. Staff had contacted British Airports Authority (BAA) to remedy these defects.

5.7 Inconspicuous notices on the back of the reception door, which detainees in the holding rooms were unlikely to see, gave telephone numbers (in English only) for the Immigration Advisory Service and Refugee Legal Centre, described Securicor complaints procedure, listed prohibited items, and advised that books were available.

5.8 One holding room was for asylum claimants and the other was for non-asylum detainees. Staff indicated that, when people were held overnight, they were likely to separate women and families into one of the two, which seemed sensible. The two rooms were similarly furnished, each with 20 unattractive seats and a central table, bin and water fountain. Both had male and female toilets. A notice in the latter informed women that they could ask for sanitary items. The facility was cleaned more than once daily, but needed deep cleaning. Only one room had a television, and that did not work. Apart from a few English-language books and magazines, there was no diversion. The only notices in the holding rooms were a warning that assailants might be prosecuted, an old 2003 notice about asylum support arrangements, and complaints information. There was no area where detainees could smoke.

5.9 A designated chief immigration officer visited the facility from time to time to check conditions and any problems staff raised, but instances were not recorded routinely.

5.10 A young Canadian woman we interviewed had imminent removal directions, by which time she would have spent more than 24 hours in Terminals 1 and 4 holding rooms. She had spent the night in the company of two male detainees, one of whom offered her his telephone card to enable her to make a call. She had been unable to sleep, partly because she was in pain from the recent removal of a wisdom tooth. She was not allowed the antibiotics she had with her, although an immigration officer had offered her a non-prescription painkiller. A DCO had given her a blanket. She had been unable to wash or change her clothes and did not know if her luggage had been held back from the connecting flight when she was detained. None of the sandwiches she had been offered was suitable for her vegan diet.

See general recommendations

**Legal rights**

*Expected outcomes:*

Detainees are able to obtain expert legal advice and representation from within the facility. They can communicate with legal representatives without difficulty to progress their cases efficiently.
5.11 Immigration officers issued detainees with decision documents, with an interpreter if necessary. These documents were generally in English only. Detainees were not offered a free telephone call and there was no visible information about how to access legal advice.

See general recommendations

Casework

Expected outcomes:
Detention is carried out on the basis of individual reasons that are clearly communicated.
Detention is for the minimum period necessary.

5.12 Terminal 4 immigration staff managed their own casework during their stay at the airport, or short duration detention, awaiting decision or removal. Casework of long duration was usually transferred to other IND casework offices.

5.13 Holding room staff alerted both IND and their own manager when a detention approached 12, 18 and 24 hours, to ensure review at an increasingly higher level. On-site immigration staff had to negotiate with external IND offices for a bed space and an escort for transfer. Supply did not always match demand. As at other terminals, when removal directions were the following day, the recurring dilemma was whether to transfer the individual overnight to an IRC, grant temporary admission to a relative’s address and risk failure to return in time for removal the next day, or to keep them in situ, to ensure timely removal.

5.14 The holding room records had 799 entries for September 2005, an average of 27 people detained per day; 292 (36.5%) were women and 55 (7%) were minors. The holding room was occupied on most nights. Records of those held overnight were entered in the daily record sheets. We noted a 16-year old girl, apparently travelling alone, held for more than 10 hours, including overnight, before she was removed following refusal of permission to enter the country.

5.15 The average duration of detention was 12 hours. In fact, during September 2005, nine people were detained in the inadequate holding facility for a three-day period of up to 42 hours. Two, held for 37.5 hours, were described as ‘escape risk’. We found 79 people held for 20 hours or more in the Terminal 4 short-term holding facility.

See general recommendations

Duty of care

The centre exercises a duty of care to protect detainees from risk of harm.

Bullying

5.16 Bullying was not a major concern for staff as detainees were held in the rooms for relatively short periods. There was no CCTV coverage but installation of a system similar to the other Heathrow holding facilities was imminent. The regular staffing level was two custody officers throughout a 24-hour period. The requirement for one male and one female officer to be on duty was not always achieved. Custody staff spent some of their time in the residential areas. There was an anti-bullying policy flowchart on the notice board in the office.
Self-harm and suicide

5.17 All staff custody staff had been trained in first aid and in the prevention and management of self-harm and suicide during their initial training. There had been no refresher training on the prevention and management of self-harm and suicide since then.

Use of force

5.18 All staff were trained and regularly refreshed in the use of control and restraint (C&R). C&R was not used regularly in the Terminal 4 holding room and there were no instances reported in the three months before the inspection.

5.19 Detainees who had been subjected to C&R were not routinely seen by a professional health worker, but they were asked if they had any injuries and if they said they had the ambulance service was called.

Health and safety

5.20 The holding rooms were checked daily for defects and any deficiencies were reported to a supervisor and then passed on to the BAA maintenance team. There were no health and safety policies, risk assessments or safe systems of work available to staff. There was an HSE notice on health and safety in the staff office, which as in other facilities was inadequate. There was also no disabilities policy or designated disabilities officer known to custody staff.

5.21 Fire equipment was maintained by the airport fire service and all statutory checks had been done. There were basic fire instructions for staff in the office but there were no fire instructions for detainees.

See general recommendations

Childcare and child protection

Expected outcomes:

Children are detained only in exceptional circumstances. Children’s rights and needs for care and protection are respected and met in full.

5.22 The holding rooms regularly held men, women and parents with children. There were no child protection procedures in the facility. A flow chart in the office showed staff what to do to report child protection issues. None of the staff had received any child protection training and none were checked to Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) enhanced level. There were a few toys and crayons for children to play with.

5.23 The room used for asylum seekers could have been used to hold women and families with children. Terminal 4 holding room was unsuitable for detaining women and children in its present form.
Recommendation

5.24 One of the two rooms should be used to hold women and families with children separately from unrelated men.

Staff–detainee relationships

*Expected outcomes:*
*Those detained are treated respectfully by staff, throughout the duration of their stay.*

5.25 Two custody staff were required to be on duty at all times, one male and one female officer, but this was not always achieved because of a shortage of female officers. All staff wore name badges and introduced themselves to detainees on their arrival. They addressed detainees by their full names. Staff were attentive to the needs of the detainees, and we saw positive interaction between detainees and staff.

*See general recommendation HE56*

Diversity

*Expected outcomes:*
*There is understanding of the diverse backgrounds of detainees and different cultural norms. Detainees are not discriminated against on the basis of race, nationality, gender or religion and there is positive promotion and understanding of diversity.*

5.26 All staff had received training in race relations or diversity during their initial training course but there had been no refresher training in diversity issues since that time. A prayer mat was available to detainees if needed and prayers could be said in a holding room or an interview room leading off the holding room. A Bible and Koran were available but there was no kiblah (compass) available for orientation for Muslim prayer. A newly initiated general complaints system was also used for racist complaints.

5.27 There was no disabilities policy or designated disabilities officer known to custody staff.

Recommendation

5.28 A kiblah (compass) should be available to Muslim detainees for orientation before prayers.

Facility rules

*Expected outcomes:*
*Detainees are able to feel secure in a predictable and ordered environment.*

5.29 No facility rules were available to detainees or staff. Observation of the holding rooms was good but no CCTV cameras were installed at the time of the inspection.
5.30 There was a new formal complaints procedure and signs displayed in the holding rooms explained this to detainees, but in English only. Detainees had to ask for a form. The complaints were sent to the local senior manager who then sent them with other documentation to the contactor’s headquarters.

5.31 There was a major physical security weakness in the facility. The doors into each holding area could not be locked so detainees had permanent access to the staff office area. The door from the staff office to the main corridor leading to the immigration offices and arrivals hall also could not be secured. Any individual or group of detainees could easily force an exit into sensitive areas of the terminal.

**Recommendation**

5.32 The holding room doors and the outer door should be made secure as soon as possible.

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**Services**

*Expected outcomes:*

*Services available to detainees allow them to live in a decent non-punitive environment in which their everyday needs are met freely and without discrimination.*

5.33 A small range of sandwiches and a choice of crisps were handed out on request. There was no provision to meet diverse dietary needs. Hot and cold drinks were available free of charge from a dispensing machine in the staff reception area in the front of the office. Children could use this machine, with the risk of scalding from hot drinks.

5.34 There was a card/coin telephone in the staff reception area in the front of the office but this was not sufficient when the room held a lot of people. The telephone was in the staff office area. Officers were unable to buy telephone cards or provide change to detainees. Cases of need were referred to the immigration team. Detainees could use their own mobile phones provided there was no camera, but many of the mobile phones brought in by detainees did have a camera (see general recommendation HE54).

5.35 Sanitary products and nappies were available on request.

**Recommendations**

5.36 Children should not have access to the hot drink dispensing machine.

5.37 Telephones should be relocated inside the holding rooms.

*See also general recommendations*

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**Activities**

*Expected outcomes:*

*The facility encourages activities and provides facilities to preserve and promote the mental and physical well being of detainees.*
5.38 Some English language novels were available but no newspapers or magazines. There was a plan to get more international newspapers from an airport shop. There was a television in one of the two holding rooms, although it did not work, and there was none in the other holding room. There were no children’s games available, apart from a few toys and crayons.

Recommendations

5.39 Children’s games should be available.

5.40 Both holding rooms should have working televisions.

Preparation for release

**Expected outcomes:**

*Detainees are able to maintain contact with family, friends, support groups, legal representatives and advisers, and are given notice of their release, transfer or removal.*

5.41 Visitors were not allowed into the holding rooms but they could telephone detainees. There were no facilities for detainees to prepare for removal, transfer to immigration removal centres or, on rare occasions, release from the facility.

See general recommendations
Section 6: Recommendations and good practice

General recommendation

To the Home Secretary

6.1 The Independent Monitoring Board National Council should be enabled to implement a mechanism for regular, independent monitoring of short-term holding centres as soon as possible. (HE25)

General recommendations

To the Director General, Immigration and Nationality Directorate

6.2 IND should take steps to reduce the use of force and the number of failed removals, by
   • ensuring that those about to be removed have access to information and advice about their removal
   • requiring risk assessments to be carried out on each detainee about to be removed, and ensuring in-flight escorts for those identified as a risk. (HE26)

6.3 All holding facilities holding children should have a comprehensive child protection policy agreed with the local area child protection committee. Staff in contact with children should receive appropriate training, and all staff should undergo enhanced Criminal Records Bureau (CRB) checks. (HE27)

6.4 On-site senior immigration managers should document supervision visits to the holding rooms. (HE28)

6.5 All detainees claiming to be under 18 should be treated as such until independent professional examination confirms otherwise. (HE29)

6.6 Detainees should not be held for substantial periods or overnight in accommodation that lacks adequate sleeping, washing, exercise and dining facilities. (HE30)

6.7 Women and families with children should be held in appropriate accommodation separate from unrelated male detainees. (HE31)

6.8 The IS91 (authority to detain form) and related documentation should be fully completed. It should include information about risk or special needs known to detaining authorities, including medication, and details of all successive places of detention, including police stations. (HE32)
6.9 Written reasons for detention should be provided in a language the detainee can understand at the time of detention. (HE33)

6.10 Detainees should always be examined medically after every incident of control and restraint, and any injuries should be recorded. IND should monitor trends and, where necessary, commission investigations. (HE34)

6.11 Detainees should receive written information about the place of detention and what will happen next in a language they understand. (HE35)

6.12 There should be arrangements to allow detainees to recover or arrange for the disposal of their property. Detainees should be given correct information, at an early stage, about these arrangements and any limitations that apply at each destination. (HE36)

**General recommendations**

**To the facility manager**

6.13 Custodial staff should receive refresher training in anti-bullying and suicide and self-harm prevention, and adequate policies and procedures should be in place. (HE37)

6.14 All detainees should have healthcare checks within 24 hours of arrival, and a healthcare practitioner should visit the facility every day. (HE38)

6.15 General information about legal rights, including how to apply for bail and how to find competent and qualified legal advice, should be available to detainees in a range of common languages. (HE39)

6.16 Information available in terminal holding rooms should include immigration rules relating to people seeking to enter the UK as visitors. (HE40)

6.17 Every holding room should have a race relations and diversity policy. (HE41)

6.18 Holding rooms should contain newspapers, books, notices and other reading material in different languages, including basic information on the facility, health and safety procedures, and fire instruction notices. (HE42)

6.19 Health and safety risk assessments should be produced and copies kept in each facility. (HE43)

6.20 Copies of all control and restraint incident reports should be kept in every holding room. (HE44)

6.21 Detainees should be informed of the availability of holy books and other religious artefacts. (HE45)

6.22 Detainees should be aware of how to make a racist incident complaint and assisted to do so. (HE46)
6.23 There should be an assessment of the impact of policies on different religious, ethnic and cultural groups. (HE47)

6.24 The range of available food should be expanded to include provision for detainees with cultural or dietary needs. (HE48)

6.25 There should be a disability policy and a designated disabilities officer for every holding room. (HE49)

6.26 Staff should receive regular refresher training in diversity issues. (HE50)

6.27 Detainees should be able to contact legal representatives without charge. (HE51)

6.28 Detainees should be offered a free telephone call on arrival. (HE52)

6.29 All detainees should be able to use a payphone, in privacy, and there should be arrangements to change money or provide cards. (HE53)

6.30 Multi-SIM non-camera mobile phones should be available for detainees not able to use a personal mobile. (HE54)

6.31 All holding rooms should be deep cleaned and redecorated regularly. (HE55)

6.32 Holding rooms should have a minimum of two staff on duty when detainees are present, and a female detainee custody officer should always be on duty when women or children are detained. (HE56)

Other recommendations

Section 1: Queen’s Building

6.33 The Immigration and Nationality Directorate (IND) should expand the work of the removals facilitation unit (RFU) so that it is available to all those facing removal at Heathrow, and consider replicating it at other relevant ports and airports. (1.23)

6.34 IND should ensure that all detainees have the opportunity of effective contact with knowledgeable immigration staff before their removal. (1.24)

6.35 Heaters in the holding rooms should be made safe. (1.38)

6.36 The holding rooms and other areas should be deep cleaned and professional fumigation advice sought. (1.39)

6.37 Children should not be detained in the existing holding facility in Queen’s Building. (1.43)

6.38 There should be an electronic means of raising the alarm in an emergency in the holding rooms. (1.48)

6.39 The semi-secure rooms used to hold violent detainees should be made fit for purpose. (1.49)
6.40 Toilets should be easily accessible by staff in an emergency. (1.50)

6.41 Detainees should not be isolated in the two semi-secure rooms without authorisation from a senior Immigration and Nationality Directorate manager. (1.51)

6.42 If children are detained, they should not have access to the hot drink dispensing machine. (1.55)

6.43 A change machine should be installed. (1.56)

6.44 If children are detained, children's games should be available. (1.58)

6.45 A television should be available in a non-smoking room. (1.59)

Section 2: Terminal 1

6.46 The holding room should be redecorated. (2.10)

6.47 The smoking room should be cleaned and redecorated. (2.22)

6.48 There should be a secondary exit from the office. (2.28)

6.49 If detained, children should not have access to the hot drink dispensing machine. (2.32)

6.50 If children are detained, children's games should be available. (2.34)

6.51 An appropriately sized property store should be available. (2.36)

Section 4: Terminal 3

6.52 Detainees transferred from one short-term holding facility to another over a period of days should have the opportunity to shower, change and launder clothing. (4.5)

6.53 Detainees should not be removed without adequate clothing. (4.6)

6.54 Detainees should be given advance notice of transfer with information about where they are going. (4.7)

6.55 The holding room should be staffed by a minimum of two detainee custody officers at all times. (4.8)

6.56 People detained for long periods should have access to an area where they can smoke. (4.12)

6.57 Removal directions should be served on detainees, and any change notified, at an early stage. (4.20)

6.58 If children are detained, children's games should be available. (4.38)
Section 5: Terminal 4

6.59 One of the two rooms should be used to hold women and families with children separately from unrelated men. (5.24)

6.60 A kiblah (compass) should be available to Muslim detainees for orientation before prayers. (5.28)

6.61 The holding room doors and the outer door should be made secure as soon as possible. (5.32)

6.62 Children should not have access to the hot drink dispensing machine. (5.36)

6.63 Telephones should be relocated inside the holding rooms. (5.37)

6.64 Children’s games should be available. (5.39)

6.65 Both holding rooms should have working televisions. (5.40)

Good practice

6.66 The management and monitoring of all the facilities by the on-site service delivery manager was impressive. (HE57)