NOTE

from : Presidency

to Heads of central bodies of the MS for law and order and security

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Subject : Checklist regarding possible measures on the occasion of European Councils and other comparable events
1. **Establishing the responsibilities at strategic and police level – agreements with the organiser**

a) For each event, it is clearly established who is going to take on which responsibility with regard to the maintenance of public order, in the framework of the preparations as well as during the actual event. The duties of each service are well-defined, with a difference being clearly made between the strategic level and the police level, the national and the local level as well as between the organiser and the services in charge of maintaining public order and the security policy. Each of the responsible services does its own planning in order to achieve the overall planning.

b) At strategic and police level, it is clearly established, both at national and at local level, which are the matters that require co-operation with other services that can provide the necessary input with regard to managing the event efficiently (mobility, public health, prevention services, judicial services, etc.).

c) There is going to be the setting up of an executive institution comprising representatives of all the competent services involved. This institution shall meet periodically prior to the event as well as during the actual event, so as to make decisions in a coherent and co-ordinate way according to the course of the event.

d) All the parties involved are to take the necessary material, technical and personal measures to perform the assigned duties with all the required efficiency, quality and swiftness. To this end, a database containing the possible contacts is to be created.
e) Should several Councils or similar events be taking place in the same country, it will have to see to it that the security measures and the thresholds of tolerance are harmonised as much as possible on the occasion of such events.

f) The organising country makes the necessary security arrangements with the organiser of the event. The responsibilities of each one of the parties are clearly defined and established.

g) The security arrangements with the organiser shall include at least:
- the event’s location and infrastructure which cannot be the cause of any disturbances of public order (this also goes for the guests’ hotels)
- the entrance check: it has to be designed in such a way that unauthorised people cannot have access to the event’s location. If necessary, a perimeter system shall be created. In such a situation, it has to be clear which responsibilities in which area devolve on which service.
- The maximisation of the security measures which are to be taken by the organiser (among which there is for instance private surveillance) and of the European or similar bodies’ available security services.
- The fast and complete exchange of information about the people who shall be attending the meeting, the length of their stay, the place where they shall be accommodated, etc.
- The necessary measures with regard to the VIPs’ and hotels’ security.

2. The exchange of information

a) The permanent national contact point in each Member State ensures the collection, analysis and exchange of relevant information regarding European Councils and other comparable events, in relation to both the other Member States and third countries.
b) In each Member State, the permanent national contact point that ensures the collection, analysis and exchange of relevant information proceeds to draw up a permanent risk analysis of the groups of demonstrators from the home Member State. This risk analysis pertains to groups of peaceful demonstrators as well as to groups of potential troublemakers. This risk analysis, which has to be constantly updated, concerns at least the matters mentioned in the annex.

c) This risk analysis is forwarded well in advance to an organising country. As the event draws nearer, the organising country can of course ask the other Member States for further information.

d) In each Member State, the permanent national contact point that ensures the collection, analysis and exchange of information provides –in conformity with the national legislation– on the occasion of the event or on its own initiative, all the relevant information for the other national contact points concerned. The information can be about the demonstrators’ travel means and routes, the alleged length of their stay, the accommodation, etc.

e) The permanent national contact point in the organising country and/or the competent Minister contacts well in advance the permanent national contact point in the Member State concerned in order to inform them about the needs, the expectations, the structures and the method of working. This also applies to the international police co-operation, as stated in point 3.

f) The permanent national contact point in the organising country supplies the permanent national contact points in the other countries with the legislation, thresholds of tolerance, etc. that are in force in the organising country.

g) The permanent national contact point, in conformity with the national legislation and the technical possibilities, proceeds to exchange personal data regarding violent troublemakers.
h) The international information exchange occurs between the permanent national contact points in each Member State. After being processed, the information is used by the permanent national contact point itself and passed on to the relevant authorities and police services. The permanent national contact point of the organising country should take all the necessary measures in order to be able to disperse the information from the foreign police teams to the right place at the right time. Contacts between the police services of the different countries involved in an event are co-ordinated and, if needed, organised by the permanent national contact point.

i) The police forces of the organising country should ensure that lines of communication and information facilities are clear to supporting foreign police forces, taking into account the nature of information (terrorism, general crime facts, public order, etc.).

j) The permanent national contact point in each Member State should communicate via the liaison officer appointed by the country concerned.

k) If a local contact point is also in place, this contact point shall work together with the permanent national contact point, the latter being responsible for managing the event. To this end, the permanent national contact point draws up the minimum criteria which this co-operation will have to meet. The local and national contact points should keep one another informed. This information flow should take into account information provided by the liaison officer from the supporting country.

l) The permanent national contact points should communicate in such a way that the confidential character of the data is guaranteed.

m) After the event, the permanent national contact in the organising country point shall draw up as quickly as possible an incident report, should disturbances of law and order have occurred. This report shall be handed over to the central authorities referred to in Article 3 of the Joint Action of 26 May 1997.
n) After the event, the permanent national contact point in the organising country is to draw up as quickly as possible an overall evaluation report which shall be handed over to the central authorities referred to in Article 3 of the Joint Action of 26 May 1997. The evaluation report should at least have a connection with the international police co-operation and the international information exchange.

3. **The international police co-operation**

a) Each Member State should appoint a liaison officer who has the necessary knowledge in relation to public order on the occasion of large-scale events with an international dimension.

b) Taking notably into account the risks in connection with the presence of one or several groups of demonstrators from a given country, the organising country can ask another Member State that the aforementioned liaison officer should be put at the organising country’s disposal on the occasion of a concrete event.

c) The principal question as to sending a liaison officer is issued well in advance by the competent Minister in the organising country. The organising country is at liberty to choose the country from which the liaison officer is going to be requested. The further development of the co-operation should occur by means of the permanent national contact points referred to in point 2.

d) On the occasion of the event the liaison officer should be stationed at the permanent national contact point of the organising country. He will be in charge of the communication with the home country.

e) Each Member State proceeds to the appointment of the necessary police or intelligence officers who are able to identify the persons or groups likely to pose a threat to public order and security. These police or intelligence officers have experience in public order maintenance with reference to large-scale events with an international dimension.
f) Taking into account that the presence of one or more groups of foreign demonstrators contains
certain risks, the organising country may request the other country to put these police or
intelligence officers at its disposal on the occasion of a concrete event.

g) The police forces of the organising country should only request the support of foreign police or
intelligence officers that can contribute added value. This added value must be considered in the
light of a number of factors, such as professional experience in public order maintenance with
reference to large-scale events with an international dimension, knowledge about risk
demonstrators or groups and being able to supply information so as to prevent disturbances of
public order and security. For countries which are involved and which want to contribute added
value in the future, the opportunity can be given to learn from experience.

h) The composition of the team of foreign police or intelligence officers will depend on
knowledge of the hard cores which are very likely to be present.

i) The foreign police force will indicate as soon as possible the extent to which it can meet the
request to provide support for the police force of the organising country. The scale of the
foreign police team will then be determined in consultation. The size of the police team will
therefore not be the same for all countries, but will relate to some extent to the threat and the
risk posed by the demonstrators from the country concerned and to practicalities.

j) The police force(s) in the organising country should provide an opportunity for the supporting
foreign police or intelligence officers to acquaint themselves with the organisation of police
operations in the host country and/or the venue town(s) and with the location of the meeting, as
well as to get to know the operational commander(s) at the venue town(s) on the event’s day.
This can occur on one of the days prior to the event.
k) The support that the foreign police or information officers can supply, forms part of the host police organisation’s tactical plan. This means that the foreign police or intelligence officers shall be informed, in a language they can understand, about the host police organisation’s tactical plan, that they shall be given the possibility to attend briefing and debriefing procedures, that they shall be given the opportunity to become an explicit partner in the information structure (so that they can give information as well as be informed) and that they shall be actively included in the police deployment in the field. As regards the use of languages, arrangements must be made in advance by the countries concerned.

l) The host police organisation should ensure the physical safety of the supporting foreign police or intelligence officers, by having the foreign police or intelligence officers accompanied by the host police organisation. The accompaniment of the foreign police or intelligence officers is organised in such a way that there is always good communication between the management of the local police forces and the permanent national contact point of the organising country. The foreign police or intelligence officer always sees to it that his/her action does not unnecessarily jeopardise his/her fellow countrymen or foreign colleagues, or make them take unjustified risks.

m) If possible, and if desirable, the police forces of the country where the demonstrators are from, supervise the risk demonstrators during their whole travelling time, until they reach the country where the event takes place.

n) The host police organisation should assign the team of the supporting country at least one accompanying police officer with sufficient language knowledge and proficiency to maintain operational contact with the team and make reports. This accompanying police officer should be knowledgeable about public order maintenance on the occasion of large-scale events with an international dimension and about the missions of foreign police or intelligence officers. The accompanying police officer is thoroughly briefed on his/her own task, on the task of the supporting police team and on the tactical plan of the host police organisation.
o) The police forces of the organising country should have available sufficient translation capacity. This will relieve supporting police teams from the various countries of having to do much interpreting, which would keep them from actual operational tasks. This translation capacity will also facilitate communication between the organising country’s police forces and the supporting police team.

p) The host police organisation should provide the team of the supporting country with the necessary communications equipment, which meets the needs of the supporting team.

q) The team of the supporting country should consult with the police force of the organising country about the equipment to be brought by the team and the use made of it.

4. Measures relating to the crossing of borders and the foreign demonstrators.

a) The organising country should take all the measures that it considers to be necessary to prevent potential troublemakers from moving to the location where the event takes place. Should it be necessary, article 2.2 of the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement will be applied.

b) Each country should appeal to the existing juridical possibilities so as to prevent people who are notorious for disturbing public order from moving to the country where the event takes place, should there be serious reasons to assume that these persons are moving with the intention to organise or provoke disturbances of public order or to participate in them.

c) The organising country should make the necessary arrangements to implement quickly and efficiently the potential expulsion measures. The necessary arrangements should also be made with the Member States to settle the co-operation in case of repatriation of citizens.
d) The host country should conclude the necessary agreements with the neighbouring countries so that the expulsion and repatriation will work efficiently.

e) If necessary, the host country should make the necessary arrangements with the countries involved to allow common or co-ordinated preventive patrols or to carry out common controls.

f) The necessary agreements with the countries involved must be made, should police accompaniment of the demonstrators during their outward and return journey be provided.

5. **Communication and media strategy**

a) At international level the organising country should proceed soon enough to communicate the thresholds of tolerance and the security measures (insofar that these are not confidential). Therefore the support of the competent authorities in the other countries could be requested, so that the demonstrators of the different countries are acquainted with the applicable rules on the occasion of the event.

b) At national level, all the parties involved should proceed to the development of a common communication strategy. The necessary arrangements should be made, referring to the determination of the responsibilities regarding the communication towards the media, this to avoid double circuits.

c) On the one hand, the communication strategy should contain the reports for the broad public in general regarding the event (the thresholds of tolerance and the security measures, information about the course of the event and possible incidents, …) and the specific reports for the local population regarding the event and the measures that have been taken. On the other hand, this communication strategy concerns a constructive dialogue between the policy representatives and the demonstrators.
d) Within the internal police organisation, the necessary information should be supplied to the actors involved, about, among others, the thresholds of tolerance in force, the missions of the foreign police forces, …

6. **Preventive measures**

a) All the parties involved make the necessary agreements concerning the preventive measures which should be taken and concerning the exact role and contribution of the prevention services, in particular in relation with the role and the contribution of the police services. The aim of the co-operation is an integrated approach of the event, for which the tasks of each service should be carried out in a complementary way. In such a way and if necessary, the prevention workers can interfere as mediator between the police forces and the demonstrators.

b) The local population has to be involved in the event by means of prevention in the districts. This preventive approach includes developing and organising activities, which have to prevent possible confrontations with demonstrators. The prevention in the districts is developed in collaboration with the local authority.

c) The member states proceed to exchanging information, with a view to the development of a common approach and through - amongst others - the European Network for Crime Prevention, on the best practices to establish dialogues with the organisers of demonstrations so that legitimate demonstrations are not used by groups having violent intentions.

d) It is recommended that local contact points for prevention are created by the local authorities. These contact points will be in permanent contact with the permanent national point, as mentioned in point 2, a). This local point will gather and spread useful information on a good guidance of the demonstrators and will look for solutions concerning the practical problems of the demonstrators and the local population, with respect to the current rules and habits.