TERRORIST ACTIVITY IN THE EUROPEAN UNION:

SITUATION AND TRENDS REPORT (TE-SAT)

October 2002- 15 October 2003

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1. **INTRODUCTION**

This report is the 2003 edition of the Situation and Trends report covering the period from October 2002 till 15 October 2003. The objective of this report is to outline the terrorism situation in the European Union over the last twelve months and analyze the trends established. The report is intended to inform the European Parliament on the phenomenon of terrorism targeting the Member States.

This is an open report based on contributions from the Member States complemented where necessary from open source material. Information coming from open sources is identified by italic script.

An overview of terrorist activities is offered in two parts, the first of which relates to activities carried out by domestic groups within the European Union while the second part focuses on international terrorist activities affecting the European-Union.

2. **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

The threat of terrorist actions within the European-Union is posed by a wide number of groups and organisations ranging from international Islamic extremist networks and large scale Nationalist groups down to violent political extremist activists, generally carrying out acts of sabotage and criminal damage.

The fact that no Islamic extremist attack has been committed in the European Union since the last edition of the Situation and Trends report in October 2002 should not be considered as a diminution or an absence of threat. It is without any doubt a direct consequence of the work of Security services and of law enforcement agencies which have dismantled a number of support and possibly active terrorist cells. The finding during a police search in a Member State of traces of Ricin poison did confirm the will of Islamic extremist networks to use biological or chemical weapons.

While the European Union has not been victim of Islamic extremist attacks within its boundaries, attacks overseas, notably in Morocco were obviously targeting its citizens and interests confirming if necessary the previous threats from Osama Bin Laden and its close affiliates. The temporary closure on a number of occasions of Embassies of European Union Member States in Africa and Asia is another example of the seriousness of the threat.
The coalition attack against Iraq and the Middle-East crisis have led to a mounting frustration within Muslim communities and generated a rise of anti-Semitic actions but no terrorist attack was reported.

ETA continued its terrorist activities in Spain and France and carried out a number of attacks. While the group maintains its operational capability it has suffered a number of setbacks resulting from the extensive international cooperation and the successful law enforcement operations that were carried out. It should be noted that a number of ETA operatives have been arrested in both South America and European countries where they were hiding.

The Northern Ireland peace process has reached a crucial stage. While the Provisional IRA (PIRA) remains on ceasefire and committed to the Peace Process, the Real IRA (RIRA) and Continuity IRA (CIRA), continue to oppose the peace process and to engage in terrorist activity in Northern Ireland. Following the rejection through a referendum in July 2003 of an evolution of the administrative status of Corsica, Corsican nationalist terrorist groups have launched new bombing campaigns in Corsica, and to a lesser extent on mainland France. They deliberately target the State apparatus and law enforcement representatives.

Anarchist terrorism is still active in parts of the European Union. Greece did score a major success against the Revolutionary Organisation 17 November (R.O 17N) by dismantling this group both on means as well as on operational capabilities. The arrest of four leaders of the “Revolutionary Popular Struggle” (ELA) is estimated to have eliminated the organisation potential. The Spanish left-wing group Revolutionary Armed Groups First of October (GRAPO) does not appear to have recovered its capabilities since its command structure was dismantled in coordinated French-Spanish operations in 2002.

In Italy, Red Brigades are still active as demonstrated by the killing of a police officer and one Red Brigades member during a chance encounter in March 2003.

No right-wing terrorism attack was reported nevertheless activities were identified. On pretext of the Turkish government attitude, the Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress (KADEK) has on 1 September 2003 put an end to its unilaterally declared truce in an attempt to involve Turkey in a two sided truce which would eventually lead to a peace process.
To be noted during 2003 is the radicalisation of Turkish left wing extremist movements amongst which DHKP/C remains the most dangerous. Due to the presence of large Turkish communities, the European Union remains a base for propaganda, recruitment and logistical support for these groups. The Iranian “People Mujahideen-e-Khalq “(MEK) reaction to the arrest its leaders in France – when a number of its members attempted suicide by immolation – demonstrated a worrying commitment to their cause and little care for human life.

Terrorist and extremist movements have developed very efficient communication networks using both the internet and mobile telephones. These have provided them with a real time capacity of mobilising sympathisers and coordinating actions.

3. TERRORIST ACTIVITIES WITHIN THE EU

3.1 SEPARATISM TERRORISM

3.1.1 BASQUE SEPARATISM- EUZKADI TA ASKATASUNA (E.T.A)

The organisation is presently experiencing a difficult situation. In the course of last year its military apparatus has been decapitated, the logistics networks as well as various sub-apparatus, notably the procurement and information units, have been weakened and the operative capacity has been considerably reduced due to successive disbanding of command units and detention of activists both in France and in Spain, which led to temporary abortion of many attack projects planned by the organisation.

Furthermore the decision to make its political organisation BATASUNA illegal has resulted in a decrease of activities of the front organisations belonging to the Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco groups.
In the short term, it seems unlikely that ETA will change its ‘unique front’ strategy, which mostly limits its terrorist activities to the Spanish side of what the organization calls ‘Euskal Herria’, the ‘Basque homeland’. However, this attitude is not based on a fundamental difference in politics, since ETA and its followers have for many years considered France and Spain as being equal ‘oppressors’ of the ‘Basque people’.

Spain

During the considered period, counter terrorists activities have been very successful. A number of ETA cells were disrupted in Spain (Donosti cell, Madrid cell, Nafarroa cell, Vizcaya cell), while arrests were conducted in France including the Head of Armed Cells. Furthermore, close cooperation between Spain and France has also resulted in extradition to Spain of a number of ETA operatives arrested in France. ETA terrorists have also been arrested in Germany, The Netherlands, Mexico, and Argentine. However ETA conducted twenty one (21) terrorist attacks, killing seven persons and causing numerous injuries.

ETA structure is very complex, it has been evolving in the course of the group’s activities over the years and nowadays consists of two perfectly discernible components: the armed unit - identified by the organization itself with the acronym ETA - traditionally comprising three activity areas or “apparatus” (military, logistics and political), and another unit, forged during the evolution of structures created as complementary to the armed groups, in line with the Marxist-Leninist theories on revolutionary techniques. These structures originally appeared as “armed struggle fronts” directed against the so called oppressive State, with the aim of replacing the organs of this legitimate state in order to establish a “parallel state” which would emerge from revolutionary conquests by means of armed action, or from the network of organizations established to this effect.

This part of the ETA compound called Movimiento de Liberación Nacional Vasco (M.L.N.V. – Basque Movement for National Liberation), integrates trade unions (LAB), political parties (HB-Askatasuna), communication media (Egin/Gara), organs related to international relationships (Xaki), political leadership organs in association with the military apparatus of the entire structure (Kas-Ekin), education, language protection and youth organisations (Jarrai-Haika-Gazteriak-Segi), Basque prisoners’ relief organisation (GPA), employers’ organizations etc.. MLNV is presently in a critical situation as a result of the political and judicial measures put in place by the Spanish authorities since 1998.
The “military” component\(^1\) actually constitutes an entire compound based on a rigid and hermetic organizational structure with all command units based in France. Thus the group benefits from a relative operative independence and can operate without facing continuous pressure from the Spanish law enforcement agencies while still being close to the territory targeted for armed activities.

The organisational structure is divided according to fields of activity into three large apparatus consisting in turn of various sub-apparatus. All of these units are co-ordinated by the Executive Committee, the highest leading and decision taking body which is composed of the heads of the individual apparatus or representatives of the apparatus concerned with each specific case. Police operations conducted both in France and Spain have led to the decapitation of the command units as well as to deterioration of resources, education and logistics infrastructure in France. Furthermore, the neutralization of activities in Spain has resulted in sustained periods of no armed activity.

The traditional twin-responsibility policy employed by the organisation for each apparatus has now been replaced with another where the responsibility of each apparatus is delegated to 3-4 persons with the aim of solving the problems mentioned above and to maintain their operative capacity. From a strategic point of view, the recently observed changes - especially after the declaration of the so-called “cease-fire on armed action” in September 1998 - affected mainly the Political and Military components:

- There have been many changes affecting the operative or military level aimed in most of the cases at safeguarding their own inviolability. These changes affect the “modus operandi” of the organization rather than its functioning, nature and goals. The obsessive striving to guarantee the survival of the organisational structures, the militancy and operative capacity led to greater operative autonomy of the armed command units thus eliminating the traditional liaison agents now considered to be vulnerable points that might lead to the detection of the command unit.

\(^1\) Being identified, as stated above, with the acronym ETA for denomination reasons only, this being the actual origin of the organization.
● Terrorist attacks still target individuals belonging to social, political, economic and institutional social circles (Judicial Authorities, Law Enforcement Agencies, communication media, politicians and entrepreneurs).
● Another strategy change involves possible future plans of armed activity in France. The planning of such activities by responsible military ETA circles has to be taken into consideration. However considering the negative impact such actions could have on the command units based in French territory they are not considered likely to be conducted in the near future.
● The recently observed emphasis on conducting large-scale operations which aim at creating considerable public shock and international coverage is of an equally great importance. Possible central scene of terrorist activity could be Madrid and the planned action could involve placing various explosive devices and vehicle bombs in different strategic points of the capital (subway, fast access roads, important streets, particular commercial centres etc.) and setting them to explode successively in the course of a few hours.
● The “Summer Campaign” aiming at preventing tourists from visiting Spain usually conducted in the summer period is now planned to start early in the year. It should be preceded by a campaign of threatening letters sent to Embassies and Consulates as well as Airlines and travel agencies organizing trips to Spain.
● The organization is interested in planting militant members in various European countries whose real task, beyond any legal cover would be to create an infrastructure offering accommodation for activists. This accommodation could be temporary, for direct use after perpetrating attacks, or of a more permanent nature in countries other than France, as is the case with Germany, Italy, Portugal, Netherlands, and Belgium. This expansion tendency is being reflected in the creation of new structures in Central America. The pressure recently exerted upon the ETA collective in Mexico, reflected in the extradition of more than 20 militant activists from the country forced the responsible persons to seek new locations in Central American countries, e.g. Venezuela, Nicaragua, Dominican Republic, Belize.
● In spite of its setbacks, ETA is still actively recruiting amongst youngsters facing court trials on the grounds of participation in acts of vandalism and fleeing to evade imprisonment. It is also incorporating former militants who are now being called back after a period of rest in Latin American countries. Good economic conditions together with well-functioning procurement of logistic material provide considerable operative strength to the organisation.
The changes seen on the political front stem from the period prior to the declaration of the “cease-fire on armed action” in September 1998 which followed the signing of the so-called Lizarra Agreement. This policy was based on principles evolved and adapted in the course of the last decade as a strategic goal based on essential objectives of the terrorist organization originating in the following facts:

- The necessity to overcome the growing isolation of the “abertzale” project (MLNV) of “Nation building of Euskal Herria” (French and Spanish Basque Country) forced the organization to seek support from the rest of the nationalist parties.
- The difficult situation for the terrorist organization confronted with a considerable weakening of its potential due to the successful police and judicial actions called for decisive action aiming at recovering the lost potential.
- The risk of dispersion of the subordinate pro-terrorist units comprising the so-called Movimiento de Liberación Nacionalista forced ETA to seek protection through integration with the other forces in the Basque nationalist movement and eventually signing the Lizarra Agreement.

France

ETA has established important bases on French territory by transferring to France a large part of its logistics structure. This trend is apparently confirmed by the number of arrests that have been made since the beginning of the year including that of the presumed chief for the commandos of the military branch of the terrorist organization, on 9 May 2003 in Saintes.

The organization is apparently facing difficulties in the recruitment and turnover of its militants. The problem could be amplified by the arrest in France of 64 suspects in 2002 and 29 including 4 French nationals, during the first half of 2003. However ETA-Militaire can always recruit volunteers among the anarchic-nationalist youth from ‘Segi’, the main activity of which is street violence.

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2 French contribution lists ETA Militaire, while Spain lists it as ETA, it is the same organisation.
3 Youth organisation linked to ETA
The pressure exerted on the organization by the police and the army, both in France and in Spain, could lead to a radicalisation of some of the young Basque nationalist militants.

The presence in ETA-Militaire commando arrested in Saintes on 9 May 2003 of a French national member of ‘Segi’, seems to confirm this analysis, as does the arrest on 15 May 2003 in Seissan of a French woman - a fugitive since March 2002 - who had in her possession a firearm and false identity papers and admitted belonging to the terrorist organization ETA-Militaire.

It seems unlikely that, in the short term, ETA will modify its ‘unique front’ strategy, which mostly limits its terrorist activities to the Spanish side of what the organization calls ‘Euskal Herria’, the ‘Basque homeland’. This current reluctance to commit terrorist acts in France, except for acts of street violence (throwing of improvised explosive devices against banks and state buildings) could have the following reasons:

- Political reasons: the organization has lost the support of the French Basque population. This is a situation that the organization is hoping to change by trying to assume control of the nationalist associations of the French Basque country.
- Structural reasons: ETA’s difficulty to preserve its illegal activities faced with an increased repression which would meet any terrorist acts in France, as well as the worry of always maintaining its direction and logistics infrastructures on French territory.

The outlawing on 17 March 2003 by the Spanish Supreme Court of ‘Batasuna’ - which acted as a political showcase for ETA-Militaire - could result in a transfer of some of its activities to France in order to bypass the Spanish government’s decision.
Germany

On 21 January 2003 an alleged ETA member was arrested in Nuremberg. The Spanish judicial authorities requested his extradition on the grounds of membership in an armed group as well as illegal possession and storage of war weapons.

3.1.2 NORTHERN IRELAND

The peace process is still ongoing in Northern Ireland and the main actors appear to be committed to see its success. However the risk of terrorist actions from radicals such as Continuity IRA should not be neglected.

Ireland

- Provisional IRA / PIRA

PIRA remains fully committed to the Peace Process and there are no indications of any threat to the long standing cease-fire.

- Continuity IRA / CIRA

Although limited in resources and well trained activists CIRA still represents a significant threat. The arrest on 3 August 2003 of nine individuals who attended a training camp in the south of the country is a clear indication that they are still committed to a military strategy. Of those arrested, six were charged with membership of an unlawful organisation, two were charged with offences against the Firearms Acts and one was released pending directions from the Director of Public Prosecutions. In a search of the training camp two shotguns, two rifles, assorted ammunition, two telescopic sights and assorted items of paramilitary clothing were recovered.

- Real IRA / RIRA

On the 6 August 2003 the leader of RIRA, Mickey McKeivitt, was sentenced to 20 years imprisonment for Directing Terrorism. He was sentenced to a further six years imprisonment on a charge of being a member of an unlawful organisation. Both sentences will be served concurrently. It is expected that McKeivitt will appeal his conviction through the higher courts.
Despite McKeivitt’s incarceration RIRA, which is now splintered into two separate groupings as a result of criminal activity, continues to pose a significant threat, although there have been no incidents since the last meeting.

**United Kingdom**

− Republican groups

The Provisional IRA (PIRA) remains committed to the ceasefire it declared in 1997. The majority of loyalist terrorist groups also remain on ceasefire, though low-level paramilitary activity continues in Northern Ireland. Dissident republican terrorist groups, namely the ‘Real’ IRA (RIRA) and the Continuity IRA (CIRA), continue to engage in acts of terrorism in Northern Ireland and still present a threat to the United Kingdom.

− Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF)/Ulster Defence Association (UDA)

*In October 2002 there were talks between the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Loyalist Volunteer Force (LVF) aimed at ending the feud between them and concentrating against republicanism. In November these organisations issued joint statements which said they had resolved a dispute which had prompted a number of shootings in the previous weeks.*

− Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF)/UDA

*The former UFF leader, Johnny ‘Mad Dog’ Adair, was returned to prison at the height of the loyalist feud in early 2003. Shortly after his arrest a number of his leading supporters were forced to leave Northern Ireland by the UDA and are now resident in Great Britain. The UFF claimed they carried out an attack on 30 April when shots were fired at the house where Adair’s wife and family were staying.*

**Germany**

On 06 December 2002 an alleged member of PIRA was arrested at the airport in Prague/Czech Republic.
He is being suspected of having been a member of an "Active Service Unit\(^4\)" of the PIRA which is suspected to have fired three mortar grenades containing ca. 80 kg of explosive targeting the tank facilities of the British "Quebee" barracks on 28 June 1996. The suspect was extradited to Germany on 9 April 2003.

3.1.3 CORSICAN SEPARATISM

France

Three events in July 2003, to say:

- The arrest of the suspected killer of the Prefect Claude Erignac,
- The rejection by the inhabitants of Corsica of a proposed institutional reform,
- The verdict at the ‘commando Erignac’ trial,

Resulted in the temporary withdrawal of the separatist representatives in the Corsican local Parliament and generated a wave of violence. In July and August there were 77 attacks, of which about 20 were aimed at representatives of the state. Responsibility for these acts was claimed by clandestine activists acting against the government’s repressive action; they are also accusing the government of being the cause of the failure of the project of institutional reform.

The separatists, confronted by a political impasse, tried in vain to assemble all the composing parts of the nationalist movement at the traditional “international Corte days”\(^5\). The autonomists of the ‘Parti National de la Corse’ refused to attend these meetings, careful to not be seen to condone the violence. In preparation for the next territorial elections these so-called “moderate nationalists”, who have no representative in the Corsican Territorial Parliament, are attempting to gather the largest possible number of individuals and incorporate them in a wide democratic formation. To do so the separatists need to adopt a clear position on the question of armed fight, they have organized a debate on the subject. Much is at stake for if the nationalists were to decide to put forward a common list for the elections, they could become the biggest power in the Territorial Parliament.

Violence is increasing ongoing as reflected both with the number of attacks and the modus operandi.

\(^4\) Specific name for PIRA commandos
\(^5\) Corte is the name of a city in Corsica.
● From 1 January to 31 August 2003, two hundreds and one (201) attacks or attempted attacks using explosives were committed in Corsica, comparing to one hundred and seven by the end of August 2002. The number of attacks in 2000 and 2001 there had been two hundreds and fifty one (251) and one hundred and fifty (150) attacks, respectively.

● July and August 2003 saw an increase in the quantity and quality of violent attacks: there were 77 attacks and attempted attacks by explosives, of which about 20 were aimed at state representatives. Six of these attacks were committed during the day. On 6 September, the ‘FLNC Union des Combattants’ sent a communiqué to the Bastia radio station ‘Radio Corsa Frequenza Mora’ in which it claims responsibility for the damages made by firearms against the Palais de Justice of Bastia, as well as those made by explosives against the prison of Casabianda. The communiqué points out that FLNC Union des Combattants’ does not advocate extreme solutions, that its actions are always very well thought out and that it takes extreme care to not endanger human lives. The group assigns the responsibility for the failure of the truce of military action to the French state, which it also accuses of insincerity. It also calls on all parties involved to unite around collective claims ‘in order to create conditions for the cessation of hostilities’.

3.2 ANARCHIST TERRORIST MOVEMENTS

Reports received from Member States confirm that in spite of some major successes from law enforcement, anarchist terrorism is still active in the south of the European Union, essentially within the so-called Mediterranean Anarchist Triangle which includes Greece, Italy and Spain. However the scope of the movement is wider as demonstrated by the number of foreigners arrested in June in Salonica (Greece). In recent years the anarchist movement worldwide has been increasingly active, motivated by headlines such as “Anti-globalisation, anti-capitalism and anti-imperialism.” Extreme left-wing anarchists are “travelling” around, and staging increasingly violent demonstrations during anti-globalisation rallies and causing as much disturbance as possible to international summits. The next natural step for these extremists could be moving from anarchist activism and extremism to anarchist terrorism as already experienced in the southern part of Europe.
Greece

In the course of the three last months anarchist activity has increased. Incidents and arrests of anarchists during the E.U. Summit in Salonica, as well as the process of the trial of the Revolutionary Organization 17 November members have contributed significantly to the way individuals or groups taking part in the anarchist – insurrectional movement generally behave or act. This was particularly obvious by the fact that several arsons and assaults on government targets occurred and resulted in a number of property damages.

– “Revolutionary Organization 17 November” (RO 17 N)

The Hellenic Police during the last period and particularly from June 2002 until December 2002, dismantled the domestic terrorist organization “RO 17 N” which is considered as the most important terrorist threat in Greece, as it has been active since 1975, committing assassinations, launching of rockets, bombing attacks as well as bank robberies. In Greece, following the arrest of its 19 members, the finding and confiscation of its arsenal (pistols automatics, explosives, rockets), the competent police authorities estimate that the dismantling of the “ Revolutionary Organization 17 November” is complete, with regard to its means, as well as to the operational staff. At the beginning of March 2003 the trial of its arrested members has been initiated in an Athens court of justice.

– “Revolutionary Popular Struggle (ELA)”.

This organization, which was considered as the second most significant terrorist threat in Greece, has ceased its activities since 1995. The Hellenic Police continuing its inquiries for the dismantling of the domestic terrorist organisations arrested in January 2003 four (4) leaders of ELA (3 men and 1 woman). The above mentioned individuals allegedly participated in the organization’s "Revolutionary Council”, took decisions relating to the activities, the modus operandi, the structure of communication and participated actively in the attacks carried out. Criminal proceedings have been initiated against these persons resulting in their detention.
– “Revolutionary People’s Action” (LAIKI EPANASTATIKI DRASI)

This recently formed group: claimed responsibility for an explosive device which had been placed in the offices of ALICO Insurance Company on 9 July 2003. The device was deactivated by Police bomb disposal experts in Athens.
There is no evidence so far with regard to the above group. It is estimated that it is a group of limited operational or other capabilities.

– Revolutionary Struggle (EPANASTATIKOS AGONAS)

With a telephone call to a newspaper this recently formed group claimed responsibility for two improvised explosive devices, which had exploded during the night on 5 September 2003 in a building of the Court of Justice in Athens. These explosions resulted in minor injury to a Police officer and property damages.

These attacks may be related to the progress of the trial of the arrested members of 17 November. There is no evidence so far with regard to the above group. It is estimated that it is a group of limited operational or other capabilities.

– Other activities

In June 2003, during the E.U. Summit several incidents occurred in Salonica involving both Greek nationals and foreigners, on 21 June 2003, 29 individuals were arrested of whom twenty one (21) were Greek, two (2) Spanish, two (2) Austrians, one (1) British, one (1) American, one (1) Cypriot and one (1) Syrian national. They had played a leading role in the incidents carried out by members of the anarchist – insurrection movement, in particular the “Black Block Attack” group. Following their arrest, a small arsenal was found in their possession, which included eighty five (85) Molotov-cocktail bombs, metal bullet firing devices, gas masks, globs, hammers, slingshots, gloves, hoods, etc. It is estimated that two thousands five hundreds (2500) members of the anarchist – insurrection movement participated in the protests causing severe property damages and arsons. Furthermore eight Police officers suffered minor injuries.
Italy

Full attention is being paid to the pro-insurrection wing that embodies the tendency towards radicalism of the whole anarchist movement and presents marked subversive characteristics. Of particular interest is the CCCCC – Célula Contre el Capital, la Càrcel, los Carceleros y sus Celdas (Cell against the Capital, Prison, Gaolers and its Cells) which has claimed responsibility for four attacks:

- On 13 December 2002 in Rome a bomb sent via mail to the Spanish newspaper “El Pais”.
- On 14 December 2002 a bomb addressed to Iberia airlines which was discovered in the post office of Malpensa airport.
- On 16 December 2002 a bomb addressed to Iberia airlines office in Fiumicino airport which had been found in Rome.
- On 17 June 2003 a bomb which exploded in front of the Spanish Language Institute in Rome.

On 19 September 2003 forty five searches, were carried out by the Carabinieri in Liguria, Tuscany, the Piedmont and Emilia Romagna in the frame of an investigation on eco-terrorism. The searches targeted residences and seats of associations frequented by followers of the anarchic-insurrectionary movement, of the Azione Rivoluzionaria and the ESP. They are accused of subversive association.

Spain

There is no prospect for an end to violent actions of anarchist inspiration perpetrated, at least at the beginning, within the so-called Mediterranean Anarchist Triangle. The central arguments brought forward by the perpetrators of these violent acts are the situation of anarchist prisoners in Italian, Greek and Spanish prisons and the demand to abolish the F.I.E.S. system (Fichero de Internos de Especial Sequimiento – Specially Monitored Prisoners’ File System) used in Spain. Most probably, attacks of a strictly anarchist nature directed against the capitalist and globalisation symbols will continue to be the main points of reference for anarchist terrorist actions.

The recent disbanding of an operative cell in Valencia should be noted, the responsibility of this cell in the perpetration of various sabotage acts in the Autonomous Community of Valencia is still being investigated.

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6 Also dubbed the five Cs.
3.3 ECO TERRORISM

No case of eco terrorism in the proper sense of terrorism has been reported by the Member states during the period October 2002 – October 2003.

3.4 BIO TERRORISM

Bio terrorism and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction is still a major threat most often linked to Islamic related terrorism and al Qaeda. The finding of traces of ricin in at least one case confirms the will of terrorist to try and make use of these weapons. The Anthrax scare in 2001 and 2002 has demonstrated the huge impact on the public of such threats.

Belgium

During the weekend of 31 May and 1 June, twelve (12) envelopes containing a toxic powder were mailed, probably all from the same post box in Deinze (Ghent region). Five were intercepted on 2 June in two different post al sorting offices; while five other reached the addressees respectively on 3 and 4 June and the two last ones on 8 June.

Addressees were the Prime Minister, the Minister of Justice, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Port Authority in Antwerp, the Ostend Airport CEO, the Embassies of Saudi Arabia, the US and Great Britain, the Brussels Court of First Instance and the Court of Appeal in Brussels.

An investigation is still being conducted to determine the exact composition of the yellow granular product found in the envelopes and its fabrication process. It has been ascertained that the powder contains phenarsazine\(^7\) which causes irritation to the skin and also affects the eyes as well as the bronchial tubes. Traces of hydrazine were also detected.

\(^7\) Large quantities of phenarsazine can be lethal if they are ingested. Setting the product on fire can also cause the spread of a toxic cloud. However, the quantity found in the envelopes was not deadly.
The writing on the envelopes of slogans “Let our innocent brothers Go...” most certainly referred to the trial in Belgium of people suspected of having connections with the Islamic fundamentalists or to the recent Gulf crisis Slogans such as “Where are your mass destruction arms...” could be linked to the fact that US military convoys bound for Iraq transited via the Ostend Airport and the Antwerp harbour with Belgian Government’s approval
Some texts also contained the following words: "The international islamitic society".

3.5 CYBER TERRORISM

No case of cyber terrorism has been reported by the Member States, however chat rooms on the internet are reportedly widely used.

3.6 LEFT-WING TERRORISM / ACTIVITIES

France

While in 1980 two hundreds and forty (240) violent acts were attributed to the extreme left, since 1990 the number has dropped to about twenty (20). A dozen of events have been reported so far for 2003, but none considered as a terrorist attack. This confirms both a decrease in number and a change in modus operandi.

The violent acts committed nowadays are mostly ineffective and mostly cause minor damages. They are either claimed by groups lacking consistency or not claimed at all, and appear to be marginal phenomenon. In the area of the extreme left, the temptation to resort to ultra-left terrorism has, during the last decade, given place to a greater implication in societal and social unrest. Consequently, should they resort once more to violence - in the real sense of the term - they could go down the anarchic-liberal road.
The anti-globalisation protests and its avatars, on a European, if not international, level unites various small groups of the radical extreme left, such as the squat movement. Each protest is an opportunity to form or strengthen alliances and the less experienced learn from the veterans rioters. Those advocating confrontation gain in skills and efficiency. Although modest in scale, in July 2002 in Strasbourg, the ‘No Border’ movement gathering appeared as an international meeting.\(^8\)

The same happened during the Evian G8 summit or in Annemasse in the “Village Alternatif Anti-Autoritaires et Anti-Guerre (VAAAG). There the European autonomous anarchists created the Convergence des Luttes Anti-Autoritaires et Anti-Capitalistes (CLAAAC), aiming at staging a Europe-wide protest. They also intensified their relations to third persons, of whom some have been proved to be dangerous.\(^9\)

**Germany**

There is no left-wing terrorist group operating in the Federal Republic of Germany at present. In the past years there has been an increase in the activity of extreme-left groups, which carried out several arsons and bomb attacks targeted against special objects, using various names; their activities were mainly limited to certain areas. Since 1995 18 attacks in the greater Berlin area have been attributed to/linked to the ‘Militant group (MG)’, an organization subscribing to the anti-imperialist ideology. In this context BKA currently carries out investigations into 3 suspects.

Furthermore, the ‘Militant group (MG)’ initiated a so-called militancy debate in the left-wing scene-publication ‘Interim’, in which several autonomous groups take part. Subject of this discussion is, among others, the initiation of armed fight and the organization of the fight against the Western social system. However, there is no evidence that the armed fight has already begun. Further attacks targeting special objects can be expected.

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8 Using the slogan ‘No border, no nation, no social control’, the event, which united for 10 years about 1,500 European troublemakers, made several attempts at quasi-riots, all contained by the police forces.

9 Spain, Italy and Greece form a sort of Mediterranean arc, where the anarchic element causes minor trouble. In Italy and Greece some of these groups have not given up their attacks against politicians.
Italy


The Red Brigades for the Formation of a Fighting Communist Party (BR-PCC) has come to the fore once again, after years of silence, with the murders of Massimo D’Antona and Marco Biagi (in 1999 and 2002, respectively).

Furthermore, as a confirmation that the threat the Red Brigades are still active and dangerous, on 2 March 2003 two members of the Red Brigades were involved in a shoot-out with railway police aboard the Rome-Florence train. A Police constable was killed instantly and another was injured, one Red Brigades member died later in hospital from the wounds received.

– Nuclei Territoriali Antimperialisti – NTA (Anti-Imperialist Territorial Units)

During the period under review, the Nuclei Territoriali Antimperialisti which first emerged in December 1995, have produced and circulated a number of documents. Moreover, they have claimed responsibility for the incendiary attacks committed on 22 March 2003 in Vicenza and Maniago targeting three cars with American Forces in Italy registration numbers. These actions must be seen as part of a strategic plan intended to counter US imperialism.

– Centro di Ricerca per l’Azione Comunista (Research Centre for Communist Action) C.R.A.

The Centro di Ricerca per l’Azione Comunista (Research Centre for Communist Action) has drawn police attention for its particularly intransigent attitude reflected in various documents it circulates. CRAC, is very active in Bologna and Milan and in the Veneto region, it has centred its propaganda on welfare-related issues. It firmly opposes any form of mediation and tends to exacerbate labour disputes.

– Brigata 20 luglio”

The so called “Brigata 20 luglio” claimed responsibility for two bombs which exploded near a police station in Genova on 9 December 2002.
– Other groups

● A number of incidents have occurred since September 2002 in Sardinia which can be attributed to groups with a basic Marxist-Leninist ideology and to pro-independence organisations (as to the attacks perpetrated by the latter, reference was made to issues dear to pro-insurrection anarchist groups).

● A number of groups openly advocate taking action to subvert the established order. They are often in contact with movements in Europe pursuing the same objectives and are very active in their recruitment drive and through the production of numerous documents. They do not support the “militarist” strategy of the BR-PCC and favour political activity within the masses, halfway between public and clandestine activity. In this context, the Comitati d’Appoggio alla Resistenza per il Comunismo – CARC (Committees in Support of the Resistance for Communism) have promoted a campaign for the creation of a “Popular Front for the Reconstruction of the Communist Party”.

Law enforcement activities have led to a number of arrests:

● On 15 November 2002 Carabinieri arrested 20 people belonging to the so called “Rete del Sud ribelle”.


● On 23 June 2003 in Milan, Naples, Carabinieri arrested three persons and search the houses of 25 people linked the left-wing area. Operations were also conducted in Paris and Zurich.

Spain

– Grupos De Resistencia Antifascista Primero De Octubre (G.R.A.P.O.) – Antifascist Resistance Group First Of October (Grapo)

Due to GRAPO scarce operative possibilities, its future armed activities are likely to focus on obtaining economic resources for re-structuring and strengthening.
GRAPO could still revert to perpetrating actions targeting state property, facilities, and economic infrastructure in line with the anti-state lines of argument presented by the so-called Reconstituted Spanish Communist Party\(^{10}\), the political support of the terrorist organization.

The actual residual but still sporadically active terrorist capacity of a very dynamic and determined cell of the armed group could lead to some violent actions in the future.

**Sweden**

There are no active domestic groups that may be labelled left-wing terrorist groups according to the Swedish legal definition of terrorism. However, there are numerous national radical groups on the extreme right and left (i.e. the White Power movement and the autonomous movement), aiming at obtaining political change by the means of threat and violence and thus posing a threat to internal security.

- In December 2002, the annual Salem (Stockholm) manifestation, held in honour of a murdered skinhead, attracted more than 1 500 White Power supporters. For the first time, the autonomous movement had also mobilised for this event, and approximately 1 000 anti-fascist activists from Sweden, Norway and Denmark gathered in Salem with the aim of preventing the manifestation. In spite of numerous small-scale confrontations the manifestation could be held according to plans without any serious incidents.
- After the violent anti-globalisation riots during the Gothenburg summit in June 2001, the autonomous movement in Sweden has had difficulties to mobilise en masse. On a local level, however, the threat from anti-fascist groups has remained steady during the period under review.

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\(^{10}\) Parodio Comunista de España –reconstituido - P.C.E. ®
The number of reported crimes committed by anti-fascist activists has increased steadily since 1998. For example, on 1 May 2003 a so-called street-party was arranged in central Stockholm gathering about 1000 activists. The arrangement soon degenerated into vandalism and violence resulting in a number of arrests.

- During the first months of 2003, the autonomous groups in Sweden were primarily engaged in planning protest activities connected to the war in Iraq. As it turned out, the actions actually carried out were in general symbolic and non-violent.

3.7 RIGHT-WING TERRORISM / ACTIVITIES

No right wing terrorist organisation has been identified in the contribution received from the Member States. Nevertheless, a number of violent acts including projected bomb attacks have been reported targeting either Jewish and Muslim individuals or interests. A number of factors ranging from the tension in the Middle-East to unemployment resulting from the economic crisis in a number of European countries could lead to more racist and anti-Semitic acts.

France

There has been a noticeable decrease in the amount of violence related to the extreme right: nineteen violent acts were reported from January to July 2003 against forty three during the same period in 2002. However, the decrease in the number of attacks and their non-organized character should not mislead as to the vitality of the former leaders of Unité Radicale and the neo-nazi regionalists.

Since a meeting in Macon (France) on 5 and 6 April 2003, when the Bloc Identitaire“” was created11, the “Jeunesses Identaires” (JI) satellite of this new group, have multiplied their acts of propaganda denouncing the ‘Islamisation of France’, the measures adopted by the Minister of the Interior for the Muslim community, as well as the ‘American hegemony’.

11 Created by the former leaders of Unité Radicale, which was dissolved by the decree of 6 August 2002 for ‘incitement to racial and religious discrimination’ following the attempt to assassinate the President of the French Republic by a militant of Unité Radicale on 14 July 2002.
In the months to come, the “Identaires” will try and establish themselves nationally. The risk of excess is obvious: on 15 September 2002 there was an attack against the parish priest of the basilica of Saint-Denis and on 29 January 2003, an individual who was threatening to commit suicide by bomb in the Great Mosque in Paris was arrested.

**Germany**

There is no indication on the existence of terrorist structures linked to the right-wing scene in Germany. Measures taken by the law enforcement authorities against persons belonging to the extreme right-wing in the Munich area led to the finding of numerous weapons and substances that could be used in the manufacture of explosives. The investigations so far revealed that the target of the right-wing extremists is connected to the celebrations for the laying of the foundation stone for the new synagogue in Munich. The uncovered plans for attacks of the group led by one of the leading figures of an extreme right-wing comradeship, present nothing new concerning their targets. Since 2001 individual completed or prepared attacks with explosives against Jewish cemeteries, lodgings for asylum seekers and shops belonging to foreign citizens have been carried out. So far no major injuries to persons have been registered.

The modus operandi of execution and preparations of those crimes did not show the dimension that has come to light in the above mentioned Munich case.

Covert investigations on individuals belonging to the opposing political camp have, for years, been characteristic of the so-called ‘counter-antifascist actions’. These partly detailed reports on these individuals’ habits have—as far as authorities are aware—-not led to a concrete endangering of the person targeted.

**Italy**

There is no active right-wing terrorist organisation in Italy, neither do they show the capability to pursue a subversive strategy. In a more general context, however, the risk of a spectacular attack still persists.
Sweden

There are no active domestic groups that may be labelled right-wing terrorist groups according to the Swedish legal definition of terrorism. However, there are numerous national radical groups on the extreme right and left (i.e. the White Power movement and the autonomous movement), aiming at obtaining political change by the means of threat and violence and thus posing a threat to internal security.

- The number of reported crimes committed by White Power supporters has remained at a relatively steady level in the last years. However, the White Power organisations have been more active and more visible than before during the period under review. A general trend of less conflict and more co-operation and co-ordination between different groups has been observed. The amount of propaganda spread by these organisations has also increased.
- In connection with the Swedish general elections in September 2002, one of the dominant groups within the White Power movement formulated political ambitions and ran candidacy in one Swedish municipality. Despite an intensive election campaign, the group did not manage to gain any seats in the election.
- The annual “Salem” manifestation, held in December 2002 in Stockholm to honour of a murdered skinhead, attracted more than 1,500 White Power supporters, and thus became the so-far largest White Power manifestation in Sweden.

4. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

While the scope of international terrorist which could impact on The European Union is very wide, no mention was made in the contributions received of terrorist movements in Latin America or in Africa.

The main focus is still on Islamic groups close to of al Qaeda which are very active in the European Union which they consider both as a potential target a recruiting ground and a logistical base. The crisis in the Middle-East is also a cause of concern since two suicide bombers who participated in an attack in Israel had apparently been recruited in the United Kingdom. While Kurdish groups appear to be shifting to political activism rather than terrorism, the Turkish DHKP-C has been involved in terrorist attacks in Turkey and as such is potentially dangerous considering its good network implantation within the Turkish communities in Europe.
4.1 ISLAMIC EXTREMIST TERRORISM

Austria

As in recent years, also during the period covered by this report, no terrorist actions or terrorist crime occurred in Austria, which could be linked to the Islamic extremist spectre.

During the first 10 months of 2003, the number of Chechens seeking asylum in Austria has increased significantly. More than 5,500 Russian nationals have entered Austria illegally. More than 90% pretended to be of Chechen nationality and have applied for asylum. However, a considerable part of them travelled on to other Western European countries without waiting for the end of the asylum procedure. At the moment, no information is being available concerning extremist Chechen structures. But it cannot be ruled out that among Chechens arriving in the EU by this way there are persons being wanted for having carried out terrorist activities.

A Russian national, subject to an international arrest warrant who had lived in Austria by false identity and had applied for asylum, was identified and arrested in Vienna in May 2003.

Denmark

There have been no terrorist incidents to report since the last TE-SAT report prepared under the Danish Presidency in 2002.

There are no national groups in Denmark, which can be described as terrorist groups. Therefore the Danish efforts in the area of terrorism are concentrated on the fight against international terrorism. Several international terrorist organisations have sympathisers in Denmark, and the Danish authorities are devoting considerable resources to monitoring these people to see whether they are breaking the law or in the process of doing so. The Danish authorities are upholding the high level of security, which was established after the events in the USA the 11th of September 2001 and especially since the start of the military campaign in Iraq, in which Denmark takes part. Presently there are no indications of the planning or execution of terrorist actions in Denmark. The threat of terrorist actions in Denmark is thus still generally considered to be relatively low.
● In August 2003 a Danish citizen, born in Morocco, was arrested on suspicion of infringing a provision on terrorism in the Danish Penal Code (section 114). A closer investigation into the circumstances leading to his arrest did not give sufficient reason for continuing the investigation into a possible violation of the above mentioned provision, and he was released.

● The month before, another Danish citizen, born in Morocco, was sentenced to death in Morocco charged with membership of the organisation Salafia Jihadia and participation to the terrorist attack in Casablanca in May this year.

● A Danish citizen is still detained in Guantanamo.

France

In communiqués broadcast on Arab satellite channels in the form of a videotape or audio tapes Ayman al Zawahiri, who appears to have succeeded bin Laden as spokesman for al Qaeda urged Muslims to continue the Jihad and once more threatened the United States should they sentence the prisoners of Guantanamo to death. He also threatened the Western countries who are allied to the United States and announced a ‘great battle’. Although there has been no attack by Islamists in Europe or North America in the past months, the Mujahideen networks have struck Western targets in the most vulnerable geographical areas: in Saudi Arabia, in Morocco which had, up to then, been spared. France and its nationals living abroad remain likely targets.

Moreover, one of Al Qaeda’s affiliates, Jemaah Islamiyah, in its effort to create a great Islamic state which would include Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia and the south of the Philippines, is trying to ignite Southern Asia by extremely murderous acts. The organization claimed responsibility for the car bomb attack against the Marriott hotel in Jakarta (Indonesia) on 5 August 2003 which was presented as a message addressed to the Indonesian government. This operation felt like an echo of the audio message attributed to Al Qaeda’s Number Two, Ayman Al-Zawahiri, warning that attacks against US interests in the world would intensify.

Where the developments in the subject of the investigation on the attacks of Casablanca (45 dead, of whom 3 French nationals) are concerned, the security services and the Moroccan police have made multiple arrests, uncovering several Islamic terrorist cells.
These police operations led to the arrest of several persons of French origin or dual nationality. Although their belonging to the radical Islamic movement seems to be an established fact, there is no evidence linking them to the attacks themselves. However, the interrogation of certain activists who are still escaping justice could change the situation, since it is almost certain that the international jihad movement provided material support to the young local perpetrators.

Still in North Africa, the happy ending to the adventure of the kidnapped European tourists by a terrorist group close to the Salafist Group for Call and Combat, led by Hassan Hattab, on 18 August 2003 with the liberation of the last hostages in northern Mali, is a reminder of the fact that this area is a hotbed of the Islamic terrorism that struck France in 1995. Although, apparently, the potential for harm of all the armed Islamic groups operating in Algeria has been greatly reduced in the past three years, the payment of a ransom to the kidnappers threatens to increase the potential of the SGCC anew.

Moreover, in the course of the past two years, terrorists have tried to affect France through its interests and representatives abroad:

- On 11 April 2002 in Djerba (Tunisia): 19 dead, of whom 2 French national,
- On 8 May 2002 in Karachi (Pakistan), attack against a vehicle transporting DCN mechanics: 14 dead, of whom 11 French nationals, and 12 French nationals wounded,
- On 6 October 2002, attack against the French oil tanker ‘Limburg’ in the sea off Yemen,
- On 12 October 2002, in Bali (Indonesia): 202 dead, of whom 4 French nationals,
- On 12 May 2003 in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia): 34 dead and close to 100 wounded, of whom 4 French nationals;
- On 16 May 2003 in Casablanca (Morocco): 45 dead, of whom 4 French nationals.

On French territory, the French security services have exerted strong pressure on the Islamic movement operating in France or neighbouring countries. Several networks were dismantled and seventy one (71) terrorists have been arrested since May 2002, thirty eight (38) of whom are still in prison. During 2002 and the first months of 2003, the French branch of the support structure of the perpetrator of the Djerba attack, directly linked to Khalid Cheikh Mohamed, leading operational figure of al Qaeda, was dismantled. On 1 and 2 June 2003, two important figures of al Qaeda were arrested at Roissy-Charles-de-Gaulle airport; one of them was headed for the island of La Réunion in order to reconnoitre the island for future terrorist acts.
Germany

The investigation results confirm the assessment of the security authorities, according to which there is a potential pool of Islamic fighters residing in Germany who are willing to prepare and conduct terrorist attacks also in Germany. The collected objects show the potential perpetrators from the Islamic terrorism sector are prepared to use violence emphasizing at the same time the significance of Islamic mosques as central meeting point for potential terrorist.

- On 15 January 2003 the German Minister of Interior issued an activity ban on the Hizb ut Tahrir al Islami. In direct connection with the ban a total number of 30 premises were searched. As early as on 12 November 2002 the activists of Hizb ut Tahrir had been subject to search measures conducted on the grounds of suspected membership in/setting up of a criminal organization. Pursuant to the activity ban issued for Hizb ut-Tahrir further 82 premises in 11 Federal States were searched; computers, floppy disks, comprehensive propaganda material and other documents pertaining to the organization were collected.

- Pursuant to a Rogatory letter by the USA two Yemeni citizens suspected of being al Qaeda members were arrested on 10 January 2003 in Frankfurt am Main. The US prosecution authorities have been conducting an investigation against an allegedly top-rank al Qaeda member responsible for the logistics and financing sector of the organization. In the course of the investigation it has been established that the suspect, an Imam of the largest mosque in Sanaà (Yemen), was going to have an appointment in Frankfurt am Main on 07 October 2003.

- On 12 February 2003 in the course of an investigation concerning a suspected terrorist cell imbedded within an international conspirative network, eleven premises in Ludwigshafen, Mannheim, Worms, Wiesbaden Munich and surrounding areas were searched. Four out of the five suspects residing in Germany were found and interrogated. The corresponding investigation is being conducted against a total number of nine suspects of different nationality residing both in Germany and abroad.

- On 20 March 2003 police searched seven premises in Berlin, including the al Nur mosque serving as an initial meeting point for the group. The main suspect was arrested and found in possession of a Portuguese passport which had been stolen in a burglary in the Portuguese Embassy in Luxemburg in 2000.
Further objects collected included a pistol wanted by the Yugoslav Police in connection with a theft perpetrated on 18 August 1999, a list of chemical materials suitable for fabrication of explosive substances, various documents and a laptop computer.

- On 2 September 2003 in Bonn three residential premises attributed to an alleged member of GSPC Algerian terrorist group were searched. Numerous documents, audio and video cassettes as well as various data storage media and computers were collected. In his function as the “liaison person for Germany” the man is suspected to have been engaged in logistic support activities for GSPC who have a European network at their disposal.

- The Public Prosecutor is conducting an investigation against GSPC members on the grounds of kidnapping German tourists in Algeria in February 2003.

- On 19 February 2003 the court in Hamburg sentenced the Moroccan national Mounir el Motassadeq to a total of 15 years in prison for participation in a terrorist organization and abetment to 3066 cases of murder. The accused had been arrested on 28 November 2001 the verdict is the first in the world to be pronounced for participation in the attacks of 11 September 2001.

- On 10 March 2003 the court in Frankfurt/Main convicted 4 Algerian nationals for conspiracy to murder, preparation of a bomb attack and illegal possession of weapons. Aerobui Beandali was sentenced to 10 years, Fouhad Sabour to 11 years and 6 months, Salim Boukhari to 12 years and Lamine Maroni to 11 years. They had been arrested in Frankfurt/Main on 25 and 26 December 2000. When their residences were searched, the police seized, inter alia, weapons, chemicals and materials for the manufacture of bombs, as well as a self-shot video of the arrival to and departure from the Christmas market in Strasbourg. During the proceedings three of them admitted having planned a bomb attack again the Strasbourg synagogue at the end of 2000. The court found that the presentation of their case revealed that the attack, using a pressure cooker filled with permanganate of potassium and aluminium powder, was in fact to take place at the Christmas market in Strasbourg.

- On 14 August 2003 the trial of the Moroccan national Abdelghani Mzoudi accused of belonging to a terrorist organization as well as with abetment to at least 3066 counts of murder began in Hamburg. Mzoudi has been in prison in Hamburg awaiting trial since 10 October 2002. Since 1995, the defendant has maintained contact with the perpetrators of the attacks of 11 September 2001. (Atta, Alshehhi, Jarrah), as well as with El Motassadeq, who was sentenced to 15 years’ imprisonment for similar crimes.
Greece

Currently no immediate danger is posed in Greece from the Islamic extremist activities. To date there has been no evidence regarding the presence of Islamic extremist elements or of organized Islamic terrorist cells. However, the danger of such Islamic extremist elements appearing in the future is possible, mainly through the channel of illegal immigration and in any case this danger cannot be regarded as non-existent in Greece. It is pointed out that a limited number of illegal immigrants have been found to form groups in “informally established congregation for worship-prayer areas” in Greece, within some of which several cells are active which possibly aim at guiding and controlling the above mentioned groups. Nevertheless, at the moment, the danger of Islamic terrorist threat in Greece is considered to be low.

Ireland

The threat level against Irish interests from Islamic extremists is assessed as low. Cognisance is being taken of the recently issued threat advisories from the U.S. authorities. There have been no incidents linked to Islamic terrorism.

Italy

As to the threat posed by Islamic radical fundamentalism, the close interconnection between the various organisations gives cause for concern. Although different in origin and purpose, these provide mutual assistance in terms of logistic support, financing and propaganda and have in religion their common denominator. Another key factor is the possible exploitation by charismatic Islamic leaders of marginalized youth and the social and economic malaise many immigrants experience in Western countries. In the short-medium term, autonomous cells mainly consisting in so called “non-aligned” mujahideen pose the most serious threat. They are particularly dangerous in view of their high number and basic structure.”

Although no act of international terrorism has taken place in Italy over the last few months, the possibility of serious attacks by Islamic militants, also affecting other European countries, cannot be ruled out. The most likely targets include US, Israeli and, more generally, Western interests, with particular reference to politico-economic institutions.
Law enforcement activities have led to a number of arrests:

– On 04 October 2002 in Anzio (RM) Carabinieri arrested three Egyptians nationals on suspicion they were plotting an attack against American interests. During the search explosive and guns were found.

– In October 2002 in a series of raids throughout the country, Italian police arrested four people suspected of links to Osama bin Laden's al-Qaeda terror network. The men were all Tunisian nationals.

– On 10 October, 2002 Carabinieri during the operation “BAZAR” arrested seven people belonging to an international Islamic network. The investigations, that include telephone tapings, uncovered links to Spain, the Netherlands, Switzerland, Portugal, Bosnia, Czech Republic, Bulgaria, Turkey, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Iran.

– On 21 January 2003 in a flat used as a Mosque in Badia Polesine (Rovigo) the Carabinieri seized 1 Kg of plastic explosive and some maps in which were underlined some possible targets (NATO base, an abbey in Padua, some police stations and institutional buildings). Five Moroccan men were arrested.

– In April 2003 in Milano Carabinieri arrested four Tunisian people suspected of links with the Ansar Al Islam group in northern Iraq. The operation “BAZAR” had started in 2002 after the arrest of seven people accused of the creation of an Islamic terrorist cell for the recruitment and the logistical and economical support of terrorist.

– In June 2003 as the result of an operation carried out by the Guardia di Finanza against GSPC members in the region of Milan, 6 people have been arrested, five of whom were Tunisian and one Moroccan. The suspects are accused of providing financial and logistical support to the militant Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC).

**Luxemburg**

No Islamic extremist related incident or Islamic terrorist group activities were reported by Luxemburg law enforcement agencies.

Considering the financing of terrorism, a number of Bank accounts have been frozen and others put under strict surveillance.
The Netherlands

The threat Islamic terrorism poses for the Netherlands is primarily a derivative of the international threat. In this past year no attempts at Islamic terrorist attacks were observed in the Netherlands, but there were activities that are related to Islamic terrorism. This involves recruiting activities and support activities of a financial, material or logistic nature. Within this context several dozens of persons were arrested on the basis of investigations of the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) in 2002. Although it is difficult to give an exact figure of the size of the Dutch segments of the terrorist networks, it is estimated that around 150 persons connected to Islamist terrorist networks are active in the Netherlands.

Apart from facilitating Islamic terrorism as referred to above, some Islamic NGOs (non-governmental organisations) are involved in financing Islamic terrorism. Usually this concerns organisations with a charitable or other social purpose. Whereas investigations in this field are labour intensive the Dutch authorities focus on two aspects:

- Fulfilling international and EU regulations for the combat of terrorist finance,
- Special investigations by the AIVD. In 2002 and 2003 these investigations focused in particular on two organisations: Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) and the Al Aqsa Foundation.

With regard to the Benevolence International Foundation, an official message has been submitted by the AIVD to the Ministry of Finance. BIF is affiliated to the Al Qaeda network. The official message states that the foundation Benevolence International Nederland (BIN), which is registered in the Netherlands, is part of BIF. BIN consequently has been included on the sanctions list of the United Nations; BIF already was.

Under a national sanction rule, the assets of the Al Aqsa Foundation in the Netherlands were frozen in 2003. A Dutch court confirmed this national rule. The reason for this measure was the fact that the foundation provided funds to Hamas-affiliated organisations in the Middle East, which commit or support terrorist activities. The Al Aqsa Foundation has now been put on the EU list of terrorist organisations.
On 12 September 2002 the Iraqi Kurd Najamuddin Faraj Ahmed (‘Mullah Krekar’) was denied permission to enter the Netherlands. Mullah Krekar is the alleged leader of the radical-Islamic group Ansar Al Islam, a group with presence in an area in northern Iraq and is affiliated to Al Qaeda. The Mullah was en route (from Iran) to Schiphol and there were doubts about the validity of his Norwegian travel document (Krekar has a Norwegian alien status).

Spain

The various terrorist groups comprising the so-called “Islamic World Front” (under the leadership of al Qaeda, as well as the advocates of internationalisation of Jihad on a global scale, continue to pose the greatest threat to our interests as well as to the interests of the other EU Member States. The Spanish Government’s support of the military intervention in Iraq by the United States and its Allies constitutes without doubt a further risk factor for Spain, even though it might not be the most decisive or dangerous one.

In this sense, the attack targeting the Spanish Cultural Institute Casa de España in Casablanca (Morocco) could possibly be related not only to the armed conflict in Iraq, but also to other factors, notably the campaign carried out in the course of the last few months by radical Islamist groups (including Assirat Al Moustaquim and other currents connected to Salafija Jihadiya), targeting the western life style and moral decay and reverting to violent actions against persons who are considered to have strayed from the “righteous path” and places such as entertainment centres or places where alcohol is being sold.

On the other hand, the detention of two Moroccan citizens involved in the Casablanca suicide attack emphasizes the growing presence of radical Muslim elements in particular mosques, Koran centres etc., using these locations as clandestine centres for developing various activities, mainly logistic and financial tasks related to radical Islamism professing international Jihad (procurement, accommodation, obtaining economic resources, propaganda, diffusion of extremist ideas...) At the same time, it has to be pointed out that the amount of travelling and mutual visits throughout various European countries gives evidence of the narrow ties and relations that go beyond common positions on an ideological level.
The dismantlement of the al Qaeda financial network has not only proved to be a very important step representing a heavy blow to the logistic and financial infrastructure of the organization, but also revealed details of the financing operations concerning planning and conducting of the attack targeting the synagogue in Djerba (Tunisia), as well as connections to members of the group commanded by Mohamed Atta, who were detected in Spain and who fled the country shortly before the attacks of 11th September.

The stance taken by our country regarding the support of the military intervention in Iraq has, indeed, caused great animosity in the Palestine population of the Occupied Territories as well as in various Islamic countries. In some cases, during manifestations protesting against the military invasion of Iraq the slogans were directed not only against the USA and the United Kingdom, but also against Spain. In one of the manifestations the photograph of José María Aznar was included among the national leaders constituting the “Axis of Evil” directed against the Arab world.

The perpetration of the recent attacks in Riyadh (Saudi Arabia) and Casablanca (Morocco), and the risk of terrorist attacks being perpetrated in particular geographical areas (South East Asia, Maghrib, Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula) lead to assume that armed Islamist groups tend to intensify the number of violent attacks of as well as the destructive effects of these attacks. These would most probably be spectacular, blind, murderous, and indiscriminate terrorist actions intended to cause the highest possible number of victims.

Concerning the modus operandi, suicide attack will probably continue to be the first choice, as can be concluded from the directives given by Number 2 of al Qaeda, Ayman al Zawahiri, in audio tape broadcast by Al Jazeera.

While the audio tape mentioned above did explicitly allude to damaging the interests of the USA, United Kingdom, Australia and Norway, as well as calling for armed attacks against the Jews, Ayman al Zawahiri challenged the Muslims to “expel the Americans and other invaders from their respective countries” which amounts to say that every Western country could become a victim of violent attacks.
On the other hand, the fact that the majority of Western countries have enhanced and/or tightened their security measures protecting particular potential targets (diplomatic legations, airports, ports, nuclear plants, merchandise transports, military facilities...) could lead the terrorists to revert to attacking “soft” targets (hotels, tourist facilities, cultural, economic or historic buildings of symbolic character etc.) as well as using conventional methods to minimize possible practical complications at the moment of perpetrating the attack.

Finally, it has to be pointed out that, bearing in mind the insisting proclamations of Ayman al Zawahiri referring to the necessity of expelling foreigners from Muslim countries, and the threats directed at the Western countries mentioned above, the risk of perpetrating attacks targeted against various Peacekeeping missions conducted by Western countries in geographical conflict zones like Iraq or Afghanistan has to be considered as high and growing. Beyond that, other Arab countries could become the scene of attacks directed against Western interests as Ayman al Zawahiri explicitly accused Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, Egypt, Yemen, and Jordan of “opening their lands, their air space and their territorial waters to crusader troops that invaded Iraq”.

**Sweden**

There are no indications that any foreign terror group or network present in Sweden plan to carry out acts of violence in Sweden or against Swedish interests. Islamic extremist networks continue to be represented in Sweden alongside traditional, hierarchical groups like the Hizbollah and the Hamas. Militant Islamic networks also continue to maintain recruiting structures in Sweden, primarily focusing on attracting second generation Muslim immigrants for religious instruction and, in some cases, military training in the Middle East and Central Asia.

The threat represented by international terrorism varies greatly depending on different factors and contexts. One way of assessing the various types of threats is to describe a specific threat on the basis of its different prerequisites. With such an approach, the threat facing Sweden from international terrorism can be separated into three categories:

- The direct threat.
- The transferred threat.
- The self-imposed threat.
The direct threat from international terrorism is, low. There are no known terrorist actors planning to carry out any acts of violence against Sweden or Swedish interests. There is however a possibility that Sweden may be used as a territorial base for planning and possibly even carrying out terrorist activities, and this factor also must be taken into consideration when assessing the direct threat.

The transferred threat refers to the impact on Sweden and Swedish interests of terrorist threats directed towards other countries, specifically towards the interests of these countries in Sweden. The level of the transferred threat increased after September 11, 2001. This threat is mainly connected to American, Israeli and British interests in Sweden.

The self-imposed threat refers to the assessed terrorist threat directed towards Swedish interests abroad. This threat naturally depends on each specific situation. Swedish engagement in conflict areas in different parts of the world clearly exposes Swedish citizens to potential risk. These threats can be avoided, and the vulnerability thus can be to a certain extent controlled.

**United Kingdom**

There were no international terrorist attacks in the UK during the period under review. However, al Qaeda (AQ) and associated Islamist terrorist groups continue to regard the UK as a priority target. Statements by Osama bin Laden and his deputy, Ayman Zawahiri, have underlined al Qaeda’s wish to attack the country. There has been intensive investigation of suspected international terrorist activity in the UK. Police executive action has included the following.

- Three Algerians were arrested in Edinburgh on 18 December 2002. A further four Algerians with connections to those in Edinburgh were arrested in London on the same day. Subsequently, a further five related arrests were made in Oxford and Edinburgh on 19–21 December 2002. Eight of those arrested were charged under the Terrorism Act 2000. Two of these individuals were subsequently released.
- On 5–6 January 2003 police searched a property in north London and found indications of the production of toxins. Police also searched a further four properties, and arrested a total of seven people, in connection with this investigation. Further addresses (in London, Edinburgh, Glasgow and Manchester) were searched on 6 February 2003 as part of the continuing investigation into this network. On 20 January police searched Finsbury Park Mosque in North London and arrested 7 men, in an operation related to the arrests on 5–6 January.
– A man was arrested at Gatwick Airport on 13 February 2003 after the discovery of a hand-grenade in his rucksack. He is currently awaiting trial.
– Two men were jailed for 11 years on 1 April 2003 under the Terrorism Act, after they were found guilty of raising funds for terrorism.
– An Algerian man linked to a Leicester based Islamic extremist cell was sentenced to 4 years imprisonment on 10 July for fraud, theft and conspiracy to make false instruments.

4.2 MIDDLE-EAST- IRAQ

Austria

Although some increasing concern and solidarity with the Palestinian people was observed within the Palestinian circles in Austria, there was no indication of an increased readiness for violence. On 20. June 2003, the USA applied for putting several Palestinian associations, including the Austrian Palestinian Association („Palästinensische Vereinigung in Österreich – PVÖ“), on the list of organizations sponsoring terrorism.

This association is focusing on humanitarian aid for the Palestinians by offering financial support to relief organizations and their humanitarian projects in the Occupied Territories, in Israel and Lebanon.

No circumstantial evidence has been identified from previous investigations indicating that any money was used for financing terrorist organizations, such as HAMAS, and no further information has been obtained by which the suspicion raised by the USA could be corroborated.

Denmark

The Public Prosecutor for Serious Economic Crime is presently conducting an investigation concerning the”Al-Aqsa Foundation” organisation. This investigation relates to a suspicion regarding the organisation’s possible links to the funding of terrorism in Palestine.
**France**

The recent worsening of the situation in the Middle East has had its effects on the terrorist activities of Palestinian movements, both non-religious and Islamic. Although the majority of these groups have, so far, limited their activities to the autonomous territories and to the Israeli territory, the possibility that they might attempt isolated violent attacks against Israeli or Jewish interests in Europe cannot be discounted.

More recently, the Islamic movement appears to be active in a new area: the resistance to the 'occupation of Iraq' by the coalition troops, the attacks using car bombs in Baghdad on 7 and 19 August 2003 against the embassy of Jordan (9 dead) and against the seat of the UN (22 dead, among whom the UN’s special representative), could be attributed to the Islamic movement, especially following the various claims of responsibility that were made to an Arab satellite channel and an Islamic internet site. The generalized insecurity which has reigned in Iraq for several months now is blighted by an escalation of violence which, after the attack of 29 August 2003 (a day of prayer) in the Shiite holy city of Nadjaf which caused the death of eighty three (83) believers could now degenerate into a religious war.

The communiqué, dated 3 September, broadcast by the Saudi Arabian satellite channel ‘Al Arabiya’ on 7 September, made by a spokesperson of the organization going by the name of Abou Abdel Rahman Al-Nadji, took the form, like many others before it, of a call for action, raising fears of an imminent terrorist act targeting the United States, especially as the anniversary of September 11 approaches. In the same communiqué, Al Qaeda denies every implication in the Nadjaf attack.

**Germany**

On 24 June 2003 the court in Düsseldorf opened the main hearing against Shadi Abdalla who is accused of having significantly contributed in his capacity as member of the terrorist organization Al Tawhid to the preparation of an attack with handguns and hand-grenades against Jewish or Israeli targets in Germany. During the main hearing, the defendant testified having reconnoitred Jewish attack targets in Düsseldorf and Berlin.
His statements during the preliminary proceedings essentially had corroborated the results of the investigations, according to which he belonged to a group responsible for the collection of funds for the financing of Al Tawhid and other terrorist organizations. This is the first trial in Germany against a member of the Sunni Palestinian Al Tawhid movement, which has close contacts with al-Qaeda. It is also the first trial against a member of an Islamic terrorist organization for planned attacks in Germany.

Greece

The situation in the Middle East is considered to be of significant concern. Continuing terrorist actions (suicide attacks) by Palestinian organizations together with the reprisals of Israeli Forces have put serious obstacles to the implementation of the “Road Map”. With regard to Palestinians residing in Greece, it is pointed out that in the course of the Palestinian Intifada, until today no threatening activity has occurred against Israeli targets in Greece.

United Kingdom

Two British passports were found at the scene of a suicide attack in Tel Aviv, Israel on 30 April 2003. The explosion killed three Israelis and injured 50. The attack was claimed jointly by HAMAS-IDQ and the Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. The holder of one of the passports was the suicide bomber, while the second is believed to have been an intended suicide bomber, who fled the scene when his device failed to detonate. He was later discovered dead. On 9 May, three members of his family were charged in UK under the Terrorism Act.

4.3 TURKISH-KURD GROUPS

Austria

During the period covered by this report, no activities liable to prosecution were observed which could be linked to the above-mentioned spectre. These groups focussed their activities on propaganda.
KADEK went on with its non-violent policy. Although several demonstrations were carried out because of Abdullah Öcalan’s conditions of detention (solitary confinement) and because of the Kurdish question, no incidents occurred.

The propaganda activities carried out by Turkish left-wing organizations were focussed on the condition of detention in Turkish prisons. The demonstrations staged for that reason were peaceful, too.

**France**

During the past months, the threat linked to the activity of Turkish-Kurd terrorist organizations has only increased in strength. The DHKP/C, a Turkish organization of Marxist-Leninist tendencies, which hadn’t had recourse to violence for almost two years, claimed responsibility for several attacks in Turkey since April 2003. Although in May of this year the KADEK (ex-PKK) stated its will to abandon the armed fight in favour of political activism, there has however been a hardening in its stance. The worsening of the situation in Iraq and the announced intervention of Kurdish troops in the American-British attack force will probably have an effect on the decisions of the Kurdish party. As for the Turkish Islamic organizations, their openly anti-Western ideology creates the need for special care where they are concerned, even though, for now, only Turkey has suffered violent acts.

**Germany**

– KADEK/PKK

On 29 July 2003, the Turkish parliament adopted the ‘act of repentance’, a law on ‘integration in society’, also called ‘amnesty act’. According to this act, fighters of the PKK who have not taken part in battles were granted impunity. Guerrillas of the PKK who have taken part in battles will be granted a significant remission, provided they reveal what they know to the security services. This arrangement excludes leading figures of KADEK. The leadership of the organisation has rejected the ‘amnesty act’ as it presently stands and instead suggests unlimited amnesty for all PKK/KADEK fighters, as well as for their imprisoned comrades.
On 01 September 2003, ‘Özgür Politika’ the press organ of KADEK published a statement by Abdullah Öcalan, according to which the unilateral ceasefire that was proclaimed four years ago should be turned into a bilateral armistice. At the same time, a warning was issued in Turkey that there could be a new war, if no peaceful and democratic solution to the Kurdish question was found. The actual statements of KADEK presumably mark the beginning of the change in the so-called ‘three-tier plan’ of August 2003 towards a peaceful solution to the Kurdish problem. The first step is about the achievement of a bilateral armistice, which should start on 01 September and end on 01 December 2003. The ending of the unilateral ceasefire by the KADEK does not necessarily mean that the armed fight will begin again. A possible return to violent acts of terrorism should be connected to the respect of the ‘three-tier plan’. Öcalan’s statements probably aim at getting a reaction from the Turkish government and forcing developments. KADEK’s structures allow it to initiate and carry out Europe-wide campaigns with the participation of large numbers of their members. In Germany a short-term deviation of KADEK from the ‘path to peace’ is not expected. The endangering of tourism in Turkey by KADEK is, for the time being, considered less likely.

DHKP-C

In the framework of an investigation conducted by the Public Prosecutor in Koblenz/Rhineland-Palatinate on the grounds of suspicion of larceny by extortion and infringement of the German Associations Act and pursuant to the ruling of the Regional Court in Koblenz thirty five search operations were conducted simultaneously in six Federal States against members and supporters of DHKP-C. Evidence collected in the course of these operations led to further ten search operations. An arrest warrant was issued and executed for the main suspect on the grounds of serious larceny by extortion. Even though DHKP-C has not perpetrated any serious criminal acts in Germany since the end of 1998, the investigation mentioned above shows that the organization still has intact structures both in Germany and in Turkey at its disposal.

4.4 IRAN

France

Where the Organization of Mujahideen of the People of Iran is concerned, the headquarters of which, situated in France, have for a long time been an important base from which responsibility has been claimed for several attacks in Iran, the judicial operation of 17 June profoundly disorganized its activities and structures.
Nevertheless, the OMPI quickly tried to restructure its network of influence on French territory, making the will of its leaders to continue their activities from France clear. Considering the situation in the Middle East (military intervention in Iran, pressures applied on Iran), the Shiite movement must remain a subject of concern as far as the terrorist threat is concerned.