

EUROPOL



**TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE
EUROPEAN UNION:**

**SITUATION AND TRENDS
REPORT (TE-SAT)**

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1. INTRODUCTION	4
2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY	4
3. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE EU.....	8
3.1. SEPARATISM TERRORISM	8
3.1.1. BASQUE SEPARATISM- EUZKADI TA ASKATASUNA (E.T.A).....	8
3.1.2. NORTHERN IRELAND	12
3.1.3. CORSICAN SEPARATISM.....	14
3.2. ANARCHIST TERRORIST MOVEMENTS	15
3.3. CRIMES IN FURTHERANCE OF ANIMAL RIGHTS - ECO TERRORISM	18
3.4. BIO TERRORISM	18
3.5. CYBER TERRORISM.....	19
3.6. LEFT-WING extremism	19
3.7. RIGHT-WING TERRORISM.....	22
4. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM.....	23
4.1. FUNDAMENTALIST JIHADIST TERRORISM	23
4.2. TURKISH-KURD GROUPS	42

1. INTRODUCTION

The objective of this report is to outline the terrorism situation in the European Union over the last twelve months and analyse the trends established. The report is intended to inform the European Parliament on the phenomenon of terrorism targeting the Member States.

This is an open report based on contributions from the Member States complemented where necessary from open source material.

An overview of terrorist activities is offered in two parts, the first of which relates to activities carried out by various indigenous groups within the European Union Member States, while the second part focuses on international terrorist activities affecting the European-Union.

2. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The terrorist threat to the European-Union is posed by a wide number of groups and organisations ranging from international Jihadist networks and large scale Nationalist groups to violent political extremist activists, generally involved in acts of sabotage and criminal damage.

While the European Union as an entity might not be subject to a specific threat from **al-Qaeda** and/or its affiliates, these groups are targeting a number of Member States that are perceived as enemies of Islam and designated as “legitimate” targets due to their involvement in Iraq or in Afghanistan or to specific factors such as the law banning Islamic veil in French schools. As such, France, Germany, Italy, Poland, Spain and the United Kingdom, (as well as other countries, including the United States and Israel) have been specifically designated by **al-Qaeda** leadership.

Within the European Union, United-Kingdom appears to be a primary target for **al-Qaeda** and/or its affiliates as demonstrated by the bomb attacks in Istanbul in November 2003 against the British Consulate and the HSBC bank which targeted United Kingdom interests in Turkey; and by the kidnapping and murder of a number of its nationals in Saudi Arabia and in Iraq. The disruption through law enforcement operations of terrorist cells has evidenced plans for large scale attacks within the United Kingdom.

Moreover the bomb attacks in Madrid in March 2004 and the disruption of a number of terrorist cells in other Member States demonstrate the continuous will of **al-Qaeda** and/or affiliates to strike within the European Union boundaries and influence Governments policies and the day to day life of its inhabitants. The will of some of these terrorists to use chemical devices appears to be consistent; however the most favoured method still relies on suicide bombers as demonstrated in a string of attacks in Russia in August, which culminated with the Beslan hostage taking.

A number of foreigners including nationals from various Member States have been kidnapped and/or murdered in Iraq, in Saudi Arabia and in Afghanistan. These attacks aim both at influencing national policies in these regions and destabilising local powers by depriving the population of essential aid from Non Governmental Organisations and the industry of skilled manpower.

The sheer number of arrests of Islamic terrorists or supporters in the European Union is also an indicator that Europe is not only a target for **al-Qaeda** and other Jihadist groups but it is also to be considered as place for recruitment and logistical support for Jihad in Afghanistan, Iraq and Chechnya. Fully trained fighters returning from these fighting grounds are a potential threat due to their level of training.

Interesting developments in the field of Islamic extremist activities, over the period of reporting, include the increasing number of Moroccan nationals subject to investigative action within Member States, as well as the fact that recent disruptive activity in more than one Member State has revealed active extremist cells of

European Union citizens of second generation Pakistani origin.

Furthermore, the coalition intervention in Iraq and the Middle-East crisis have led to a mounting frustration within Muslim communities and generated a rise of racists and anti Semitic actions in some countries; however no terrorist attacks in Member States have been reported in relation to this.

Law enforcement successes and very close cooperation between Spain and France against the **ETA** have brought a very noticeable decline in the number of attacks committed by the organisation in Spain, the lowest figures since 1973. Furthermore the impact of the recent arrests early October in France of some of the leading figures of **ETA** and the discovery of seven caches still need to be assessed. If the finds prove to be significant, the assessment may be that this organisation could face difficulties in reorganising networks.

The most significant Irish terrorist organisation, the **Provisional IRA** (PIRA) remains committed to the political process and continue to observe a cessation of military activities. It is suspected however that this organisation in spite of three acts of weapons decommissioning retains military capabilities.

The main dissident groups, the **Real IRA** (RIRA) and the **Continuity IRA** (CIRA) currently remain opposed to the political process and seek to carry out terrorist attacks. The 23rd International Days of Corte, the annual meeting of the Corsica nationalists in August 2004 registered one of the weakest ever recorded participation. In the absence of political perspectives, the nationalists are in the process of starting arm wrestling" with the French Government.

Anarchist terrorism is still active in parts of the European Union as demonstrated by the incendiary letter bomb campaign launched in December 2003 by the Italian **Federazione Anarchica Informale** which targeted European institutions and representatives. A number of low scale Anarchist attacks were committed in Greece prior to the Olympic Games 2004; however, the efficiency of the security measures put in place by the Greek authorities prevented any major incident during the tenure of the Games.

The Spanish left-wing group **Revolutionary Armed Groups First of October (GRAPO)** does not appear to have recovered its capabilities since its command structure was dismantled in 2002.

In Italy, law enforcement operations were successful against the Red Brigades-PCC with the disruption of a cell in the fall of 2003. However other Marxist Leninist groups are still maintaining low scale activities.

Although no right-wing terrorist attacks have been reported, some activities have been identified

The Kurdish **KONGRA Gel** is experiencing a number of difficulties and since its registration on the European list of proscribed terrorist organisations has had to face strong internal dissensions at the highest level resulting in the exclusion of a key figure of the organisation. Since June 2004, an outbreak of confrontations between the Kurdish guerrillas and the Turkish security forces has been noted. Kurdish activists were also arrested in Turkey while preparing to commit attacks

Registered on the list of terrorist organizations established by the European Union, **DHKP / C** pursues its activities in the European-Union with for example a campaign of staggered hunger strikes organized in several European countries. It should be noted however that, the organization has been involved in 2004 in a string of terrorist attacks in Turkey.

3. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE EU

3.1 SEPARATISM TERRORISM

3.1.2 BASQUE SEPARATISM- EUZKADI TA ASKATASUNA (ETA)

The strong co-operation between Spain and France has resulted in ongoing successes of law enforcement operations against **ETA**. The organisation is presently experiencing a difficult situation, in the course of last year its military apparatus has been severely weakened. The logistics networks as well as various sub-apparatus, notably the procurement and information units, have been weakened and the operative capacity has been considerably reduced due to successive disbanding of command units and detention of activists which apparently led to temporary abortion of many attack projects planned by the organisation.

Belgium

In March.2004, a police patrol intercepted a vehicle bearing a fake Belgian license plate.

The car and the plates had been stolen in France. The two occupants of the car were the subject of international arrests warrants issued by Spanish authorities for **ETA** related terrorist related offences. Recovered from the car were forged identity documents, licence plates and cash.

France

The Basque separatist movement **ETA** is still considering the French territory, as a rear base used by its leaders for their criminal activities as demonstrated by the arrest in July 2004 of two members of the logistic apparatus of "**ETA**". While in the short term **ETA** does not appear to be willing to modify its strategy of "a unique front" which concentrates the major terrorist activity in the Spanish part of "Euskal Herria", the "Basque homeland" this attitude is not based on a fundamental political difference. For several years **ETA** and its supporters have considered France and Spain equally as "oppressors" of the "Basque people".

This current attitude towards France, limited to "Kale Borroka"¹ is linked to lack of support of the French Basque population for the positions defended by "**ETA**"- to the need for the organization to protect its logistic infrastructures implanted on French soil from an increased repression.

On an operational level, **ETA** appears to be confronted with a need to recruit and train activists, considering that in 2002 and 2003 respectively. 64 and 48 of its members were arrested in France. However to renew its workforce **ETA** can still rely on the "pool" constituted by the anarcho-nationalists who are traditionally involved within the framework of the "Kale Borroka" – street violence -.

¹ Basque term for acts of street violence

On 3rd October 2004, law enforcement operations led to the dismantling of the logistic apparatus of **ETA** through a series of operations in the south of France. A total of 7 hiding places of the terrorist organization were found and 17 persons were arrested and put in police custody. Three sophisticated subterranean hiding places belonging to **ETA** and containing an important stock of weapons, ammunitions and explosives including two Soviet made MANPAD in perfect working condition were discovered. Four other addresses, identified as hiding places, were searched and led to the discovery of documentation belonging to the terrorist organization. Furthermore two historic and charismatic members of **ETA**, the presumed leader of the political apparatus and the main responsible for the legal commando groups were arrested. Since the beginning of the 2004, 49 members of the terrorist organization were arrested in France

To date, 143 individuals, are imprisoned in France among whom 126 Spanish, members of "Military **ETA**". Some of them continue to periodically lead movements of protest to denounce their conditions of detention, the application of measures of estrangement towards Spain and ask for their grouping in the French Basque-Country.

Spain

The changes that have been observed lately, mainly due to the so-called 'armed truce' which was declared in September 1998, have affected the organization's political and military action.

On an operational level, there have been many changes, most of which aim at safeguarding the organization's invulnerability. In their wish to guarantee the continuation of its organic structures and its operational capacity, the organization's leaders gave more operative autonomy to the armed commands and eliminated the individuals acting as 'liaisons', believed to be weak links who could compromise the command's safety.

The organization's terrorist actions display an indiscriminate choice of targets, although all of them still belong to certain social, political, financial and institutional groups (the judiciary, the security forces, the mass media, politicians and businessmen).

Another strategic change is the projection of the organization's armed struggle to France; although this is not foreseen to happen in the short term, because of the negative consequences it would have for the organization's leadership in France, it is something to be considered.

The organization is showing tendencies of expanding in other European countries, such as Germany, Italy, Portugal, the Netherlands and Belgium, by sending militants who would establish an infrastructure under cover of legitimate activities. It is also creating new structures in Central America. The expulsion of approximately 20 **ETA** militants from Mexico in the past 6 years resulted in a move towards other Central American countries, such as Venezuela, Nicaragua, the Dominican Republic, Belize, etc.

Currently, the organisation is believed to be facing difficulties: in the past year, its logistical apparatus has been severely disrupted and its operational capacity has been affected by the break up of armed commands and the arrests of activists in France and Spain.

However, the recruitment of large numbers of young people provides the organization with important human potential, to which are added veteran militants recalled from Latin America.

On a political level, the changes that have been observed lately originate from the time before the declaration of the 'armed truce' and the signing of the Lizarra Pact.

3.1.2 NORTHERN IRELAND

The political process is still ongoing in Northern Ireland and the main participants appear to be committed to see its success. However some radical elements, such as the **Continuity IRA (CIRA)** and the **Real IRA (RIRA)**, remain active and capable of attempting to disrupt the peace process.

Ireland

Republican groups

Since the last assessment the situation in relation to **Provisional IRA** remains unchanged in terms of organisational structures and leadership which retains firm control of the organisation. There are strong indications that **PIRA** will commit themselves to further acts of decommissioning in order to reactivate the Stormont assembly, leading to the restoration of devolved government in Northern Ireland.

The three members of **PIRA** arrested and prosecuted in Colombia on suspicion of having provided training to local terror group are still in Colombia pending the Colombian Attorney General's appeal against their acquittal.

Continuity IRA remains the only group not committed to the ceasefire. They are anxious to recruit new members to the organisation to bolster their endeavours, criminal and subversive. They have the capability to carry out sporadic acts and lack the capacity for a prolonged terrorist campaign.

Real IRA (RIRA) in the main concentrate on their criminal endeavours. That being said they continue to seek new members to their organisation. **RIRA** has the ability to carry out limited operations and remain opposed to the peace process.

United Kingdom

Republican groups

The most significant Irish Terrorist organisation, the Provisional IRA (PIRA) remains committed to the political process and continue to observe a cessation of military activity. However, the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC), the organisation charged by the UK and Irish Governments to report on paramilitary activity in Northern Ireland, published a report in April 2004 stating that PIRA continue to engage in “punishment beatings and shootings”.

PIRA have carried out three acts of weapons decommissioning. It is assessed that PIRA remains committed to the political process. However, PIRA retains the capacity to return to violence.

The main dissident republican groups, the **Real IRA (RIRA)** and the **Continuity IRA (CIRA)** currently remain opposed to the political process and continue to seek to carry out terrorist attacks. In the past twelve months, both **RIRA** and **CIRA** have carried out attacks in Northern Ireland including vehicle borne improvised explosive devices, postal threats and shooting attacks. Despite **RIRA** and **CIRA**'s intent to attack the UK mainland, security force successes have led to both organisations suffering from a limited capability to do so. Both **RIRA** and **CIRA** will continue to seek to develop their capability and may attempt to exploit criminal and smuggling associations to carry out an attack.

Loyalist groups

Loyalist terrorist groups remain technically on ceasefire, although low-level paramilitary activity continues in Northern Ireland. This includes punishment shootings and beatings against members of the loyalist and republican communities.

Germany

An Irish national, was sentenced in Germany on 23rd December 2003 to six years and five months of prison for attempt of joint murder in conjunction with detonation of explosive. Together with other **PIRA** members, he had formed a so-called “Active Service Unit (ASU)” in May/June 1996 that carried out an attack on the British “Quebec Barracks” in Osnabrück on 28th June 1996, using a home-made mortar.

3.1.3 CORSICAN SEPARATISM

France

In 2004, the 23rd International Days of Corte² registered one of the weakest ever recorded participation. In this occasion, the leaders of the main independent block "*Corsica Nazione*" and "*Indipendenza*" confirmed their intention to merge and create one main group. They also reaffirmed the necessity of strengthening the union by integrating all the nationalist organizations within a “temporary National Assembly” elected by a Corsican electorate. In front of a demobilized and divided movement, the nationalist leaders raised the tone during the closing session of the meeting.

² The annual meeting of the nationalists taking place every year in August

On 24th August 2004, a group calling itself the "*FLNC of 22 October*" claimed responsibility for an attack on 14th July 2004 against an official building and the sending of a warning mail to an architect from Marseilles entrusted by a Corsican municipality in the town urban planning. These underground nationalists, who have claimed responsibility for 29 attacks since the beginning of 2004, stated that it was a clear message that they will not allow Corsican ground to be delivered to speculators.

In total, 116 attacks and attempted attacks using explosives have been committed between 1st January and 6th September 2004. Responsibility for 29 was claimed by the "*FLNC of 22 October*" and 7 by "*I Clandestini Corsi*"³

To date, 101 persons have been arrested since January 2004 within the framework of terrorism related cases. (122 arrests had been recorded during year 2003).

3.2 ANARCHIST TERRORIST MOVEMENTS

During the review period, letter bombs were posted to a number of European Union (EU) institutions by an Italian anarchist group, Federazione Anarchica Informale. The group also stated that EU institutions, individuals connected with the EU and NATO remained targets. The incidents are subject to a Europol Target Group, within an AWF, Operation Santa Claus.

Belgium

On 5th January 2004, a staff member at the European Parliament opened an envelope that was addressed to Mr. Pöttering (PPE chairman). The envelope immediately caught fire. This envelop had been mailed in Bologna, Italy

³, 200 attacks were committed between 1st January and 31st August 2003 among which 80 in July and August

Similar devices were intercepted by the Security department of the European Parliament, again mailed in Bologna.

The police investigation has led the investigators to the trail of the Italian group **Federazione Anarchica Informale**.

France

The anarchistic groups are attracted by the use of excessive of violence but show little activity. The perspective of a renewal of violent actions should not be excluded bearing in mind the recent actions realized and claimed by Italian anarchists, end of 2003 / early 2004, targeting the European institutions. This anarchist violence with a libertarian tendency shows itself regularly in Spain and in Greece which form with Italy a sort of “Mediterranean triangle” of the anarchistic violence.

To date, France has not been affected by these violent actions; nevertheless, the possibility that the country will experience anarchist terrorist attacks cannot be ignored.

Greece

Activity in relation to anarchist groups in Greece became apparent in 2004 when small-scale improvised explosive devices were planted. It would appear that these activities are triggered as a result of domestic or international events.

Italy

Of particular worry is the activism of the anarchic-insurrectionist movements, which exhibited a significant change in direction in 2003 with the appearance of the new group, called **F.A.I.—Federazione Anarchica Informale**. This coincided with the beginning of a subversive campaign of numerous arsons and minor bomb attacks with high media impact with targeting politicians and institutions⁴. The investigations carried out by the Carabinieri led to the arrest of several anarchists, including the person that had carried out threatening acts targeting the President of the European Commission Romano Prodi and Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi.

Spain

The motivation for the terrorist actions by anarchists in Spain, are (a) the imprisonment of **ORAI** members in Spanish jails, (b) the continuing validity of the FIES-CD (Specially Monitored Prison Files) system and (c) solidarity to anarchists detained in Spain and abroad. This terrorist activity has mainly targeted public buildings, the mass media, estate agents, the electricity infrastructure, banks, shops, jails, as well as embassies and consulates. Similarities between explosive devices attributed to the various anarchist groups lead to the conclusions that the persons who manufactured them were either connected or interacting or had access to common sources of information⁵. The majority of attacks were carried out around dates holding a special significance for the anarchist movement.

⁴ The most common acts are the sending of parcel bombs or threatening letters to politicians or public offices and bomb attacks against Police headquarters.

⁵ EUROPOL comment: The Anarchist cookbook, containing so-called recipes for bomb-making is one example of common information sources. The 'cookbook' is widely and freely available via the internet.

The threat posed by anarchist groups has been reduced, as a result of police operations, which led to the dismantling of three anarchist cells that had been responsible for the vast majority of terrorist actions perpetrated in Spain in the past years. However, given that the circumstances motivating this type of attack are still present, it can be predicted that such actions will continue in the future.

The areas most prone to the activities of new violent anarchist-insurrectionist groups or cells are still the provinces of Madrid, Barcelona, Valencia and Burgos.

3.3 CRIMES IN FURTHERANCE OF ANIMAL RIGHTS - ECO TERRORISM

Hungary

The number of crimes committed in furtherance of animal rights is very low in Hungary. The cases are isolated and there is no organized group of perpetrators.

Italy

The subversive climate in Italy may also have motivated the anarchic-environmentalist groups that carried out attacks and acts of sabotage against telephone repeaters and electricity pylons in the name of the well-known anarchist-environmentalist currently detained in Switzerland.

3.4 BIO TERRORISM

Belgium

On 20th July 2004, eight suspicious letters arrived at several official locations in Brussels:

The letters contained an ochre-coloured chemical substance that caused eye-itching and breathing problems. Preliminary tests have shown that this substance was adamsite (phenarsasine). Some of the envelopes contained a threat letter written in (very poor) English, demanding that two recently convicted Islamic extremists are released within that month.

3.5 CYBER TERRORISM

No case of cyber terrorism has been reported by the Member States.

3.6 LEFT-WING extremism

France

In France, extreme left violence became marginal from 1987 on. In 2004, 6 actions recorded to day confirm this tendency, except that these demonstrations of violence are henceforth more acts of hostility than real initiatives of terrorist inspiration. After 17 years of confinement, the release, for health reasons, of a member of the dismantled terrorist organization "**Direct Action**", had no incidence beyond its relational circle.

Germany

On 28th September 2004, a German Regional Court sentenced a former **Red Army Faction** member to a total prison term of 12 years for being an accessory to attempt of murder in 32 cases and intentional detonation of explosive.

“Militante Gruppe (MG)“

To date, 23 attacks have been attributed to the so called “**Militante Gruppe (MG)**”. The most recent arson attacks in Berlin were all motivated by the fundamental topic of “social policy” reforms within Germany and need to be seen as part of the campaign by **MG** against the present cuts in social services.

The modus operandi of this group appears to favour arson attacks, and it cannot be discounted that property-oriented attacks on institutions of symbolic value will continue.

Greece

In spite of a small number of low scale attacks, terrorism in Greece has significantly decreased in direct relation with the disruption of the two most potent terrorist organisations. It must be pointed out that there was absolutely no terrorist activity, during and after the Olympic Games (June to September 2004).

‘Revolutionary Organization 17 November’ (E.O. 17N)

In the summer of 2002, the police arrested 21 members or individuals linked to the ‘**Revolutionary Organization 17 November**’ and recovered the organization’s arsenal. The trial of these individuals for their involvement in the organization was completed on 17th December 2003; 15 members of the organization received either or long-term sentences, while 4 of its members were found innocent. The organization is now considered as being dismantled.

‘Revolutionary People’s Struggle’ (ELA)

The trial of leading figures from the terrorist organization ‘**Revolutionary People’s Struggle**’ (ELA) resulted in the conviction and subsequent sentencing of four suspects. The organization has been inactive since 1995.

A small number of Terrorist incidents occurred during the period under review in this document

Italy

Recent operations aimed at striking a hard blow against the **Red Brigades-PCC** are underway. The investigations that followed the arrest of an individual identified a group which was dismantled in the autumn of 2003 with the arrest of 10 militants and the localization of two hideouts of the organization.

Further, Marxist terrorist groups such as the **Cellule di Offensive Rivoluzionaria**, the **Nuclei Comunisti Rivoluzionari--per il partito**, continue their activity with low-profile attacks. Other groups, such as the **CARC (Comitati di Appoggio alla Resistenza per il Comunismo)**, although not directly responsible for criminal acts, follow a subversive ideology.

Spain

The murder of an officer of a Cuerpo Nacional de Policía in Madrid, immediately following the arrest in France of one of the organization's leaders demonstrates that this organization is not afraid to employ violent action. Further violent acts cannot be ruled out.

It is very probable that the **GRAPO** may concentrate future actions around their main objective, i.e. to obtain financial resources.

However, possibility exists that **GRAPO** will also carry out actions against the Spanish state's financial infrastructure, faithful to the anti-establishment line set by the political party behind the terrorist organization, the PCE.

There have been no incidents in the period between 1st September 2003 and 1st September 2004

Sweden

The rate of political manifestations within the autonomous movement has decreased during the last year. At the same time the rate of reported anti-fascist criminality committed by members in the autonomous movement has increased. The number of reported crimes committed by anti-fascist activists has increased steadily since 1998. After the violent anti-globalisation riots during the European Union Gothenburg summit of June 2001, the autonomous movement in Sweden has had difficulties to mobilise en masse. On a local level, however, the threat from anti-fascist groups has remained steady during the period under review.

3.7 RIGHT-WING TERRORISM

In spite of a number of racist and anti Semitic actions in Member States linked to a number of active neo-Nazi groups, no acts of right-wing terrorism or activities of right-wing terrorist organisations have been reported by Member States. The reported racist and anti Semitic attacks may be connected with the current situation in Palestine.

Sweden

The number of reported crimes committed by White Power supporters has slightly increased in the last years. The White Power organisations continue to be generally more active and more visible. A general trend of less conflict and more co-operation and co-ordination between different groups has been observed. The amounts of propaganda spread by these organisations also continue to increase.

A general and very clear trend as far as extremist groups are concerned, is the increasing number of violent confrontations between extreme left and extreme right groups and activists.

4. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

While the scope of international terrorism which could impact on the European Union is very wide, no mention was made in the contributions received of terrorist movements in Latin America or in Asia and Africa.

Due to the terrorist acts in Madrid in March 2004, and the sheer number of Islamic cells dismantled throughout Europe (some of which were actively preparing attacks), the focus of the threat from international terrorism is still concentrated on Islamic groups affiliated to or inspired by **al-Qaeda**. These groups are active in the European Union, which can still be considered as a potential target, a recruiting ground and a logistical base.

4.1 FUNDAMENTALIST JIHADIST TERRORISM

Anti Western terrorism inspired by **al-Qaeda** and its affiliates or followers has now spread to Iraq, even though some groups fighting the Coalition forces in Iraq appear not to have a religious motivation, so Iraq has been included in this section as a separate subject. In former Te-Sat reports Iraq was covered under the heading of the Middle East.

The threat from **al-Qaeda** and its affiliates and followers appears to be the main concern for the security of the European-Union. However the assessment of the threat level varies depending on the Member States, some of which still consider that they are under no direct threat but could witness attacks on their territory against foreign targets such as US or Jewish interests.

Austria

Ethnic differentiation within the Islamic extremist scene is fading out and that a small minority of Muslims of the second and third generation are now following Salafi ideology. These individuals have access to propaganda material praising the Jihad and they have developed contacts abroad. Furthermore, some of them appear to be acting clandestinely, thus it is not impossible that individuals belonging to this sphere would be recruited for terrorist activities. However, investigations did not reveal concrete information on a possible network in Austria or on the potential support of the terrorist resistance in Iraq from within the Austrian Territory.

Within the Bosnian community different groups supporting a neo-fundamentalist interpretation of Wahhabism were identified in Austria: Vienna, Linz and Graz.

During the period covered by this document, an increase of activities both in Austria and abroad was noted. Intensification of Dawa activities among the Muslim population, some conversion attempts to fundamentalist Islam as well as the propagation of the Sharia law was reported. The main activities were consisting in holding religious courses and religious contests which were mainly conceived for young adults. Additionally, some occasional lectures were held by prominent international representatives of the Bosnian Islamic community. Austria seems to become a centre for Bosnian youth organisations. However, there is no evidence that the security of any Austrian or European interests are under any threat.

Figures relating to illegal immigration from the Russian Federation show that in the first eight months of this year about 3.800 people entered Austria illegally and applied for Asylum. While the figures for 2003 were 6800 persons. The vast majority of them, about 80% belong to the Chechen ethnic group. Among the Chechens a few sympathisers of groups close to Shamil Basayev, as well as some followers of the former Chechen president Aslan Mashadov could be identified.

Mashadow orchestrated the Guerrilla war in Chechnya in 1994 and is among the most influential decision maker of the Chechen resistance. Aslan Mashadov maintains contacts within Europe and, he is presumably building up a network of Chechen Organisations within the European Union with the help of his former government members. There is a risk that a Chechen structures reinforced by extremists potentially living in Austria develops and would support the resistance in Chechnya.

A Chechen suspected of kidnapping, membership of criminal band as well as illegal possession of arms and explosives was extradited to Russia beginning of 2004

Some individuals and one organisation with connections to Austria were mentioned in the EU decree issued in application of the UN Security Council resolution 1267 and in the list attached to it. The verifications which followed did not result in any freezing of assets. The investigations carried did not reveal any further information on financing of terrorism via the individuals or the organisation named. Most of the references were outdated or no assets in connection to them were found in Austria.

Within the reporting period, several cases of suspected financing of terrorism based on suspicions reported by banks or, on requests, by foreign security services, were investigated. Eventually, no accounts have been blocked nor any money being transferred been frozen as the original suspicions could not be substantiated and confirmed.

The investigations on the suspicions of financing of terrorism were difficult to carry out in particular with regard to the international lists and the EU list. The various reasons for this difficulty range from the lack of personal data and the absence of background information to the names and individuals on the list. In many cases it is not possible to recognise on which country's request a specific individual or organisation was put on the list or what ground the suspicions for terrorism were based on.

Belgium

A sentence was issued on 30th September 2003 regarding the false documents trafficking among fundamentalist circles, the recruiting of fighters and the plotting for an attack, and both the prosecution and nine of the accused appealed against this sentence.

On 9th June 2004, the Court of Appeal issued the following sentence:

Two Belgium nationals have been arrested abroad for suspected connexions to terrorist attacks. The first one in Turkey where the Turkish authorities suspect him of having had close connections with the authors of the November 2003 Istanbul attacks and of being involved in the preparation of this attack. The second in the Netherlands, is suspected of having been involved in the preparation of the Casablanca attacks and is considered by the Moroccan authorities as being one of the financiers of the **Moroccan Islamic Fighting Group (GICM)**. He was extradited and imprisoned in Belgium.

A number of operations have been conducted following the discovery of a Moroccan Islamist network mainly established in the area of Maaseik with connections in Brussels. The investigation aims at proving that this network is tasked with facilitating the passage of individuals who receive training in **al-Qaeda's** camps in Afghanistan to Europe. Moreover, this logistic support network is suspected of having provided support to individuals linked to the **GICM**.

In June 2004, house searches were conducted after the Italian authorities provided information regarding the presence in Belgium of individuals with links to the Madrid attacks. Four suspects were charged with participation to activities in preparation to the attacks.

In July 2004, a suspect arrested in Brussels was charged with participating in a terrorist organisation, conspiracy and forgery, and was the object of an international arrest warrant issued by the Moroccan authorities. He is believed of playing a key role within the fundamentalist circles in Belgium in connection to the **GICM**. He is suspected of being involved in the Casablanca and Madrid attacks.

Cyprus

Cyprus is not considered as a high risk country and it does not encounter any specific problems related to terrorism. However, due to Cyprus' geographical location in the fragile Eastern Mediterranean Region, surrounded by Middle Eastern Countries, Cyprus in turn has several times in the past been victimized by a number of terrorist attacks in its own territory.

In 2004 no terrorist incident has occurred in Cyprus. Nevertheless, from time to time competent services receive information about possible imminent terrorist attacks in Cyprus or about terrorists travelling to Cyprus or other related matters. Until now, none of them have been proved.

Denmark

Due to Danish participation in the Western campaign against terrorism – most notably in Afghanistan and Iraq – Denmark and Danish interest may face a generally elevated level of threat. On three occasions threats against Denmark related to the Danish presence in Iraq were issued over the Internet. The threats were made by groups called **Abu Bakr al Sidiq Brigade** (once) and **Ansar al-Zawahiri** (twice) respectively and no information as to the more precise nature of the threat was offered.

However it has not been established that terrorist actions directed against targets in Denmark are being planned or organised in Denmark and the threat of terrorist actions in Denmark is thus still considered to be relatively low.

Several Islamist fundamentalist groups have more or less active supporters in Denmark and authorities are devoting considerable resources to identify these people and monitor their activities. While the Danish citizen detained in Guantanamo was released and returned to Denmark in February 2004, another Danish citizen of Moroccan descent, who was sentenced to death in Morocco charged with membership of the organisation **Salafia Jihadia** and participation to the terrorist attack in Casablanca in May last year, is still detained in North Africa.

A Swedish citizen of Moroccan descent was arrested during a short visit to Denmark in March 2004 because he was subject to a terrorism related international arrest warrant issued by the Moroccan Authorities. A claim for extradition put forward by Moroccan authorities was examined by the Danish Ministry of Justice and found not to be sufficiently substantiated and the individual was released and returned to Sweden.

Finland

According to the assessment of the Security Police, Finnish institutions and civilians remain unlikely targets for Islamic or other international terrorism. This is a consequence of the rather low international profile of Finland and its perceived neutrality in third world issues. On the other hand, there is a permanently enhanced threat against embassies and other interests in Finland of e.g. the U.S., the U.K. and Israel. In the future there may also be an increase in the attempts to use Finland as a haven for supporting, financing and planning of terrorist activities taking place abroad. One such attempt was seen in early October, when a well-known Islamist Internet-site supporting the Jihadi activities in Chechnya popped up on a Finnish server. The service provider voluntarily removed the site from the server within a few days.

The chaos in Iraq, while internationally a major factor underlying the radicalisation of Muslims, has thus far had relatively little impact among Muslims in Finland. This is however not to deny that there are some sympathizers of radical Iraqi networks present in southern Finland.

Furthermore it is obvious that a few dozen persons of radical Islamic persuasion residing in Finland have kept – infrequent - contact with Jihadi networks in other European countries and outside the continent.

At the moment there is no evidence to link Finnish residents to any of the terrorist attacks committed abroad by extreme Islamists, or that the contacts between Finland and other countries have involved terrorist planning.

France

The international terrorist threat pressing on France still relates to **al-Qaeda** sphere of influence and ideology. While France might appear less exposed than other Member States, it should be reminded that French nationals and interests were struck, directly or indirectly, on eleven occasions since 11th September 2001, in the Maghreb, in the Middle East, in South East Asia and finally in Europe (a French national indeed died in the attacks of Madrid) and that a bomb attack was committed in Paris in October against the Indonesian Embassy. This attack was later claimed on the Internet in the name of the group "**Front Islamique Français Armé**" (**F.I.F.A.**) which threatened France and demanded the liberation of the authors of the 1995 terrorist attacks in France.

French authorities are investigating a number of suspects in connection with individuals arrested in Spain within the framework of the investigations linked to the attacks in Madrid. According to the preliminary results most of these individuals were not previously known for involvement to any radical Islamic circles. In this context, it should be noted that recent information demonstrates a toughening of Moroccan students, stemming from well-to-do families studying in France in sometimes sensitive technical or scientific domains. This profile of well educated Muslim students, who radicalise in Europe, is consistent with that of the terrorists from the Hamburg cell.

The situation in Iraq is a source for concern since several networks of recruitment for volunteers to fight Jihad in Iraq have come to light in Europe. Arab Mujahedin belonging to the Chechen networks in Paris are reportedly studying the possibility of establishing a network of fighters to be routed to Iraq from France via Syria or Saudi Arabia. Partial confirmation was recently received according to which the current responsible for the Arab Mujahedin in Chechnya would try to set up such a network. However, these projects are facing difficulties in finding contact points in Iraq to welcome and use these volunteers. Reportedly candidates are of different nationalities. Tunisians living in Europe appear to be particularly involved in these logistic networks of infiltration via Syria. Interestingly, in Iran, the logistic relay is handled by members of the **Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (GICL)**.

If no such network has been uncovered in France yet, a number of French nationals are known to have died in Iraq fighting alongside the insurgents. The risk is that potential veterans could, once back in Europe serve as catalysts for Salafist cells presently active in logistic support networks. As regard to France, the current events are dominated by the kidnapping in Iraq of two French journalists by the "Islamic Army in Iraq" while driving from Baghdad to Najaf to report on the confrontations between American forces and "**the Madhi Army**". The "**Islamic Army in Iraq**" terrorist group had already been known through the murder of four security guards of the American company "Blackwater" in March in Fallujah; act which had been followed by the lynching of two of the victims by a hysteric crowd. The "**Islamic Army in Iraq**" is also known to have detained as hostage for several weeks the Iranian consul posted in Kerbala.

Terrorist activity in France involving individuals of Pakistani origin or connected to the situation in the Kashmir attention has also recently emerged from the investigations relating to the so called "shoe bomber". Furthermore, a French national arrested in 2003 and involved in a project of attack in Australia, had also stayed in a **Lashkar-e-Tayyiba** camp in Pakistan.

Since 1st January 2004, 85 individuals were arrested, 23 of them were indicted and imprisoned.

Germany

Germany is no longer considered being only an area of retreat for **al-Qaeda** members or Arab Mujahedin. Indication exists that institutions in particular of US-American, British as well as Jewish/Israeli origin can become targets of terrorist attacks. German citizens were among victims of attacks and hostage takings, perpetrated by terrorist groups outside Germany.

On 4th March 2004 Germany's Federal Criminal Court ordered a retrial for the a Moroccan national who was sentenced on 19th February 2003 to the maximum possible 15-year jail term for membership in a terrorist organization, 3066 accounts of accessory to murder and 5 accounts of attempted murder and grievous bodily harm.

The defendant was released in April 2004 and currently facing the retrial.

Greece

Currently, Greece does not face any imminent threat from activities by Islamic extremists. To date, there has been no evidence to suggest that Islamic extremists or organized Islamic terrorist cells are present in Greece.

Hungary

Due to its geo-political situation and other favourable features Hungary can be considered to be a suitable environment for terrorist and extremist groups to try to establish an operational or logistical basis.

To date, there is no evidence indicating that there is any terrorist cell present in Hungary linked to an Islamic terrorist organization and capable of carrying out terrorist acts. However, the presence of sympathisers cannot be fully ruled out

There is also no indication of Palestine terrorist activity in Hungary. There is no evidence of radicalisation among the members of the Palestine community living in the country.

The recent threat message of Ayman al-Zawahiri, explicitly mentioning Hungary, has not effected the Hungarian national threat level

During the period of review, Hungarian police have investigated one case under the provision of plotting/preparing terrorist actions and two cases under the provision of threatening to commit a terrorist act.

The case against a suspect of Palestine origin suspected of plotting and preparing and act of terrorism was dropped. The case against a student for threatening to commit a terrorist act will be brought to court. The case against an unknown perpetrator announcing in the name of a group named “**Students for the Liberation of Iraq**” to blow up a train in East Hungary to force the Hungarian Government to withdraw its troops from Iraq is still under investigation.

Ireland

The domestic situation with regard to Islamic extremism remains largely unchanged. Despite the ongoing conflict in Iraq, the reaction from the bulk of the Islamic community in Ireland remains quite muted. A small minority are actively trying to recruit people for the purpose of taking part in the conflict, so far without success. This situation continues to be monitored closely.

As yet, there is still no evidence of any organised “cell” structure operating in the state in support of Islamic extremism. However, on 11th August 2004, an Algerian asylum seeker was arrested and charged under the provisions of the Theft and Fraud Offences Act, for activities concerning the provision of false documentation. This individual had contacts within the wider Islamic community, both at home and abroad and his activities are under active investigation.

Italy

The most recent investigations carried out in Italy have confirmed the existence of a widespread transnational logistical network which has reorganised the Mujahedin movement, turning it from a constellation of individuals and groups operating without a unified strategy to an international organization which fights the Jihad.

Moreover, the investigations carried out in Milan and Parma in 2003 revealed the existence of an association of Islamic extremists who are particularly active in the recruitment and transfer of Mujahedin from Italy to areas of conflicts such as Afghanistan and Iraq, where the terrorist organization **Ansar Al Islam**, which is linked to **al-Qaeda**, had established training camps. The cell, which had connections in other cities of Northern Italy and in Germany, and which was primarily composed of individuals who had received ideological and military training in the camps in Afghanistan, was also active in providing logistical support, by finding fake identity documents and sending money in support of militant activity.

Lately, there has been a significant increase in the threat posed to Italy by terrorism; the country is nowadays at the centre of a violent media campaign which started with the tape of 18th October 2003, attributed to Osama Bin Laden, in which the Saudi sheikh expressly mentioned Italy, claiming ‘the right to strike against all the countries who are cooperating in the military operations with the Americans’. In the past year, this message was followed by proclamations and threats by terrorist groups, among which those by the **Brigades Abu Hafs al Masri** who, in their latest message of 20th August 2004 confirmed the end of the ceasefire proclaimed by Osama bin Laden, warning that the Mujahedin have ‘turned their weapons against Berlusconi’s regime’ and that ‘they will not hesitate to capture any Westerners’.

The media campaign aiming at forcing Italy to withdraw its troops from Iraq appears to be the force behind various terrorist fatal attacks against Italian targets in Iraq.

As the situation stands now, Italy and its interests abroad is particularly exposed to the risk of terrorist acts by Islamic terrorists, both because of the presence in the country of cells of fundamentalist organizations already active in Afghanistan and Iraq and because of the intervention in the reconstruction of those countries.

As well as the potential to spur sleeper cells into autonomous action, the anti-Italy media campaign may also encourage solitary acts by individuals who, although not linked to Islamic terrorism, take unilateral action in support of the call against so-called 'infidels', a phenomena demonstrated in Emilia Romagna and Lombardy⁶

Luxemburg

To date, no terrorist incident occurred and, at the moment, it has not been possible to prove the existence of any terrorist group that might be active or established in Luxembourg. On the other hand, there are some individuals known for having fundamentalist Islamist connections. These people are under close surveillance. There is no specific threat against Luxembourg targets. However, the possibility that terrorist activities against international institutions, diplomatic representations or American interests may take place cannot be excluded.

On financial level, the distribution of several lists that were communicated by the American authorities led to a number of denunciations, among which a dozen were made spontaneously because of the individuals involved or the suspicious nature of the transactions. Several accounts were frozen and others were placed under close surveillance.

⁶ In Modena on 11th September 2003, a Jordanian national set himself on fire in his car in the vicinity of the Synagogue. In Brescia on 29th March 2004, an alien of Moroccan origin blew himself up in his car in front of a McDonald's.

The Netherlands

The Dutch commitment to the Trans-Atlantic and European international counter-terrorism policy, the presence of Dutch military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, and the perceived anti-Islam sentiments in the Netherlands, might give Islamist terrorists reason to move the Netherlands up on their list of potential targets.

Furthermore, in addition to networks affiliated to **al-Qaeda**, a rise in independently operating self-reliant diffuse radical Islamic groups and networks has been identified, which are inspired by the same ideology and the same wish to contribute to the jihad. Investigations into Islamic terrorist networks in the Netherlands recently provided with information indicating that various radical Muslims might be involved in preparing one or more Islamic terrorist attacks on Dutch territory. More specifically, certain activities indicated that one or more members of radical Muslim networks or groups were involved in a reconnaissance of several public buildings in the Netherlands.

Authorities concluded that these reconnaissance activities were carried out with the possible intention of committing one or more attacks against certain interests in Dutch society. Recently, the radical Muslims in question observed and mapped the surroundings of several government institutions and ‘soft targets’. Reportedly in circles of international radical Muslims the idea is circulating that the Netherlands should be the target of a major attack because of its foreign policy. On the basis of threat assessments, the authorities decided to visibly step up the security of the relevant objects and institutions in order to frustrate or discourage any further preparatory activities. Several arrests have been made.

Pending the investigations, it is too early to draw any conclusions regarding the aforementioned activities and persons. Neither can any specific statements about the connections or co-ordination between the various preparatory activities be made. Several options are being investigated, for example whether there is an interdependence of various cells controlled by a co-ordinating body, or whether various structures are acting independently, unaware of each other's activities, in the Netherlands. At the moment there is no further information on the time or likelihood of violent actions.

Over the last months several threats were issued against two Members of Parliament, one who is of Somali origin, and one who several times expressed strong opinions about Islam.

Portugal

The level of the threat stemming from Islamic extremism remains at moderate levels in Portugal, being the result of an increasing number of cases in which various connections were established between Islamic individuals residing in Portugal, mainly from the North African community and terrorist groups and radical Islamic movements within the ideological framework of **al-Qaeda**.

In June 2004, an appeal to Jihad was detected in a Jihadist forum on the internet and Portugal was for the first time pointed out as a target, together with the USA, Israel, the UK, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Denmark, the Netherlands and Poland. The type of this threat didn't have the same outline of the communiqués released by Arab mass media in the name of **al-Qaeda** or any other associated group. However it was taken into account in the framework of assessing the terrorist threat for Portugal.

The investigations that were carried out led to operations that targeted a group of individuals suspected of logistical support, boarding and supply of false documentation to individuals connected either to terrorism or to Islamic radicalism in other European and North African countries

Special attention was given to individuals that integrate the Maghreb network of support to Islamic terrorism that operates in Portugal, which was partially dismantled in 2003, as well as to others of Indo-Pakistani and Bangladeshi origin, that hold connections to organisations suspected of promoting Islamic radicalism.

We would like to point out the following operations:

In June 2004 a Moroccan citizen was detained and then expelled from Portuguese territory. He is suspected of attending training camps in Afghanistan and of integrating a network involved in the preparation of terrorist attacks. In the framework of the same operation, another fifteen individuals of Arab origin, most of them also Moroccan were also detained for the purpose of identification. Since they were in an illegal situation, they were deported to their respective countries.

Following the collection of information pointing towards the fact that members of risk communities were carrying out terrorism support some propaganda material of the terrorist organisation **Milliat-e-Islami**, previously named **Sipah-i-Shahaba Pakistan** was found. The analysis of the collected information indicates that Portugal might be used by that organisation for activities of logistic support and recruitment. It's worthy to mention that the address where the Sipah-i-Shahaba material was found was referenced as a meeting place for various members of Islamic extremist organisations.

After the 1st European annual meeting (Ijtima) of the **Tabligh Jamat** movement which took place in Lisbon's Central Mosque in May 2003, a second round occurred again at the same place, between 27th and 29th August 2004. Investigations are going on in a wider framework of Tabligh Jamat movement activity, on a Pakistani citizen connected to a set of suspicious banking transactions.

Slovak Republic

Over the recent years, no terrorist activity has been detected in Slovakia. With regard to the war in Iraq, no related criminal activities or radicalisation of the Islamic associations or civic foundations officially active in Slovakia have been identified

To date, one civil association named and one foundation have been officially registered in Slovakia with an official purpose to support Islam in general, register Islam as one of the religions in Slovakia, support friendly relations between Slovakia and Islamic countries and, last but not least, improve communication between state and Muslims.

Activities demonstrating links between these two entities have been monitored. The purpose of these activities is to get all Muslims and sympathizers in Slovakia united under one organisation that could be then able to effectively use financial resources and funds flowing from the Muslim countries to support Islam worldwide.

However, intelligence available states that terrorist organisations affiliated to **al-Qaeda** have enhanced their activities relating to the interests and territory of the Slovak Republic.

Spain

Although the police investigations relating to the attacks of 11th March 2004 have shown that the central nucleus of the Islamist cell linked to the attacks was probably neutralized following the suicide in Leganés, the possibility exists that some members of the cell still at large may still be in a position to carry out further violent attacks.

When evaluating the possible threat posed by Islamic terrorism, consideration should be given to communiqués issued by alleged terrorists themselves. The presence of Spanish troops in Afghanistan continues to attract threats from Islamic extremist elements: such threats could materialize at any time.

Sweden

There are no indications that any foreign terror group or network present in Sweden plans to carry out acts of violence in Sweden or against Swedish interests.

However, militant Islamic networks continue to maintain recruiting structures in Sweden, primarily focusing on attracting second generation Muslim immigrants for religious instruction and, in some cases, military training in the Middle East and Central Asia.

The direct threat facing Sweden from international terrorism is low. There are no known terrorist activists planning to carry out any acts of violence against Sweden or Swedish interests. There is however a possibility that Sweden may be used as a territorial base for planning and possibly even carrying out terrorist activities in other countries. Three individuals are currently held in custody on charges for instigating acts of terrorism in another country.

An indirect threat to Sweden continues to be mainly connected to American, Israeli and British interests within Sweden.

United Kingdom

The threat from international terrorism remains real and serious. Osama bin Laden has repeatedly named the US and Israel as the primary targets for **al-Qaeda**. But he has also identified European countries as allies of the US which should also be targeted, for example Spain (before the March 2004 attacks in Madrid), France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland and the UK. **al-Qaeda** and affiliated groups consider it a priority to mount large-scale attacks against civilian targets in some EU member states.

Although **al-Qaeda's** capability to operate has been significantly degraded since 9/11, the group's aspiration to mount large terrorist attacks on the West remains. However, the threat to the West does not solely derive from **al-Qaeda**. Osama Bin Laden intended his organisation to be a vanguard for Islamist resurgence by inspiring other Islamist groups into a violent jihad against the US and its allies. We have seen terror groups learn from, and be inspired by, the acts of **al-Qaeda** and other extremists in the Middle East. For example, the current trend for hostage taking and beheading that developed in Iraq has been replicated by a separate group in Saudi Arabia.

There is a continuing threat of terrorism against Western interests in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere in the Middle East. Jihadist groups currently operating in Iraq may eventually turn their attention towards the West in the same way that Jihadist returning from Afghanistan in the early 90s turned their attention from the USSR to their home countries.

Specifically UK interests were successfully targeted by extreme Islamic terrorists in the attacks in Istanbul in November 2003. The attacks against the British Consulate and the HSBC HQ in Turkey, used vehicle borne explosive devices detonated almost simultaneously. In the UK itself, significant terrorist plots were disrupted in March 2004 and August 2004. It is believed that these terror cells were plotting large attacks against targets in the UK.

In March 2004, the events in Madrid demonstrated the capacity of an **al-Qaeda** inspired group to mount and attack without warning against a civilian target in Europe. Following the attacks, investigations by Spanish security forces identified the cell and their actions against the terrorists may have prevented the group from executing a further series of attacks.

A number of attacks took place in Russia in the run up to the presidential elections in Chechnya. Two Russian airliners crashed on 24th August, there was a suicide attack near a polling station in Chechnya on 29th August and a further suicide attack near a metro station in Moscow on 31st August. On 1st September, terrorists took approximately 1000 people hostage at a school in Beslan, North Ossetia. The siege ended on 3rd September after explosions occurred in the school and Russian security forces intervened. Casualties are believed to have totalled over 300.

4.2 TURKISH-KURD GROUPS

France

Kongra Gel

On the occasion of a congress having taken place at the end of June in France, some executives of the organization, suspected of being close to the group of a key dissident figure, were excluded or demoted.

At the same time, on 1st June 2004, the **Kongra Gel** broke the imposed truce. Since this date, an outbreak of the confrontations between the Kurdish guerrilla warfare and the Turkish security forces has been noted. Kurdish activists were also arrested in Turkey while preparing to commit attacks.

Several demonstrations took place in France during the first half of 2004 in support of the leader of **PKK Kongra Gel** imprisoned in Turkey. Further sporadic action can not then be discounted.

However, nothing indicates that members of **Kongra Gel** intend to toughen their strategy in Europe, which constitutes, in this respect, a sanctuary both on the political plan and economically.

The absence of demonstration in Paris against the visit of the Turkish Prime Minister, from 19th till 21st July 2004, illustrates the relative current paralysis of **Kongra Gel**.

[DHKP/C \(Left Revolutionary Front of Liberation of the People\).](#)

Registered on the list of terrorist organizations established by the European Union, **DHKP / C** however peacefully pursue its activities, in spite of the renewed violence and terrorist attacks committed in Turkey.

Within the framework of a campaign of staggered hunger strikes in several European countries, five Parisian members of the **DHKP/C** participated in the campaign between 12th and 19th July 2004.

Also worthy of note is the fact that French activists participated in demonstrations at the end of June 2004 which took place against the holding of the NATO summit in Istanbul.

Other groups (such as **TIKKO**, **FESK**, **TKP-ML**) established in Europe, including France have also acted in support of **DHKP/C** by participating in hunger strikes for example, however there is currently no indication that these groups intend to commit violent actions in this support.

Germany

PKK / KADEK / KONGRA GEL

On 26th October 2003, **KADEK** decided to disband. Subsequently, a further renaming in **Kongra Gel (Kurdistan People's Congress)** took place. The ban Germany imposed on **ETA** in 1993 on the basis of the German Association Act was extended to **Kongra Gel**. By decision of the Council of the European Union of 2nd April 2004, the **Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK)** was included in the list of terrorist organisations under its aliases **KADEK** and **Kongra Gel** as well.

The new leadership of **Kongra Gel** in its majority consists of former **PKK / KADEK** functionaries. Due to disagreements on both the supremacy within the organisation and the future political line, in May 2004, high-ranking leaders and board members, among them Osman ÖCALAN, brother of Abdullah ÖCALAN, split off the organisation and, in the beginning of August 2004, announced via the print media the foundation of a new organisation named "**Patriotic Democratic Party**" (**Partiya Welatperez'e Demokratik, PWD**). **PWD's** proclaimed objective is to promote and enlarge the rights of Kurds by political means.

"Caliphate State"/ "Kaplan Association"

During the period from the end of 2003/beginning of 2004 more than 1,000 properties were searched in connection with contravention of the German Association Act, i.e. the ban on the "**Caliphate State**".

Recently, the leader of the religious organisation ‘**Caliphate State**’ was extradited to Turkey.

DHKP-C

In Germany and Western Europe, **DHKP-C** has at its disposal intact “legal” and “illegal” structures. Among the “legal” structures are a broad range of print and electronic media as well as numerous associations, part of which are registered. Media and associations are used to mobilise members, organise events, and create attention for political topics in the media, as in the case of the “fasting to death in Turkish prisons” for one.

DHKP-C’s financial means come from membership fees, “collection of donations” and the organisation of large scale events. BKA has no information on the amount of income generated.

Since April 2003 **DHKP-C** has restarted its attacks in Turkey, both by remotely detonated bombs and suicide attackers.

According to remarks in its letters of self-incrimination, it has to be reckoned with further violent terrorist attacks in Turkey against representatives of the Turkish state as well as US-American institutions.