

FRAN Quarterly

ISSUE 3 • JULY–SEPTEMBER 2012

Q1

Q2

Q3

Q4





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Warsaw, January 2013
Risk Analysis Unit
Frontex reference number: 374

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The FRAN Quarterly has been prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit. During the course of developing this product, many colleagues at Frontex and outside contributed to it and their assistance is hereby acknowledged with gratitude.

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List of abbreviations used

BCP	border-crossing point
CeCLAD-M	Centre de Coordination pour la Lutte Anti-Drogue en Méditerranée
COD	Democratic Republic of the Congo (Congo-Kinshasa)
EDF-RAN	European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network
EPN	European Patrol Network
EU	European Union
EUR	euro
FRAN	Frontex Risk Analysis Network
fYROM	former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia
GEO	Grupo Especial de Operaciones
ICJ	International Court of Justice
ID	identity document
IOM	International Organization for Migration
JO	Joint Operation
MS	Member State
NM	nautical mile
NOK	Norwegian krone
OCG	organised crime group
RAU	Frontex Risk Analysis Unit
SV	sea vessel
SEESAC	South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons
SIS	Schengen Information System
UK	United Kingdom
UNODC	United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
USD	United States dollar
VIN	vehicle identification number
WB-ARA	Western Balkans Annual Risk Analysis
WB-RAN	Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network

Note

As some Member States are unable to distinguish between the Democratic Republic of Congo (Congo-Kinshasa) and Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), 'Congo' and 'Congolese' are used as collective terms for these two countries throughout this report unless otherwise indicated.

Executive summary

During the third quarter of 2012, several FRAN indicators varied radically compared to recent reporting periods. Firstly, there was a massive reduction in detections of illegal-border crossing compared to previous third quarters, widely attributed to increased operational activity by the Greek authorities since the beginning of August 2012 at their land border with Turkey. Secondly, there was the largest number of applications for asylum since data collection began in early 2008, for the most part due to increased applications submitted by Syrians. Finally, at BCPs there were the most refusals of entry and detections of clandestine entries since early 2009.

Overall, in Q3 2012 there were fewer detections of illegal border-crossing than in any previous third quarter, following the launch of two Greek Operations: Aspida (Shield), which involved the deployment of ~1 800 Greek police officers to the Greek land border with Turkey, and Xenios Zeus, which focused on the inland apprehension of illegally staying persons. The much-increased surveillance and patrolling activities at the Greek-Turkish land border, combined with the lengthening of the detention period to up to 6 months, resulted in a drastic drop in the number of detections of irregular migrants from ~2 000 during the first week of August to below ten per week in each of the last few weeks of October. Perhaps somewhat predictably, there were increased detections of illegal border-crossing at both the Turkish sea border with Greece and land border with Bulgaria, indicative of weak displacement effects from the operational area. Also relevant in this area were several detections of significant amounts of heroin con-

cealed in vehicles attempting to cross the Bulgarian-Turkish border.

Despite the clear impact of the Greek operational activities on the number of detections of illegal border-crossing, there is little evidence to suggest that the absolute flow of irregular migrants arriving in the region has decreased in any way. In fact, document fraud on flights from Istanbul increased once the Greek operations commenced. Hence, there remains a very significant risk of a sudden influx of migrants immediately subsequent to the end of the operations.

As far as nationalities are concerned, at the EU level migrants from Afghanistan continued to be the most widely detected across a range of indicators. For instance, Afghans ranked first in terms of detections of illegal border-crossing, clandestine entries at BCPs and illegal stay, and second for being subject to decisions to leave. Hence, this nationality is by far the most significant for irregular migration at the EU level. In contrast to most other nationalities, many detected Afghans had previously resided in Iran or Pakistan, rather than their home country. In Pakistan, energy shortages in many refugee camps may accelerate departures of Afghans; according to the UNHCR, 400 000 to 800 000 Afghans are expected to leave Pakistan during 2012 and 2013.

In Q3 2012 Syrian nationals were increasingly detected across a wide range of indicators and Member States, reflecting the desperate situation in their home country. For example, compared to the previous quarter, detections of illegal border-crossing doubled in Q3 2012 to nearly 4 000. As a result they ranked second at the EU level for ille-



gal border-crossing. However, subsequent to increased operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey, detections of Syrians fell significantly, although slower and to a lesser extent than it was the case for other nationalities, which reflects Syrians' desperate plight. Each migrant detected illegally crossing the border into Greece is handed a decision to leave the country within 7 days and, so correspondingly, in Q3 2012 Syrians were also subject to twice as many decisions to leave compared with the previous quarter.

Most Syrians continued their journey on to other Member States, and so they were also increasingly detected as clandestine entries across the Western Balkans and using fraudulent documents travelling from Greece to (mostly) German airports. According to EDF-RAN data, on intra-Schengen flights the most commonly detected documents used by Syrians were counterfeit Greek and Romanian ID cards, image-substituted Bulgarian ID cards and stolen blank Greek residence permits. Finally, Syrian nationals submitted twice as many asylum applications as in the previous quarter.

As Greece is a Schengen exclave and also (mostly) a transit country, secondary movements from Greece to other EU Member States were still detected in very high numbers. For example, at the EU level there were more clandestine detections than in any other period since data collection began for this indicator in 2009, with most increases reported from the Western Balkans and of nationalities tightly coupled with those detected at the Greek border with Turkey. For instance, Slovenia reported more detections than any other Member State, mostly of Afghan migrants detected at the border with Croatia who were making secondary movements after initially entering the Schengen area in Greece.

Similarly, Afghan migrants, together with increasing numbers of nationals from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Syria, were also detected arriving on pleasure boats in the southern Italian blue borders of Calabria and Apulia after having initially entered the Schengen area in Greece. In fact, according to the FRAN data there were more detections in these regions than ever before. Finally, a wide variety of nationalities were also increasingly detected using fraudulent documents on flights from Greece to airports in other EU Member States, particularly in Germany.

Although Greece reported more than half of all detections of illegal border-crossing, there remained significant numbers reported from elsewhere, particularly the Central Mediterranean. According to FRAN data, in Q3 2012 there were more than 3 500 reported detections of illegal border-crossing on the main Central Mediterranean route (Italian Pelagic Islands, Sicily and Malta), a significant decrease compared to the same reporting period in 2011 during the peak associated with the Arab Spring, but still the highest reported so far in 2012, and higher than the pre-Arab Spring peak of 2010. Additionally, there were some significant increases of various nationalities such as Tunisians and Egyptians departing from their own countries, and Somalis and Eritreans departing from Libya. Several reports included details of how sub-Saharan migrants were often deceived, over-charged or even left to drown by their facilitators during the embarkation process.

Ranking third at the EU level for detections of illegal border-crossing, Algerians were also detected along a range of border sections, which is in contrast to most other nationalities which show strong preferences for single entry points. Algerians were equally detected at the Greek land border with Turkey, the Spanish land border with Morocco and several areas of the Spanish sea border. In total, this amounts to a very signifi-

cant pressure from Algerian migrants, which may be overlooked by a regional approach. Moreover, they were very rarely refused entry or detected with fraudulent documents, suggesting that they tended to avoid BCPs. However, with considerable detections they ranked fifth at the EU level as illegal stayers and seventh for decisions to leave, both mostly in Belgium, which indicates their final destination.

Albanians continued to be detected illegally crossing their land border with Greece at rates that remain significant at the EU level (5% of all detections) but with a slightly declining trend. They were, however, increasingly detected using counterfeit border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay. They were detected mostly at their land border with Greece but also at the land border of Slovenia.

At the eastern borders, the cross-border smuggling of tobacco products was one of

the most common offences. With respect to irregular migration, more Georgians were refused entry at the Polish border with Belarus mostly for Reason C: 'No valid visa'. As there were fewer Georgians detected illegally crossing the green border this may suggest a change of *modus operandi*. This phenomenon is likely to lead to an increase in Georgians illegally staying in other Member States. A similar pattern was observed in 2009, when the increase corresponded to an increase in asylum applications of Georgian nationals in Poland.

There were more asylum applications submitted than ever before, mostly due to a steady trend of Afghans and increasing numbers of Syrian nationals. However, these asylum seekers were joined by increasing numbers of migrants from Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia submitting applications in Germany.



1. Introduction

FRAN Quarterly reports are prepared by the Frontex Risk Analysis Unit (RAU) and provide a regular overview of irregular migration at the EU external borders, based on the irregular-migration data exchanged among Member State border-control authorities within the cooperative framework of the Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN) and its subsidiary, the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

The main purpose of the FRAN Quarterlies is to provide:

1. feedback to the FRAN community in the context of information exchange;

2. a periodic update to the situational picture of irregular migration at the EU level; and
3. material for constructive discussion on reporting protocols and related trends and patterns.

The report is intended to simultaneously serve two objectives: first, to provide a clear summary of the situation at the external border of the EU, and second, to serve as an archive for future reference and comparative analyses. Consistent with standard archival techniques, some information is repeated among sections to serve as context.

2. Methodology

The present 17th issue of the FRAN Quarterly is a comparative analysis of FRAN data collected between July and September 2012, based on data and information provided by 30 Member State border-control authorities within the framework of the FRAN. The report presents results of statistical analysis of quarterly variations in eight irregular-migration indicators and one asylum indicator, aggregated at the level of the event. Bi-monthly analytical reports were also used for interpretative purposes and to provide qualitative information, as were other available sources of information such as Frontex Joint Operations.

External borders refer to the borders between Member States and third countries. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries (Norway, Iceland and Switzerland) and third countries are also considered as external borders. The borders between the Schengen Associated Countries and Schengen Member States are considered as internal borders. For the indicators on detections of facilitators, illegal stay and asylum, statistics are also reported for detections at the land borders between the Schengen Member States and Schengen candidates (Bulgaria, Romania) or non-Schengen Member States (the UK, Ireland), so that a total for EU Member States and the Schengen Associated Countries as a whole can be presented. It was not possible to make this distinction for air and sea borders because Member States do not habitually differentiate between extra-EU and intra-EU air and sea connections but tend to aggregate data for all arrivals.

When data are examined at the level of third-country nationalities, a large percentage usually falls under the category 'Other (not specified)' or 'Unknown'. It is expected that the percentage reported under these categories will decrease with time as Member

Monthly data on the following indicators were exchanged among the FRAN community:

- 1A detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs
- 1B detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs
- 2 detections of suspected facilitators
- 3 detections of illegal stay
- 4 refusals of entry
- 5 asylum applications
- 6 document fraud (EDF-RAN)
- 7A return decisions for illegally staying third-country nationals
- 7B effective returns of illegally staying third-country nationals

FRAN data used in the tables and charts are as of 10 November 2012

States improve the quality and speed of their identification, data collection and reporting practices; nationalities are often reported as 'Unknown' if an individual's nationality cannot be established before reports are submitted.

This issue of the FRAN Quarterly also includes main findings of Frontex-coordinated Joint Operations active in Q3 2012. Namely, for sea borders they were JO Poseidon Sea 2012, JO Focal Points Sea 2012, JO Indalo 2012, JO Aeneas 2012, JO Hermes 2012, JO Hera 2012, JO Minerva 2012; for land borders – JO Poseidon Land 2012, JO Focal Points Land 2012, JO Jupiter 2012 1 Phase; and for the air border – JO Focal Points Air 2012.

Both primary data sources, such as interviews with irregular migrants, and secondary data sources, such as reports of intelligence analysts, daily reports of deployed officers and analytical products (weekly and bi-weekly analytical reports for each abovementioned operation), were used to provide an exhaustive overview of the situation at the external borders of the EU. Additionally, open source data were researched as background information for the present analysis.



3. Summary of FRAN indicators

Table 1: **Summary of FRAN indicators**

Detections or cases as reported by Member States


FRAN indicator	2011			2012		2012 Q3		
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on	
							prev. year	prev. qtr
1A Illegal entries between BCPs	41 273	38 530	28 325	13 635	23 092	22 093	-43	-4.3
1B Clandestine entries at BCPs	60	64	84	103	126	169	164	34
2 Facilitators	1 941	1 546	1 614	2 107	1 785	1 712	11	-4.1
3 Illegal stay	86 750	88 037	93 834	88 455	84 778	86 562	-1.7	2.1
4 Refusals of entry	30 076	30 325	29 011	24 635	28 244	32 278	6.4	14
5 Applications for asylum	61 574	67 413	71 874	56 854	59 591	72 292	7.2	21
7A Return decisions issued	55 716	57 389	67 310	69 904	67 891	71 129	24	4.8
7B Effective returns	35 076	37 639	41 585	38 644	40 431	38 453	2.2	-4.9

Source: FRAN data as of 10 November 2012

Figure 1. **Evolution of FRAN indicators**

Detections reported by Member States, thousands of persons

Line sections in lighter blue mark changes between second and third quarters



Source: FRAN data as of 10 November 2012



4. Situational picture in Q3 2012

- During Q3 2012 several FRAN indicators varied radically compared to previous reporting periods
- There were 22 093 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level, which is considerably lower than expected based on previous reporting periods; this low figure coincided with increased operational activity in Greece
- Asylum applications were at their highest level since data collection began in early 2008, with Syrians ranking first among nationalities
- More migrants were refused entry at the external border than in any previous period since the peak of 2009
- There were the most detections of clandestine entries at BCPs since data collection for this indicator began in 2009
- There were fewer detections of illegal border-crossing than during any other third quarter – from 2 000 per week during the first week of August to fewer than ten in the last weeks of October
- The operations caused weak displacement effects to the Turkish sea border with Greece and land border with Bulgaria
- The absolute flow of irregular migrants arriving in the region did not decrease, instead, migrants were gathering in Turkey in increasing numbers; hence there remains a very significant risk of a sudden influx of migrants immediately after the end of the operation
- Secondary movements from Greece were still very commonly detected. Increasingly these were: clandestine entries across the Western Balkans, arrivals in Calabria and Apulia and using fraudulent documents on intra-Schengen flights
- Afghans ranked first for illegal border-crossings, clandestine entries at BCPs and illegal stay, and second for being subject to decisions to leave – all most commonly reported by Greece
- Compared to the previous quarter most indicators increased significantly for Syrian nationals across a wide range of Member States:
 - detections of illegal border-crossing doubled (ranked second), almost exclusively in Greece
 - return decisions more than doubled, mostly in Greece
 - clandestine entries increased threefold, mostly in secondary movements in the Western Balkans
 - fraudulent document use increased throughout 2012, mostly during secondary movements on intra-Schengen flights from Greek to German airports
 - asylum applications more than doubled, mostly in final destination countries, i.e. Sweden and Germany
- There were more detections of illegal border-crossing on the main Central Mediterranean route from North Africa than during the pre-Arab Spring peak of 2010, including Tunisians and Egyptians departing from their own countries, and Somalis and Eritreans departing from Libya

- Unique among nationalities, Algerians (ranked third) were equally detected illegally crossing a range of border sections rather than showing a specific preference for a single entry point; they were rarely detected at BCPs but were detected as illegal stayers in Belgium, probably their final destination
- Albanians were detected illegally crossing their land border into Greece at rates that remain significant at the EU level (5% of total) but with a slightly declining trend; however, they were increasingly detected using counterfeit border-crossing stamps to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay
- Refusals of entry increased to the highest level for three years following a 14% increase compared to the previous quarter; most refusals were for Ukrainian nationals refused entry to Poland, but the biggest increases were Georgians also refused entry to Poland

4.1. Detections of illegal border-crossing

Overall, in Q3 2012 there were 22 093 detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level, which is considerably lower than expected based on detections during previous quarters. In fact, there were fewer detections of illegal border-crossing than in any third quarter since data collection began in early 2008. The particularly low number of detections was due to vastly increased operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey since 30 July 2012, and also to the overlapping effects of the end of the Arab Spring in its initial countries (Egypt, Libya, Tunisia) and far fewer detections of circular Albanian migrants illegally crossing the border into Greece.

The majority of detections were at the EU external land (66%), rather than sea border, but this was the lowest proportion for some time due to an increase in detections at the Greek sea border with Turkey – probably the result of a weak displacement effect from the land border. Nevertheless, the Greek land border with Turkey was still by far the undisputed hotspot for detections of illegal border-crossing.

4.1.1. Greek operations Aspida and Xenios Zeus

On 30 July 2012, the Hellenic Police Headquarters announced the temporary deployment of 1 881 additional police officers and technical equipment to the Evros region for a planned period of two months of operation Aspida (Greek for 'Shield'). However, at the time of writing this operation is still active and having very significant effects on detections of irregular migration across the Eastern Mediterranean region.

On 28 March 2012, JO Poseidon Land 2012 was launched as a continuation of the deployment of JO Poseidon Land 2011.

During the first seven months of 2012, detections at the Greek land border with Turkey during JO Poseidon were similar to those reported during the previous two years. In contrast, since August 2012 detections at this border section have dropped off to an almost negligible level (Fig. 2 overleaf).

Specifically, the enhanced surveillance and patrolling activities at the Greek-Turkish land border resulted in a drastic drop in the number of apprehended irregular migrants from approximately 2 000 during the first week of August to less than ten per week in each of the last few weeks of October (immediately subsequent to the current reporting period) (Fig. 2).



Perhaps somewhat predictably, immediately after the deployment of operation Aspida detections of illegal border-crossing at the Turkish sea border with Greece and land border with Bulgaria began to increase, indicating a weak displacement effect from the operational area.


The situation at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey was stable throughout 2010 and 2011. However, since illegal border-

crossing in the Evros region became more difficult because of operation Aspida, some displacement has been observed towards the land border between Turkey and Bulgaria (Fig. 3).

There is a very significant risk of a sudden influx of migrants immediately subsequent to the end of the operation.

Figure 2. **Detections of illegal border-crossing at the Greek land border with Turkey declined rapidly after the deployment of operation Aspida on 30 July 2012**


Monthly numbers of migrants apprehended at the Greek-Turkish land border in 2010–2012



Source: JO Poseidon

Figure 3. **Detections of illegal border-crossing at the Bulgarian land border with Turkey increased rapidly after the deployment of operation Aspida on 30 July 2012**

Monthly numbers of migrants apprehended at the Bulgarian-Turkish land border in 2010–2012



Source: JO Poseidon

On 5 August 2012, the Greek authorities also started the implementation of the operation Xenios Zeus aimed at increasing detections of illegal stayers in Athens and the port of Patras (see box below).

4.1.2. EU Summaries

While useful for summary purposes, EU-level figures conceal considerable variation within and among Member States, nationalities and the major irregular-migration routes. For example, in contrast to the overall decline, in Q3 2012 detections of illegal border-crossing significantly increased at the border sections ranked second and third at the EU level: the Hungarian-Serbian land border and Lampedusa, respectively.

In Lampedusa, the continued trend in detections of Somalis coincided with more detections of Tunisians than ever before apart from the 2011 Arab Spring upsurge. Following a precipitous increase, there was also the highest ever level of Eritreans. In Q3 2012, at the Hungarian land border with Serbia more detections than in any other period since data collection began, mostly of Afghans, Kosovans and Pakistanis.

Also significant at the EU level were increased detections at the blue border of the Italian region of Apulia, where numbers of Pakistanis and Afghans surged dramatically, with the former nationality outnumbering the latter for the first time at this border section.



Athens police in crackdown on illegal immigrants

Greek police have rounded up nearly 5 000 people in an operation targeting illegal immigration in Athens. More than 1 130 people have been arrested in the capital since Saturday. More arrests are expected. Some Greek politicians have called for the government to adopt a harder line on illegal immigration. The BBC's Mark Lowen in Athens says police have targeted migrants across the Greater Athens area.

A police spokesman told the BBC that illegal migrants without the necessary paperwork would be repatriated. About 200 Pakistanis were among suspected illegal migrants rounded up in Athens on Sunday, the Ekathimerini newspaper reported. They were to be sent home.

'We do not care about colour, ethnicity or religion of the illegal immigrants,' Public Order Minister Nikos Dendias said on Saturday. 'The only criterion is the observance of laws with full respect, I repeat with full respect, for human rights and the European order.'

The Greek authorities have increased the number of guards at the border with Turkey amid fears there may be a sudden influx of refugees entering Greek territory as the situation in Syria deteriorates, he adds.

Greece has frequently called on other European nations to do more to help tackle illegal migration into the EU, arguing that it takes the strain.

Source: www.bbc.co.uk, 5 August 2012





Figure 4 shows the evolution of the FRAN Indicator 1A – detections of illegal border-crossing, and the proportion of detections between the land and sea borders of the EU per quarter since the beginning of 2008. The third quarter of each year is usually influenced by weather conditions favourable for both approaching and illegally crossing the external border of the EU. Moreover, good conditions for illegal border-crossing also make it easier to detect such attempts. The combination of these two effects means that the third quarter of each year is usually the one with very high, and often the highest number of detections.

Consistent with the majority of reporting periods both before and after the 2011 Arab Spring, at the EU level the most commonly detected illegal border-crossers were from Afghanistan (at 4 518); a small change compared to the previous quarter but only half the peak of Q3 2011.

Without question, the most significant development in Q3 2012 was the doubling of the number of detected Syrian nationals compared to the previous quarter. Travelling in


family groups, Syrians were fleeing the civil war in their home country in large numbers and ranked second among all illegal border-crossers at the EU level (at 3 923). Consistent with recent reporting periods, the overwhelming majority of Syrians were detected at the Greek land border with Turkey, although numbers of Syrians detected at this border section declined rapidly following the deployment of operation Aspida.

In contrast, nearly all other top ten nationalities of migrants were detected in lower numbers than in the previous quarter, which is unexpected at the time of year typically associated with seasonal increases. The decrease is widely attributed to the increased operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey. Particularly pronounced decreases were observed in detections of migrants from Algeria (-25%), Pakistan (-10%), Bangladesh (-43%) and Somalia (-23%).

Apart from Syrians, the only other nationalities in the top ten that were detected in increasing numbers were Tunisians and Eritreans (+33% and +25%, respectively), both of which were mostly reported from Lampe-

Figure 4. In Q3 2012 there were far fewer detections of illegal border-crossing than in any other third quarter

Total quarterly detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, split between detections at the land and sea borders



Source: FRAN data as of 10 November 2012

dusa, i.e. beyond the area of operational activity in Greece.

The 22 093 detections of illegal border-crossing in Q3 2012 were the result of combined detections in 15 Member States, many of which experienced differing trends. Figure 5 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing among ten Member States during the third quarters of both 2011 and 2012 (size of circles), and also the degree of change between the two reporting periods (slopes).


In Q3 2012, most Member States reported increased detections of illegal border-crossing compared to the same period last year but, in many cases, from relatively low bases (Fig. 5). For example, detections in Malta rose by more than two orders of magnitude between Q3 2011 and Q3 2012, mostly due to increased detections of Somalis and Eritreans. Also significant were the increases reported by Hungary, where detections of Afghans, Kosovans and Pakistanis rose considerably at the land border with Serbia, and by Bulgaria, where detections of Syrians and Iraqis increased at the land border with Turkey.

In contrast, only four Member States reported reductions, i.e. Spain, Greece, Italy and Lithuania. However, the absolute numbers in the former three countries were by far the largest, constituting some 83% of all detections, so the reduction in these three Member States drove the overall decrease.

In Greece as a whole, there was a 44% decrease compared to the year before (Fig. 5), almost exclusively at its land border with Turkey. This decrease was apparent despite more than double the number of detections at the Greek sea border almost certainly in response to the increased operational activity at the land border.

Figure 5. **In Q3 2012 there were far fewer detections of illegal border-crossing than in any other third quarter, driven entirely by fewer detections in the top three Member States**

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q3 2011 and Q3 2012 for the top ten Member States shown by circle size; gradient of lines indicates percentage change



Source: FRAN data as of 10 November 2012




Figure 6. In Q3 2012, despite the overall decrease, all but four Member States reported increased detections of illegal border-crossing compared to the same period in 2011

Detections of illegal border-crossing in Q3 2012

The largest decrease compared to the previous year was reported by Italy (-63%), mostly due to exceptionally high detections reported during the 2011 Arab Spring. Nevertheless, detections in Italy still constituted more than a fifth of all detections at the EU level. Detections in Apulia and Sicily were actually

higher than in the Arab Spring period, and doubled in Lampedusa compared to the previous quarter.

Greece and Italy were not the only Member States to report reduced detections of illegal border-crossing compared to the same

period in 2011. Ranking third at the EU level, Spain reported an overall decrease of 44% in detections of illegal border-crossing compared to Q3 2011, particularly at its land and sea borders with Morocco at Ceuta and Melilla, where nearly half of all Spanish detections took place.


Figure 6 shows detections of illegal border-crossing in Q3 2012 distributed among Member States. Despite decreased detections of illegal border-crossing, in terms of absolute numbers Greece was the only country in the highest category (the darkest shade of colour), as half of all detections were still reported by the Greek authorities. The second category included Italy, which ranked second among Member States in spite of a reduction of two-thirds compared to the year before, and Spain, which ranked third, even though detections there almost halved. Following increases in Malta, Romania and Bulgaria, these Member States belong to the third category in Figure 6. According to this interpretation, all the other Member States were in the lowest category of detections of illegal border-crossing in Q3 2012, despite some considerable increases.

Apart from analysing the changes in terms of Member State distributions, it is also informative to consider these overall trends by nationality of migrants. Figure 7 illustrates the number of detections of illegal border-crossing of top nationalities during the third quarters of 2011 and 2012 (size of circles) and the degree of change between these reporting periods (slopes).

Despite an over 50% reduction compared with Q3 2011, at 4 518 migrants from Afghanistan still accounted for one-fifth of all detections of illegal border-crossing at the EU level (Fig. 7). Of these Afghan migrants, most were detected at the land border between Greece and Turkey, where detections fell rapidly in September following operational activ-

Figure 7. **Most nationalities were detected less frequently as illegal border-crossers in Q3 2012 compared to the same period in 2011; the exceptions were much higher numbers of Syrians detected in Greece, and Eritreans and Somalis detected in Lampedusa and Malta**

Detections of illegal border-crossing during Q3 2011 and Q3 2012 for the top ten nationalities show by circle size; gradient of lines indicates percentage change



Source: FRAN data as of 10 November 2012



ity in the area. In contrast, Afghan migrants were increasingly detected making secondary movements across the Hungarian land border with Serbia and at the Greek sea border, presumably after having been displaced from the Greek land border with Turkey.

During the third quarter of 2012, the nationality with the fastest growing share of detections were Syrians both in terms of relative growth and absolute numbers: up nearly sevenfold from 602 in Q3 2011 to nearly 4 000 in the current reporting period.

The other nationalities that also increased at the EU level, tended to be those detected at border sections other than the Greek land border with Turkey. For example, migrants from Kosovo*, whose detections increased at the EU level (+161%), were mostly reported from the Hungarian land border with Serbia, whereas migrants from Eritrea (+150%) and Somalia (+121%) were increasingly detected in Lampedusa and Malta.

In Q3 2012, consistent with a large proportion of previous reporting periods, the most commonly detected nationality at a single border section, with 13% of the total detections at the EU level, were Afghan migrants detected at the Greek land border with Turkey. Also significant at the EU level were detections of Tunisians, Somalis and Eritreans at the Italian Pelagic Islands (Lampedusa) and detections of Somalis in Malta.

4.2. Routes

For more detailed analyses detections of illegal border-crossing are frequently classified into major irregular migration routes. As illustrated in Figure 8, in the third quarter of 2012 the most detections of illegal border-crossings were reported on the Eastern and Central Mediterranean routes, which is consistent with the overall trend for most third quarters in the past. However, on the

Eastern Mediterranean route the summer peak of detections, which has been remarkably consistent over recent years, was much lower than expected following increased operational activity in the area resulting in far fewer detections during the final month of the quarter.

In the Central Mediterranean, increased detections of several nationalities illegally crossing the blue border to Lampedusa and Malta, as well as increased landings in Apulia and Calabria from Greece and Turkey, combined to produce the highest number of detections both before and after the prominent peak reported during the Arab Spring in 2011.

In Q3 2012, there were 11 072 detections of illegal border-crossing on the Eastern Mediterranean route, a 75% reduction compared to the same period in 2011, and most other third quarters (Fig. 8). Nevertheless this route was still the undisputed hotspot for illegal entries to the EU during the current reporting period, mostly because of vastly increased detections of Syrian nationals.

Elsewhere, detections in the Central Mediterranean (5 323) showed a seasonal increase of a third but were much reduced compared with the dramatic peak during the same period in 2011. The only route to exhibit both annual and seasonal increases was the Western Balkans route (2 028), which is heavily associated with secondary movements of migrants that initially entered the Schengen area in Greece.

These routes not only differed in their magnitudes over time but also in the composition of detected nationalities and the stage of the migration process (primary or secondary movement) captured in the data. For instance, the main Central Mediterranean route (Italian Pelagic Islands, Sicily and Malta) was typified by detections of Tunisians and more recently Somalis and Eritre-

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

ans, all making their initial border-crossing into the EU. In contrast, the part of the Central Mediterranean route, consisting of the south-eastern Italian regions of Apulia and Calabria, was dominated by detections of migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistanis and increasingly Bangladeshis making secondary movements after initially entering the EU in Greece. Similarly, the Western Balkans route also reported large numbers of Kosovan migrants entering the EU for the first time, as well as migrants from Afghanistan and Pakistan making secondary movements after initially entering the EU in Greece.

On the Eastern borders route, migrants from Georgia and Afghanistan were detected in


lower numbers, such that Somalis were the most commonly detected nationality with less than 100 detections in Q3 2012. The flow on the West African route almost entirely consisted of migrants from Morocco (31 of 40), the others being Senegalese.

4.2.1. Eastern Mediterranean route

Since data collection began in early 2008, the Eastern Mediterranean has maintained its status as a major hotspot of irregular migration. Detections have followed a remarkably seasonal pattern invariably peaking in the third quarter of each year and concentrated at the border between Greece and Turkey, with a shift from the sea border to

Figure 8. **The third quarter of 2012 was characterised by far fewer detections on the Eastern Mediterranean route than in previous third quarters and by significant seasonal increases in the Central Mediterranean**

Detections of illegal border-crossings between BCPs by main irregular migration routes




Source: FRAN data as of 10 November 2012



Figure 9. In the Eastern Mediterranean region the third quarter of 2012 was characterised by far fewer than expected detections of illegal border-crossing, associated with increased operational activity at the Greek land border with Turkey

Detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs at the Greek land and sea border with Turkey



Source: FRAN data as of 10 November 2012

the land border visible in late 2009 (Fig. 9). In Q3 2012, 11 072 illegal border-crossings were detected on the Eastern Mediterranean route, a 75% reduction compared to the same period in 2011, and most other third quarters. The most common nationalities included migrants from Afghanistan, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Algeria and, following dramatic recent increases, migrants from Syria, who ranked second in Q3 2012.

In an attempt to simultaneously compare temporal trends in detections of several nationalities, Figure 11 illustrates monthly detections of the top six nationalities at the land border between Greece and Turkey since the beginning of 2011, according to the FRAN data. This graph clearly shows that in July, detections of most nationalities were consistent with the previous year, but following the launch of the Greek operation Aspida on 30 July 2012, detections dropped off to almost negligible levels.

The overall decreasing trend of detections in Greece following the launch of operation Aspida is unequivocal. However, there was some variation in the extent to which detections of different nationalities were affected. Detections of all nationalities decreased in response to the operation probably because migrants were deterred from approaching the border in the first place. However, this deterring effect was the least pronounced in the case of Syrians as the detections of this nationality were the last to decrease and the scale of their decline was the smallest. In the week subsequent to the current reporting period, Syrians were by far the most detected nationality in this region. This probably reflects the desperation of the Syrian nationals: as they flee the civil war in Syria they are less likely to be distracted or displaced by operational activities.

On 28 March 2012, JO Poseidon Land 2012 was launched as a continuation of the deployment of JO Poseidon Land 2011.

The reduced detections were reported by the Greek authorities despite it being particularly easy to cross the River Evros as the water level was so low during the summer that it was possible for migrants to wade across the river rather than use boats (Fig. 10). At one time, in the area of Orestida the water level dropped by more than 1m in areas where the water level would normally have been too deep to wade. Hence many migrants claimed during interviews that they had waded across the River Evros to Greece. The photographs in Figure 10 were taken by JO Poseidon Land




Figure 10. Migrants wading across the River Evros while water levels were particularly low

aerial asset during its flight mission at a time when several migrants crossed the river on foot but still used life vests probably supplied and reused by a facilitator.

Figure 11. **Detections at the Greek land border with Turkey were reduced to negligible levels by the end of Q3 2012 by the Greek operation Aspida**

Detections of illegal border-crossing at the Greek land border with Turkey (monthly detections for a group of chosen nationalities)



Source: FRAN data as of 10 November 2012



Secondary movements

Greece was still the undisputed main entry point for illegal border-crossers. However, it is a Schengen exclave and a transit rather than destination country for the majority of migrants. Thus, the secondary movements originating in Greece are characterised by a similar composition of nationalities of migrants attempting to re-enter the Schengen area heading for their final destinations as those who enter Greece. In Q3 2012, these movements tended to be reflected in the detections of:

- 1) illegal border-crossing throughout the Western Balkan land borders;
- 2) migrants landing at the blue border of the southern Italian regions of Apulia and Calabria;
- 3) clandestines and document fraudsters on board ferries to Italy (Ancona, Venice);
- 4) document fraudsters travelling on flights from Greek airports to many major EU airports.

Western Balkans: There were almost 9 000 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs reported at borders between Western Balkan countries themselves or at their borders with the neighbouring EU Member States. The number was only slightly higher compared to the previous quarter (+4%), which is not as much as typically expected of seasonal increases usually associated with the third quarter of the year. Among the top five border sections, Croatia-Slovenia reported the highest relative increase, both against the previous quarter (+138%) and the corresponding quarter in 2011 (135%).

Italian Ionian coast: For some time there has been a steady flow of Afghans and, to a lesser extent, Pakistanis arriving in the southern Italian blue borders of Calabria and Apulia with some very large increases observed during Q3 2012. In fact, according to the FRAN data there were more detections in this re-

gion than ever before. The most commonly detected migrants were from Afghanistan, which is a significant but steady trend. In contrast detections of migrants from Pakistan, Bangladesh and Syria have increased very sharply since the beginning of 2012.

JO EPN Aeneas 2012 started on 2 July. The operational plan defines two operational areas, Apulia and Calabria, covering the seashore along the Ionian Sea and part of the Adriatic Sea. As mentioned in previous FRAN Quarterlies, the detections at the Greek-Turkish land border are directly correlated with detections in the Ionian Sea. In 2011, it was estimated that more than 15% of migrants reported at the Greek-Turkish land border were afterwards detected in Apulia and Calabria.

Most Syrian migrants were family units travelling from Syria to Turkey and from there directly to Italy rather than via Greece, which technically does not fall under secondary movements. The final intended destinations mentioned during the interviews were France, Germany and the Netherlands. During interviews, they claimed that their settlement in these Member States had already been arranged. Two weeks after their arrival at a CARA centre*, most of them absconded from there.

Intra-Schengen flights: In Q3 2012, there were nearly 1 000 detections of migrants travelling on intra-Schengen flights with fraudulent documents. These intra-Schengen document fraudsters were mostly detected by Italy (entry and exit) and Greece (exit), where numbers were increasing throughout 2012, and – to a lesser extent – by Germany (entry), where numbers were decreasing. Following recent increases, Syrians were the most detected nationality on intra-Schengen flights followed by Afghans and Somalis.

* Centri di Accoglienza Richiedenti Asilo - the Italian Reception Centres for Asylum Seekers

4.2.2. Central Mediterranean route

Irregular migration in the Central Mediterranean massively fluctuated in size and composition during 2011, largely due to the political and civil unrest across North Africa, particularly in Tunisia and Libya. Since Q4 2011, the situation has significantly improved following better cooperation between Italian and Tunisian authorities concerning the return of Tunisian nationals.

According to FRAN data, in Q3 2012 there were just 3 427 reported detections of illegal border-crossing on the main Central Mediterranean route (Italian Pelagic Islands, Sicily and Malta), a significant decrease compared to the same reporting period in 2011. However, this figure was still the highest reported so far in 2012, and was higher than the peak in 2010. Additionally, there were some significant increases in various nationalities.

On the Central Mediterranean route, detections of migrants from Tunisia continued to increase from 82 during the last quarter of 2011 to over 1 000 in Q3 2012. Tunisians were not the only North African nationality to feature in the top five most detected nationalities in the Central Mediterranean region, as Egyptians were also detected in significant and increasing numbers (287). The fact that fewer Egyptians than Tunisians were detected in the Central Mediterranean should be interpreted in light of Egypt being eight times more populous than Tunisia, which shows that irregular migration pressure from Egypt is proportionally much lower than that from Tunisia.

Also significant in the Central Mediterranean during the third quarter of 2012 were detections of Somalis (854) and, following recent increases, also Eritreans (411). Somalis have been detected in similarly high numbers during previous reporting periods (for example over 1 000 in Q2 2012) but there were more Eritreans detected in Q3 2012 than ever before.



© Frontex, JO Hermes 2012

Figure 12. An Egyptian fishing boat arriving with migrants on board

Some Syrian nationals were also detected using the direct sea route from Turkey to Italy but these tended to arrive in Calabria. They were family units which recently abandoned Syria. Few of them mentioned that they had ever stayed in a refugee camp established in neighbouring countries. Most of them were owners of shops and small businesses afraid of the current situation who decided to leave Syria with the whole family. All of them had previously arranged their settlement in some other EU Member State where they had relatives and friends (France, Germany and the Netherlands were the main final destinations stated by the migrants).

Egyptian migrants

Most of the Egyptian migrants were young males, sometimes minors, travelling to Europe seeking to improve their standard of living. In other cases, they are fleeing from the conflict between Muslims and Copts. As Italy has an efficiently working readmission agreement with Egypt, Egyptian migrants tended to arrive undocumented from Libya in order to avoid repatriation. The migrants typically paid the facilitators EUR 5 000 for well-organised trips originating in Egypt and making the sea crossing aboard fishing boats.

Figure 12 shows a fishing boat that arrived in Sicily from Egypt. Once near the coast a black zodiac with a single engine approached the boat. The skipper of the fishing boat



then boarded the zodiac together with 20 other migrants. Before leaving the skipper instructed some of the migrants on how to operate the fishing boat and to follow the lights to the coast. This information supports the theory that the trips are well-organised from Egypt as the boats were able to communicate and coordinate their movements. After landing in Sicily several migrants were apprehended by land patrols. At the same time, the Joint Debriefing Team, while on their way to the scene of the landing, encountered nine Egyptian migrants and handed them over to the Italian authorities.

Tunisian migrants

Most Tunisian migrants were young (18–29 year old) unmarried males with a primary level of education and low incomes (EUR 150–300 per month). All interviewed Tunisians claimed to have relatives or friends in the EU ready to help them settle in, especially in Italy. Tunisian migrants typically arrived undocumented to avoid readmission because Italy and Tunisia cooperate efficiently with regard to the repatriation of documented Tunisian nationals.

If migrants succeed in reaching Sicily (sometimes via Lampedusa or Pantelleria), they then continue their journey to other EU Member States; the majority travel to France as they can speak French.



© Frontex, JO Hermes 2012

Figure 13. Tunisian migrants arrive in small rubber dinghies or fishing boats



© Frontex, JO Indalo 2012

Figure 14. Rubber boat used by the Algerian migrants detected during the reporting period

In July 2012 the facilitation networks targeted Sicily instead of Pantelleria and Lampedusa, as it is harder for the migrants to reach the Italian mainland from the small islands. Migrants claim that the facilitators may start to focus on the southern coast of Sicily, as they expect lower surveillance there.

Somali migrants (departing from Libya)

Asked for their reasons for leaving home, Somali migrants mentioned escaping the threat of the terrorist group Al Shabab.

Somalis ranked third among all nationalities detected with fraudulent documents on intra-Schengen flights, with almost none detected in Greece, which suggests that these migrants have the means and the confidence in their documentation to use flights to move around within the Schengen area.



4.2.3. Western Mediterranean route

In 2011, irregular migration in the Western Mediterranean region increased steadily from just 890 detections in Q1 2011 to 3 568 detections in the third quarter of the year. A year later in Q3 2012, detections dropped to just over 2 000 detections, which was, nevertheless, the highest level so far in 2012.

As has been the case for several years, most of the detections involved Algerians (859) followed by migrants of unknown nationality (524, presumed to be sub-Saharan Africans). Algerians were mostly detected in Almeria and at the land border with Morocco, the migrants of unknown nationality were mostly reported from the land borders.

JO EPN Indalo 2012 started in this region on 16 May covering five zones of the south-eastern Spanish sea border and extending into the Western Mediterranean.

In Q3 2012, there were far fewer Moroccan nationals detected (79) compared to Q3 2011. Most were detected just east of the Gibraltar Strait, between Tangiers and Ceuta. According to the migrants' statements, the area between Ksar Sghir and Sidi Kankouche is the most popular departing area among Moroccans who want to cross the Gibraltar strait (10.15 NM distance). The boats used for the sea crossing were toy boats bought by the migrants in a supermarket for EUR ~100.

According to interviews, North African migrants were mostly single male adults aged 18–30 but also a few minors. They mainly spoke Arabic and, to a lesser extent, French or English; having relatives or friends in EU Member States, mainly in France or Spain, who would help them find a job and settle within the ethnic communities already established in these countries. They mainly belonged to the lower middle socio-economic classes and were suffering from a general-

ised lack of opportunities, welfare and access to public health services. It is often the case that migrants enter Spain a number of times and are then apprehended by the Spanish authorities. Several migrants had been returned to their country of origin at least once before by the Spanish authorities.

Increased border surveillance along the Mauritanian coast generated by the deployment of joint Mauritanian-Spanish police teams and also joint maritime and aerial patrols in Mauritanian national waters has reduced departures towards the Canary Islands but also may have resulted in a displacement effect to the Western Mediterranean route from the Moroccan coast.

4.2.4. Western African route

In the third quarter of 2012, there were just 40 detections of illegal border-crossing in this region, almost exclusively of Moroccan nationals but with an influx of Senegalese nationals.

The Moroccan nationals detected in the area are mostly single males belonging to the lower socio-economic classes with friends in EU MSs who can help them to find a job there.

The good cooperation among the Spanish, Senegalese and Mauritanian authorities and the joint patrols in the operational sea areas and on the coastline of Senegal and Mauritania have resulted in a displacement of the departure areas of migrant boats towards the Canary Islands, with the reactivation of the Western African route (from north of Mauritania to the Western Sahara territory) used by the criminal networks operating in Mauritania.

4.2.5. Eastern borders route

The eastern land borders route is, in effect, an amalgam of detections of illegal border-crossing reported by Finland, Estonia, Lat-



via, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania. Despite the total length of all the border sections, detections tend to be lower than on other routes, possibly due to the long distances between major hubs and many countries of origin. Also according to several bi-monthly analytical reports shared during 2012, this route is predominantly affected by use of visa fraud and counterfeit border-crossing stamps, rather than by illegal border-crossing.

In Q3 2012, there were just 423 detections of illegal border-crossing at the eastern land borders of the EU, which is lower than in the previous quarter and comes unexpected given improved weather conditions associated with the third quarter of the year. This decrease was due to fewer detections of Georgians and Afghans, such that in Q3 2012 Somalis were the most commonly detected nationality on this route.

JO Focal Points was active at 24 BCPs during the reporting period and collected information on refusals of entry, illegal border-crossing, asylum applications, overstayers, use of fraudulent documentation and stolen vehicles (see Section 4.10. Other illegal activities at the border).

4.2.6. Western Balkans route

Illegal border-crossing between BCPs

According to information exchanged among participants of the Western Balkans Risk Analysis Network, there were almost 9 000 detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs reported at borders between Western Balkan countries themselves or at their borders with the neighbouring EU Member States (FRAN data amounted to 2 028). The number was only slightly higher (4%) compared to the previous quarter, which was substantially less than expected based on seasonal increases usually associated with the

third quarter of the year. Given the favourable weather conditions during the months of July, August and September, overall detections of illegal border-crossing traditionally tend to be the highest during the third quarter. In Q3 2011, for example, they were 35% higher compared to the second quarter of the year.

Nevertheless, the overall stable trend during the third quarter of 2012 was not evenly spread across individual border sections. Among the top five border sections, Croatia-Slovenia reported the highest relative increase, both against the previous quarter (+138%) and the corresponding quarter in 2011 (135%). On the other hand, while most irregular migrants were detected at the border section between the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM) and Serbia for the fifth consecutive quarter, the absolute numbers there decreased by 10% compared to the previous quarter falling below 2 000 (also 23% reduced in comparison to the third quarter of 2011).

These observations would indicate that secondary movements from Greece through the Western Balkans started to wane somewhat, and are likely to decline further following the start of Xenios Zeus and Aspida operations in Greece. Likewise, the increasing trends in Slovenia and at the border between Croatia and Serbia are also indications of widespread changes in irregular migration routes.

In terms of nationalities, two thirds of all detections (6 000) were linked to migrants who entered the Western Balkans en route from Greece (i.e. Afghans, Pakistanis, Somalis, Moroccans, Syrians and Bangladeshis). In contrast to the lower than expected overall detections, Syrians continued to increase compared to the previous quarter (+55% to 377), but not to the same degree as reported during the second quarter (+220%). In fact, nationals of Bangladesh were the fastest

growing group of migrants: their number rose from 73 in the second quarter to more than 270 during the third quarter.

Importantly, detections of Albanian nationals decreased by 25% compared to the previous quarter. This, coupled with similar decreases in refusals of entry, clearly indicates that Albanian circular migration towards Greece has been slowing down in connection to further economic deterioration in this country.

Illegal border-crossing at BCPs

Detections of migrants hiding in vehicles continued to increase during the third quarter of 2012, both compared to the second quarter (+53%) and the corresponding quarter of 2011 (+43%). More precisely, there were 670 migrants detected for illegal border-crossing at BCPs, mostly in Serbia, followed by Croatia and Slovenia. These trends continue to suggest that more migrants en route from Greece are now opting to cross the regional and common borders hidden in vehicles (as reported in previous WB-RAN Quarterlies and WB-ARA 2012).

Similarly to detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs, Serbia also reported the largest share of all illegal border-crossings detected at BCPs (40%), mostly at its borders with the FYROM, Hungary and Croatia. It was followed by Croatia, where detections also increased for reasons unrelated with irregular migration (maritime tourism).

Afghans remained the top nationality detected along this route with a 22% share, even though their numbers decreased by 13% compared to the previous quarter. They were also the top nationality on all major border sections en route from Greece to Hungary or Slovenia.

4.3. Clandestine entry (1B)

The fact that Indicator 1B (detections of illegal border-crossing at BCPs) is restricted to the external land and sea borders of the EU and detections that are confirmed clandestine entries (e.g. hiding in means of transport) results in extremely low detections for the whole of the EU in Q3 2012 (169), especially compared with other indicators, such as detections of illegal border-crossing between BCPs (+20 000). However, this is still the highest number of clandestine entry detections since data collection began for this indicator in 2009.

Some of this increase was due to increased detections reported by Slovenia and Bulgaria. In the case of Slovenia, which reported more detections than any other Member State, most of the increases were due to more detections of Afghan migrants at the border with Croatia. Nearly all of these Afghan migrants were making secondary movements after initially entering the Schengen area in Greece (see Section 4.2.6. Western Balkans route). In Bulgaria the increased detections of clandestine entries at BCPs were due to more Turkish nationals and to, a lesser extent, also Syrians and Palestinians.

In Q3 2012 clandestine entry in lorries was one of the most frequent and increasingly detected methods. In many cases the embarkation point was Serbia, where facilitators assisted irregular migrants to enter lorries at rest stops. They would often cut the covers of the lorry's cargo compartment or break and re-seal customs seals and ropes.

In contrast to the low number of detections of clandestine entry at the external border (169), there were more detections within the EU (971), which was also the highest number recorded in recent years, roughly evenly split between the land (526) and sea (445) borders.



The geographical distribution of those detections also sheds light on the direction of secondary movements and the final destination countries targeted by specific nationalities. For example, Italy, the UK and Romania reported the greatest number of internally detected clandestine migrants, mostly Afghans, Vietnamese and Algerians, respectively.

In Italy, most Afghans were detected making secondary movements on ferries arriving in Venice from Greece, as well as recent increases in the number of Palestinians on ferries arriving in Venice and Ancona, where both nationalities are often also detected holding fraudulent documents.

In the UK, there was an increased number of clandestine Vietnamese and Iranians detected presumably arriving on ferries from mainland Europe. These nationalities joined the steady flow of Albanians that have been targeting the UK using this entry method since they were granted visa-free travel to the Schengen area in late 2010.

At the Romanian land border, Algerians were frequently detected on exit to Hungary. These migrants are assumed to have originally entered the Schengen area at the Greek-Turkish land border.

4.4. Detections of facilitators

Notwithstanding an increase during the first few months of 2011, detections of facilitators of irregular migration have been falling steadily for the last two years. According to some reports, this long-term decline may in part be due to a widespread shift towards the abuse of legal channels and document fraud to mimic legal entry to the EU, which results in facilitators being able to operate remotely and inconspicuously rather than accompanying migrants during high-risk activities such as border-crossing.

In Q3 2012, there were 1 712 detections of facilitators of irregular migration, which is a 4% reduction compared to the previous quarter, and despite a 10% increase compared to the same period in 2011, this figure remains broadly in line with the long-term decrease observed for this indicator (Fig. 1).

The total EU-level detections of facilitators of irregular migration tend to be made up of several disparate trends involving unrelated nationalities detected in different Member States. For example, despite a decline in detections compared to the year previously, France reported the most detections of facilitators of irregular migration, whereas Spain, ranking second at the EU level, detected 23% more facilitators over the same period (Fig. 15). Hungary reported the largest proportional increase of any Member State, mostly involving Serbs, Hungarians and Russians detected inland and at the border with Serbia.

Member States tend to detect more domestic facilitators than any other foreign nationality; in Q3 2012, all of the top four reporting countries for this indicator reported their own citizens as facilitators more frequently than any other single nationality. Among the countries reporting the most facilitators this propensity was strongest in Italy, where 30% of all detected facilitators were of Italian nationality, followed by France and Spain both with around a fifth of all facilitators being of domestic nationalities. Overall, Poland and Lithuania detected the highest proportions of domestic facilitators (80%) but generally in much lower absolute numbers.

All of the most common phenomena were reduced in both the long and short term. For example, the most common detections were of Italian, Spanish and French facilitators, all detected inland in their own countries, as well as Moroccan facilitators detected inland in Spain; all these detections were reported in lower numbers in Q3 2012 com-




Figure 15. **Against a background of slowly reduced detections at the EU level, France still detected more facilitators than any other Member State, contrasting with significant increases in Spain and Hungary**

Detections of facilitators in Q3 2012

pared to both the previous quarter and the third quarter of 2011.

In contrast, two notable phenomena increased in frequency, although in lower absolute numbers than the most common at the EU level. Firstly, more Polish facilitators

were detected inland in Poland than ever before – up sixfold since a year ago during Q3 2011. Secondly, Bulgaria reported more detections of Turkish facilitators at its land border with Turkey, almost certainly related to the recently increased flow of illegal border-crossers at this border section.



4.5. Detections of illegal stay

In Q3 2012, there were just above 86 500 detections of illegal stay in the EU, which is more or less a stable trend compared to the year before and also the recent reporting periods. This is consistent with a stable but slightly declining long-term trend observed over the last two years (Fig. 1). However, this long-term decline masks much variation among Member States. The vast majority of illegal stayers were detected inland (68 700) and so are presumed to be long-term overstayers as they were making no attempt to leave. The next most common location for detections of illegal stayers was those exiting at the air (9 600) followed by the land borders (5 600) whereby illegally staying migrants were leaving the EU or Schengen area.

For the first time since data collection began in 2008, in the third quarter of 2012 Sweden ranked first in terms of detections of illegal stayers, ahead of Germany, Greece, France and Spain (Fig. 16). The increase was almost exclusively due to Syrian nationals.

All Syrian nationals staying illegally in Sweden were reported inland rather than at the air border and were actually asylum seekers rather than illegal stayers. Despite double-reporting of Syrian asylum seekers in Sweden, they were not the most common nationality of illegal stayer, in fact Syrians ranked fourth at the EU level behind Afghans and Pakistanis mostly detected in Greece, and Moroccans mostly detected in Spain.

Combining nationalities with Member States provides a more illustrative situational picture. According to this interpretation, the most common illegal stayers were Pakistanis in Greece with a 55% increase in the third quarter of 2012 compared to the year before. Also significant and increasing in Greece were detections of migrants from Bangladesh, which doubled compared to a

year previously in Q3 2011. These increased detections do not appear to be related to the Greek operation Xenios Zeus in Athens, which was focused on detecting illegal stayers, as the increases were gradual over the course of 2012 rather than suddenly increasing immediately subsequent to the start of the operation.

Both these nationalities were also detected very frequently as illegal border-crossers at the Greek land border with Turkey and it may be that detections of Pakistani and Bangladeshi illegal stayers are related, and subsequent to detections at the border. In both cases there were more detections of illegal stayers than illegal border-crossers, suggesting that some individuals crossed the border undetected or they had been previously illegally present in Greece for some time. Conversely, Afghans – the nationality most frequently detected illegally crossing the Greek border with Turkey – were detected much less frequently as illegal stayers in Greece than at the border. This may suggest that Afghans have a higher propensity to leave Greece sufficiently quickly to avoid detection as illegal stayers.

The vast majority of illegal stayers in Greece were detected inland, rather than on exit at the border, and there is no evidence in the FRAN data that detections were reduced or increased by the Greek operation Aspida at the land border with Turkey.

Presently, for each overstayer there is no breakdown by the extent of overstay in the FRAN indicator. It has often been suggested that perhaps a significant proportion of the ~15 000 overstayers detected on exit at the border (as opposed to the majority, who were detected inland), may in fact be absent-minded short-term overstayers rather than long-term overstaying irregular migrants.




Figure 16. **Stable trends in detections of illegal stayers at the EU level masks much variation between Member States**
 Detections of illegal stay in Q3 2012

Hence, analyses of overstayers may in fact be overestimating the phenomenon as in some cases up to 80% of migrants detected on exit at the border may involve those who have only overstayed by a few days, probably for logistical reasons or absentmindedness, rather than behaviour associated with

irregular migration. One potential caveat is that 75% of these detections were of Russian nationals and so this may be reflecting the behaviour of a single nationality rather than a trend that can be reliably extrapolated to a wider contextual range.



4.6. Refusals of entry

In Q3 2012 there were more refusals of entry since data collection began, with the exception of Q3 2009 during the wave of Georgians attempting to enter Poland. The total of 32 278 refusals of entry issued at the external borders represented a 6% decrease compared to the year before in Q2 2011 and a 14% seasonal increase since the previous quarter. As in all previous quarters since 2010, there were more refusals at the land border (48% of the total), where Ukrainians were the most commonly refused nationality, than at the air border (38% of the total), where Albanians, Brazilians and Americans were most commonly refused entry.

As was the case in the previous quarter, the sharpest increase was the increase in refusals of entry to Georgian nationals issued at the Polish border with Belarus representing double the number reported in Q2 2012 and a sevenfold increase compared to the same quarter one year ago. In the FRAN data, the vast majority were refused for Reason C: 'No valid visa'. This was confirmed by JO Focal Point reports, in which the majority of Georgians were refused for not having a valid visa or residence permit (C) (79%) or an alert had been issued in the SIS or national database (H) (21%). In some cases, Georgian nationals claimed to be visiting their friends in Lithuania whom they had met during holidays in Turkey. However, they were unable to provide evidence that they had actually spent their holiday in Turkey.

The reason for the unexpected increase of refused Georgians is most probably lower or no activity of Belarusian border authorities. This phenomenon is likely to lead to an increase in Georgians illegally staying in other Member States, in particular Sweden and Germany. As it was the case with a similar pattern observed in 2009, this increase cor-

responds to an increase in asylum applications of Georgian nationals in Poland.

Despite increased numbers of Georgians refused entry to Poland, the most common nationality refused entry at a single border section were Ukrainian nationals refused at their land border with Poland.

Ukrainian nationals ranked second in terms of the number of refusals. The two main reasons for refusals of Ukrainians were not having appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay (E) (60%) and not having a valid visa or residence permit (C) (25%). Albanian nationals ranked third in terms of the number of refusals of entry at Focal Points during the reporting period.

The majority of Albanians continued to be refused at the Focal Point Kakavia, one of the main border-crossing points at the Greek-Albanian border. The main reported reasons for refusal of entry were an alert issued in the SIS or national database (H) (55%), false travel document (B) (13%) or not having appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay (E) (12%).

According to FRAN data, there were 39 Angolan travellers refused entry during August 2012, from a total of 572 passengers as stated in the bi-monthly analytical report. This number of refusals far exceeds any other reporting period and should be monitored.

4.7. Asylum claims

In Q3 2012, there were more applications for asylum in the EU than in any other period since data collection began in early 2008. The number of claims increased by 23% between the second and third quarters of 2012, to reach a staggering 73 013 applications. Much of this increase was due to double the number of applications submitted by Syrian and Serbian nationals compared to the previ-




Figure 17. **Despite reduced refusals in half of all Member States, in Q3 2012 there were more migrants refused entry to the EU than in any other period since data collection began in early 2008, mostly because of increased refusals to Ukrainians and Georgians in Poland**

Refusals of entry in Q3 2012

ous quarter, as well as increased applications from migrants from the Russian Federation, Iran and the fYROM.

With an overwhelming 25% of the EU total and following nearly a 50% increase compared to the previous quarter, Germany received by far the most applications for international protection, and more than reported by any



Member State since data collection began in early 2008 (however, not taking into account asylum applications filed in France elsewhere than at the border, data which are not reported to the FRAN).

Without question, the most significant trend was the increased applications by Syrian nationals, which in Q3 2012 increased to nearly 7 500 applications or 10% of the EU total. Although closely followed by the number of applications submitted by Afghan nationals (stable at 9.8% of the total) this represents the most major influx of asylum seekers for many years. Of these asylum seekers, more than a third were reported by Sweden. As Syrians are fleeing from a civil war, many were travelling in family groups, which dis-

tinguishes them from other asylum seekers which are usually young males.

The large number of asylum applications by Syrian nationals also continued beyond the current reporting period. According to the Pulsar data exchange at the EU air border, between weeks 42 and 44 of 2012, some 309 Syrian nationals applied for asylum, mainly in Sweden, Germany and Poland. Specifically, during this period Stockholm airport (ARN) reported 207 Syrian nationals, many travelling in family units; the majority arrived from unknown embarkation points (nearly 90% of all cases) but the most common third-country airport of departure was Istanbul (IST) with Turkish Airlines, followed by intra-Schengen flights from Barcelona with

“ Syrian asylum seekers in Denmark want the government to follow Sweden’s lead and grant them three years residency due to the ongoing civil war

30 Syrian asylum seekers are demanding to be allowed to seek asylum in Sweden and have gathered outside the Swedish embassy in Copenhagen to protest. Syrian asylum seekers descended on the Swedish Embassy in Copenhagen yesterday afternoon [26 September 2012] to demand asylum in Sweden.

Thirty asylum seekers from five asylum centres are protesting against the decision made by the Danish government not to follow Sweden’s example and grant them three years residence as refugees in Denmark. Asylum seekers from Syria that have their cases rejected end up in limbo because the government won’t forcibly return them to Syria where a civil war is currently raging.

As a result they are forced to remain in asylum centres without the right to work in Denmark. Due to the dangerous situation in Syria, many of the rejected asylum seekers also refuse to say they will cooperate with their eventual return. This means they lose the right to live and work outside asylum centres, a right granted to them after the government recently changed the law.”

Source: cphpost.dk, 27 September 2012



“Syrian asylum seekers in Denmark want the government to follow Sweden’s lead and grant them three years residency due to the ongoing civil war

© Scanpix




Figure 18. In Q3 2012 there were more applications for asylum in the EU than in any other period since data collection began in early 2008, mostly because of increased applications submitted by Syrian nationals in Sweden and Germany

Applications for international protection in Q3 2012

Note: For the Netherlands data on inland asylum applications in Q3 2012 were not available.

Vueling Airlines. According to recent Pulsar reports, Syrian migrants have now begun to arrive from Istanbul either acting as impostors using Swedish passports or travelling with forged EU passports and forged or sto-

len blank Greek residence permits (consistent with other document fraudsters arriving from Turkey reported within the EDF-RAN). However, many Syrians also arrived from Istanbul with Turkish Airlines in possession of



genuine Syrian passports without any visas or permits.

According to the FRAN data, with nearly 18 000 applications Germany received by far the most requests for international protection, up by nearly 40% compared to the same period in 2011. Applications were mostly submitted by migrants from Syria, Serbia, Afghanistan, the FYROM, Iraq and Iran.

In Q3 2012 the largest cohort of applications in a single Member State were migrants from Syria seeking international protection in Sweden. In fact, more than a fifth of all applications in Sweden were submitted by Syrian nationals.

Also significant at the EU level were increased applications submitted by migrants from Serbia in Germany and, to a lesser extent, also in Sweden. These applications were submitted inland rather than at the border.

4.8. Document fraud

Frontex and the FRAN community have been exchanging data on detections of false-document users since the beginning of 2009. However, it soon became apparent that this indicator had become insufficient to effectively describe and analyse increasingly complex *modi operandi* related to document fraud. Hence, following a brief pilot project in 2011, in January 2012 Frontex and the FRAN community embarked on a much more detailed and ambitious data-exchange project in the field of document fraud, to be overseen by a new specialist sub-network of the FRAN known as the European Union Document-Fraud Risk Analysis Network (EDF-RAN).

Overall, the migrants most associated with document fraud to illegally enter the EU or Schengen area in Q3 2012 were from Albania, Syria, Ukraine, Iran, Afghanistan and Congo.

With the exception of Albanians, all these nationalities were detected in increasing numbers throughout 2012. Document fraud between the Schengen area and non-Schengen countries was dominated by increasing numbers of Albanian nationals mostly associated with travel to the UK. Within the Schengen area document fraud was characterised by increasing numbers of Syrians and a steady trend of Afghans. In both cases, the most significant detections were made on exit from Greek and on entry to German airports.

Migrants from Syria

According to a sample of 24 Member States and Schengen Associated Countries, migrants from Syria were increasingly detected as document fraudsters across the EU such that there was a threefold increase since the beginning of the year. They used a very wide range of documents, which suggests that very competent facilitation services were employed.

4.8.1. Entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries

According to a sample of 24 Member States and Schengen Associated Countries, in Q3 2012 there were 2 014 detections of document fraud on entry to the EU/Schengen area from third countries. Although long-term comparisons were not possible for Member States new to the EDF-RAN, or for those currently unable to meet the strict reporting protocols, it is clear that at the EU level document fraud to enter the EU and Schengen area from third countries is increasing compared with 2011.

Much of the increase in detections of document fraud was due to a single phenomenon: the use of counterfeit border-crossing stamps by Albanian nationals to fabricate travel histories and extend periods of stay.

According to Focal Points reports, overall during Q3 2012, Albanian nationals remained the top reported nationality of persons using falsified documents followed by Ukrainian and Serbian nationals, together accounting for four-fifths of all detections, which is broadly comparable to the EDF-RAN data.

Visas are also frequently fraudulently obtained. Although this type of fraud is not currently covered by the EDF-RAN data exchange, or listed as a specific possible reason for refusal in the Schengen Borders Code, some Member States share this information in their bi-monthly reports.

4.8.2. Intra-Schengen

In Q3 2012, there were nearly 1 000 detections of migrants travelling on intra-Schengen flights with fraudulent documents. These intra-Schengen document fraudsters were mostly detected by Italy and Greece, where numbers were increasing throughout 2012 and, to a lesser extent, by Germany, where numbers were decreasing. Following recent increases, Syrians were the most detected nationality using fraudulent documents on intra-Schengen flights followed by decreasing numbers of Afghans and an increased trend of Somalis.

During non-systematic entry checks of flights arriving from other Schengen Member States, the most commonly reported document fraudsters were arriving in Frankfurt from Athens (Afghans and Syrians), and arriving in Malpensa from Copenhagen (almost exclusively Somalis). Conversely, during exit checks on flights to other Schengen Member States, the most document fraudsters were detected in Athens attempting to board flights to Fiumicino, and in Heraklion attempting to board flights to Malpensa (in both cases involving migrants of many nationalities including Albanians and Syrians).

Inside the Schengen area, Syrians were detected almost exclusively on entry to German airports and, to a lesser extent, on exit from Greece. As has been the case since the beginning of the EDF-RAN data exchange, in Q3 2012 Afghan migrants with false documents were commonly detected on flights between Greece (exit from ATH) and on entry to Germany, albeit at a reduced rate compared with most of 2011 and the beginning of 2012.

Somali migrants most commonly detected as document fraudsters on intra-Schengen flights were detected mostly by Italy either exiting towards Copenhagen from Fiumicino, or arriving from Copenhagen at Malpensa airport.

4.8.3. Legal channels

Many reports conclude that the abuse of legal channels to illegally enter the EU is on the rise. For example, according to Norwegian reports there has been an increase in the abuse of a highly skilled worker scheme.

4.9. Returns

4.9.1. Return decisions

In Q3 2012, there were 71 129 third-country nationals subject to an obligation to leave the EU as a result of an administrative or judicial decision, which was a 25% increase compared to during the same period in 2011, and represents the biggest change in this indicator yet reported. However, much of this change was due to new definitions applied to this indicator by Italy in early 2012. Taking this revision into consideration the adjusted increase was 10% compared to Q3 2011. Many more migrants from Syria and, to a lesser extent, Pakistan, were subject to decisions to leave in Q3 2012 compared to during the same period in 2011. Nevertheless, the absolute total number of migrants subject to return deci-



sions is still underestimated by this indicator, as data on decisions were unavailable from, inter alia, France, the Netherlands and Sweden, where it is assumed that high numbers of decisions were reached.

Nearly 60% of the total reported decisions at the EU level were issued in just three Member States: Greece, Italy and the UK. In Greece, most decisions were taken for Pakistanis and Afghans, each accounting for around one-fifth of the Greek quarterly total. These decisions amount to large numbers of requests to leave the country within 30 days, most of which are routinely ignored by migrants who instead continue with their secondary movements to other EU Member States. In Q3 2012 both of these nationalities were subject to fewer decisions issued by Greece than during the same period in 2011, which is in contrast to vastly increased numbers of Syrian nationals and, to a lesser extent, Bangladeshi nationals.

Overall Syrian nationals were subject to more than 3 500 reported decisions to leave at the EU level, which is nearly a fivefold increase compared to the same period in 2011. However, four-fifths of all decisions to return Syrians were issued by Greece and were probably ineffective orders to leave the country within 30 days. Hence, in reality few Syrians were subject to meaningful decisions to leave, which is confirmed by the very low number of Syrians that were actually returned at the EU level (162).

Italy issued more return decisions to Tunisians than to any other nationality followed by Albanian nationals, whereas in the UK Indians and Pakistanis were the most common nationalities subject to decisions to return.

4.9.2. Effective returns

In Q3 2012, there was a steady trend of 38 453 third-country nationals effectively returned to outside the EU. This total does not include effective returns between Member States. As has been the case during every quarter of data exchange so far for this indicator, the UK was the Member State conducting the largest number of returns.

Despite a reduction of more than a third, the most commonly returned nationality were Albanian migrants returned by Greece, followed by a steady trend of Indians returned by the UK. There was a one-third increase in Ukrainians returned by Poland, which resulted in this nationality being the third most returned at the EU level. Although from lower bases, some of the biggest increases at the EU level compared to the year before included the number of Serbians returned by Switzerland (+240%), Moldovans returned by France (+414%) and Russians returned by Latvia (+632%).

In Norway, since 2010, most people who applied for assisted voluntary return have been offered graded reintegration support. The amount offered in support is up to NOK 20 000 (EUR 2 700). The only condition is that people apply for voluntary return before the deadline that has been set for leaving Norway. Since 19 July 2012, families who have been refused asylum in Norway are offered NOK 10 000 (EUR 1 350) per child in addition to the NOK 20 000 per adult if they return voluntarily to their country of origin. This support is meant to encourage families who have been illegally in Norway for many years to apply for voluntary return to their home country.

The Norwegian authorities have closely monitored the system in order to detect possible misuse and to monitor the possible pull-factor effect. Earlier this year, Norway experienced




Figure 19. In Q3 2012 there was a 10% decline in the number of effective returns performed by Member States

Effective returns in Q3 2012


a sudden increase in the number of asylum seekers from Belarus. Many applied for assisted voluntary return suspiciously shortly after they were registered as asylum seekers. In March, it was decided that IOM returnees from Belarus were no longer entitled to receive subsistence allowance or reintegra-

tion grant. Since June, Georgians have also been temporarily excluded from the financial support scheme.

For many nationalities there were very large discrepancies between the number of decisions issued and the number of migrants

Figure 20. Nationalities that typify detections of illegal border-crossing at the Greek land border with Turkey were subject to the most decisions to leave in Q3 2012, but Albanians and Russians were effectively returned in the highest numbers

Return decisions issued and effective returns (voluntary and forced) to third countries of top nationalities in Q3 2012



* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence
Source: FRAN data as of 10 November 2012

actually returned. In most cases more decisions were made than effective returns implemented (Fig. 20). This is due to the large number of decisions issued by Greece, most of which are ignored by migrants, who simply attempt to continue their movements to other Member States. This discrepancy is most apparent for the migrants that are detected illegally crossing the border into Greece from Turkey, particularly in the case of Syrians.

4.10. Other illegal activities at the border

Cross-border crime is a significant challenge to the effective management of the external borders and Frontex works with Member States to collect information on developments in this area. Cross-border criminal activity takes many shapes and is carried out

both by individuals and organised criminal groups, which seek to exploit the steady flow of goods and passengers across EU borders for illicit activities.

During Q3 2012, the smuggling of tobacco products, drug trafficking and the attempted smuggling of stolen vehicles were the most common offences registered at the border. A number of high profile successes by law-enforcement authorities, such as the seizure of 3 tonnes of cocaine by Spanish authorities or the dismantlement of a human trafficking network by German and Italian police, demonstrate the effectiveness of cooperative efforts in countering cross-border crime. However, details of these cases also illustrate the sophisticated methods used by criminal groups in pursuing their illegal activities. This section of the FRAN Quarterly aims to provide an overview of trends in cross-bor-

der crime at the external borders during Q3 2012 and is composed with input from Frontex Joint Operations, Member State contributions and open sources information.

4.10.1. Eastern borders route

Smuggling of tobacco products

The smuggling of tobacco remained one of the most frequently encountered offences at the eastern border despite the overall detected volume of smuggled tobacco and cigarettes decreasing from the second quarter of 2012. Table 2 ranks the prices of tobacco products in EU Member States and neighbouring third countries, and shows the huge discrepancies that exist even with limited geographical ranges (e.g. between the Russian Federation and Norway). Such dramatic and profitable price differentials, as well as the low price to volume ratio, are the clear drivers of tobacco smuggling.


The external border sections with Ukraine, Belarus, Moldova and the Russian Federation were particularly affected by this problem (Fig. 21), specifically Poland and Slovakia tended to report the most regular incidents of tobacco product smuggling during Q3 2012.

The problem of smuggling of tobacco products has been repeatedly highlighted in the media including reports providing information on the additional health risks posed by illicit tobacco, particularly counterfeit cigarettes and 'cheap whites'. While some of this increase in availability and consumption of illicit tobacco can be attributed to illegal tobacco factories in Poland and the Baltic States, the smuggling of tobacco products across the eastern borders is also a significant factor in this development.

The types of cigarettes smuggled into the EU generally fall into three categories:

Figure 21. While there was a proportional increase in detections of cigarette/tobacco smuggling at the borders with Turkey and Belarus, the overall number of incidents in Q3 2012 was actually a third lower than in Q2 2012

Share of detected incidents of smuggling of tobacco products in Q1, Q2 & Q3 2012 by borders with third countries



Source: JO Focal Points Land 2012



© Polish Border Guard Bieszczadzki District

Figure 22. Polish border guards detected an abandoned cache of cigarettes complete with backpack harnesses for easier transport thought to have been smuggled across the green border into Poland from Ukraine

- 1) Contraband cigarettes are cigarettes sold legally in one country and then smuggled into another jurisdiction to exploit price and tax differentials. The smuggling of contraband cigarettes tends to be carried out by both individual smugglers as well in larger shipments by organised criminal groups.
- 2) Counterfeit cigarettes are cigarettes produced to look like branded products and are generally sold at a lower price than the genuine brand cigarettes. The tobacco used in these cigarettes is generally of inferior quality to the genuine product and has in the past been found to contain additional harmful substances.
- 3) 'Cheap whites' are cigarettes produced exclusively for the purpose of smuggling and illegal sale circumventing taxation and other sale legislation. The most well-known brand of 'cheap whites' is Jin-Ling, but there are also other brands produced exclusively for the purpose of smuggling and illegal sale.

Due to significant price differentials of tobacco products (Tab. 2), all EU Member States are potential markets for smuggled ciga-

Table 2: European cigarette market – July 2012

Price of cheapest brand pack per 20 cigarettes; non-EU countries marked in italics

Country	Price €
Norway	€ 8.59
Ireland	€ 7.25
UK	€ 6.33
France	€ 5.40
Netherlands	€ 4.48
Sweden	€ 4.34
Belgium	€ 4.11
Denmark	€ 4.09
Germany	€ 4.04
Finland	€ 4.00
Italy	€ 3.90
Austria	€ 3.45
Luxembourg	€ 3.40
Portugal	€ 3.40
Spain	€ 3.30
Malta	€ 3.30
Cyprus	€ 2.90
Slovenia	€ 2.50
Greece	€ 2.40
Czech Republic	€ 2.39
Slovakia	€ 2.31
Poland	€ 2.21
Romania	€ 2.19
Turkey	€ 2.14
Estonia	€ 2.10
Bulgaria	€ 2.04
Latvia	€ 2.02
Hungary	€ 2.01
Lithuania	€ 1.91
Morocco	€ 0.84
Russian Federation	€ 0.41
Ukraine	€ 0.33
Belarus	€ 0.26
Moldova	€ 0.18

Source: KPMG/PMI Project Star 2011 Results

rettes. Research commissioned by the tobacco industry* suggests that the share of smuggled cigarettes of all kinds (counterfeit, contraband and 'cheap whites') varies across different markets. For example, in large markets such as the UK, Germany and France, the overall share of illicit tobacco products can vary between 10% and 15%, while in smaller markets such as Lithuania and Latvia the

* KPMG/PMI Project Star 2011 Results

market share can be as high as 30% of all cigarettes consumed.

There were no significant changes in *modi operandi* used in smuggling cigarettes; depending on the nature and size of smuggling activities, smugglers continued to employ a range of suitable *modi operandi*. So-called individual 'ant smugglers' frequently cross the border carrying relatively small quantities of cigarettes, while organised crime syndicates aimed to smuggle large quantities of cigarettes/tobacco with fewer border-crossings in order to reduce the probability of detection. Large quantities of illicit tobacco goods were often concealed in commercial vehicles such as lorries, buses or trains and there were continued reports of detections of this *modus operandi*.

The smuggling of larger quantities of tobacco products takes place both in concealed spaces in vehicles crossing at regular BCPs as well as in conjunction with illegal border-crossing across the green border between BCPs. During June and September 2012, detections of cases of tobacco smuggling between BCPs accounted for 39% of all cases of tobacco product smuggling. Polish border guards regularly detected cases of smuggling of tobacco products across the green border along the border section with Ukraine. During Q3 2012, Polish border authorities seized large numbers of cigarettes and arrested several suspects allegedly involved in the smuggling of cigarettes from Ukraine to Poland.

Smuggling of petrol

As in previous quarters, price differentials for petrol between EU Member States and third countries made the smuggling of petrol a profitable enterprise along certain border sections (Tab. 3). An overall increase in the cost of petrol in the EU generated a significant incentive for petrol smuggling, es-

Table 3: Increased price differentials between EU Member States and the Russian Federation boosts the potential profitability for petrol smugglers

Price of Euro-Super 95 fuel Q3 2012 in Member States and neighbouring third countries and respective price differences as well as development of price differential from Q2 to Q3 2012

Q3 2012 (September)			
Border	EU country in EUR	Third country in EUR	Price difference in Q3
Finland-Russian Federation	1.73	0.76	0.97
Lithuania-Belarus	1.47	0.68	0.79
Poland-Belarus	1.40	0.68	0.72
Estonia-Russian Federation	1.39	0.76	0.63
Poland-Russian Federation	1.40	0.76	0.64
Slovakia-Ukraine	1.60	1.05	0.55
Greece-Albania	1.79	1.36	0.43
Hungary-Ukraine	1.55	1.05	0.50
Greece-fYROM	1.79	1.35	0.44
Poland-Ukraine	1.40	1.05	0.35
Romania-Ukraine	1.31	1.05	0.26
Romania-Moldova	1.31	1.10	0.21
Hungary-Serbia	1.55	1.49	0.06
Hungary-Croatia	1.55	1.42	0.13
Slovenia-Croatia	1.58	1.42	0.16
Bulgaria-Serbia	1.31	1.49	-0.18
Romania-Serbia	1.31	1.49	-0.18
Bulgaria-fYROM	1.31	1.35	-0.04
Greece-Turkey	1.79	2.01	-0.22
Bulgaria-Turkey	1.31	2.01	-0.70

Border	Price difference in Q2	Price difference in Q3	Change in price difference Q2 to Q3 2012
Finland-Russian Federation	0.89	0.97	9%
Lithuania-Belarus	0.78	0.79	1%
Poland-Belarus	0.77	0.72	-6%
Estonia-Russian Federation	0.58	0.63	9%
Poland-Russian Federation	0.62	0.64	3%
Slovakia-Ukraine	0.44	0.55	25%
Greece-Albania	0.29	0.43	48%
Hungary-Ukraine	0.36	0.50	39%
Greece-fYROM	0.46	0.44	-4%
Poland-Ukraine	0.25	0.35	40%
Romania-Ukraine	0.15	0.26	73%
Romania-Moldova	0.20	0.21	5%
Hungary-Serbia	0.1	0.06	-40%
Hungary-Croatia	0.12	0.13	8%
Slovenia-Croatia	0.07	0.16	129%
Bulgaria-Serbia	-0.15	-0.18	20%
Romania-Serbia	-0.11	-0.18	64%
Bulgaria-fYROM	-0.01	-0.04	300%
Greece-Turkey	-0.25	-0.22	-12%
Bulgaria-Turkey	-0.72	-0.70	-3%

Source: European Commission Oil Bulletin (24/09/2012) and open source data for third countries



pecially along the border section with the Russian Federation and Ukraine.

While there were no specific reports of detected cases of petrol smuggling involving large volumes of petrol, anecdotal evidence suggests that petrol smuggling occurs frequently and often involves individual smugglers transporting smaller quantities for their own consumption or sale to acquaintances. Estonian tax and customs authorities estimated that the quantity of fuel transported from the Russian Federation to Estonia in the fuel tanks of vehicles and then sold illegally amounts to a significant ~7% of the total fuel sold in Estonia. According to estimates, four-fifths of all vehicles crossing the border to the Russian Federation perform this trip mainly to buy fuel, which leads to extended waiting times.* The EU-wide market share of smuggled petrol is difficult to assess, but the loss of income due to unpaid fuel taxes as well as potential environmental damage due to the use of lower-grade petrol are thought to be significant.

* Estonian National Audit Office, <http://www.riigikontroll.ee/tabid/168/amid/557/Itemid/631/language/en-US/Default.aspx>


Stolen vehicles detected on exit

Stolen vehicles are regularly detected on exit from the EU to third countries along the eastern borders. The overall number of detections increased over the first three quarters of 2012, which does not necessarily indicate an increase in the number of stolen vehicles, but may reflect the deployment of better-equipped and more knowledgeable border guards along key border sections. The border sections with Ukraine and Belarus remain particularly affected by vehicle smuggling, where the majority of stolen vehicles were detected as part of JO Focal Points Land 2012 during Q3 2012 (Fig. 23).

As reported in previous FRAN Quarterlies, the theft and smuggling of agricultural and industrial machinery is emerging as a serious challenge to border guards along the East-

Figure 23. **The distribution of detections of stolen vehicles on exit among border sections varied only minimally over the last three quarters of 2012**

Share of detected vehicles on exit in Q1, Q2 & Q3 2012 by borders with third countries



Source: JO Focal Points Land 2012

ern Border. Insufficient markings on these vehicles as well as border guards' lack of expertise regarding agricultural and industrial machinery make detections of the particular vehicles difficult.

However, despite an increase in the theft and smuggling of agricultural and industrial machinery, the most often detected smuggling is that of stolen passenger cars, particularly luxury brands such as BMW, Audi or Mercedes. Organised criminal gangs are involved in the orchestrated theft and transport of stolen vehicles from EU Member States across the eastern borders to destinations in the Russian Federation, Ukraine and Central Asia. These groups are involved in *ad hoc* thefts as well as planned thefts to meet specific orders from clients in destination countries. Small transporters such as the Ford Transit or Mercedes Sprinter are also popular targets for vehicle thieves and smugglers and were repeatedly detected on exit from the EU along the eastern borders during Q3 2012.

Criminals engaged in the smuggling of stolen vehicles tend to employ a range of *modi operandi* including the alteration of VINs, falsification of documents or smuggling of vehicles in parts. Stolen vehicles are most commonly detected due to the discovery of altered VINs by border guards with specific knowledge and experience in the detection of stolen vehicles.

4.10.2. Western Balkans route

Smuggling of drugs

The smuggling of drugs along the Western Balkans route continues to be a serious concern for Member State border and law-enforcement authorities. Regular detections of drug smuggling and the presence of highly organised and internationally connected criminal groups pose significant challenges to the law-enforcement authorities of Western Balkan countries as well as EU border authori-

ties along the external border adjacent to this region.

A joint operation by police forces in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and Montenegro attempted to dismantle a notorious criminal network engaged in a range of criminal activities, particularly the smuggling of drugs along the Western Balkans route into Europe. While the head of the group, suspected by the United States of trafficking heroin and cocaine to Europe through the Balkans, escaped arrest, the police were able to seize assets and evidence of the involvement of criminal organisations. Law-enforcement authorities in Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro announced intensified efforts to disrupt the criminal networks operating in the Western Balkans region.

Organised criminal groups along the Western Balkans route are thought to have been responsible for a considerable share of drug trafficking into the EU. In particular, Albania remains one of the main source countries of marijuana intended for distribution in the EU, although public awareness and eradication efforts have led to a significant decrease in cultivation and production since 2010.

Stolen vehicles detected on exit

In Q3 2012 the Western Balkans route accounted for 30% of all stolen vehicles detected at the external border through JO Focal Points Land 2012 (Fig. 23). More than two thirds of these were reported from the border section between Slovenia and Croatia, and one quarter at the Hungarian-Serbian section. Only few stolen cars were discovered at the Bulgarian-Serbian border points. The most prevalent brands were Audi, BMW and Volkswagen, each of which accounted for one-fifth of the total number of detected vehicles. Most of these cases were discovered on exit from the EU because either the VIN number



Private weapon possession in the Western Balkans

Although detections of small weapons were very limited in Q3 2012, the risk of weapons trafficking from South Eastern Europe remains significant. Particularly during the Balkan wars of the 1990s, large amounts of weapons were distributed amongst the population. According to South Eastern and Eastern Europe Clearinghouse for the Control of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SEESAC), Serbian civilians own more than one million registered small arms. UNDP estimates that Serbian citizens possess additional 200 000 to 1 500 000 illegal small weapons. The ratio of illegal weapons per household is highest in the territory of Kosovo*, where around 400 000 small arms are possessed by 1.7m citizens, most of them unregistered. This fact certainly represents a constant risk of continued illegal weapon shipments from the Western Balkans.

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence

Source: seesac.org

was identified through the SIS database or because it had been altered in some way.

Smuggling of weapons

The number of detected attempts to smuggle weapons and ammunition along the Western Balkans route decreased substantially going into Q3. The dismantling of an organised crime group specialised in the smuggling of weapons from the Western Balkan countries by the Slovenian authorities in Q2 is a potential explanation for this decline. While border authorities reported no significant detections of small arms, during Focal Points Land officers reported 16 individual cases of migrants carrying telescopic truncheons across the border from Croatia to Slovenia. Telescopic truncheons are illegal in Slovenia

and subject to confiscation by the border authorities when brought into the country.

Smuggling of petrol

No Member State operation or the Frontex-coordinated Joint Operation Focal Points reported any cases of fuel smuggling in the third quarter of 2012. However, at least on a low level, the smuggling of fuel continues to exist and remains a gainful activity in the Western Balkans region. The highest price discrepancy for fuel can be found between Greece and its neighbours (EUR 0.43 for one litre of Super 95). The country is thus the most profitable destination for both smuggled petrol and diesel, especially from Albania and the FYROM (see Fig. 25). Hungary and Slovenia have the second highest fuel prices in the region, which may result in small-scale smuggling activities from Croatia. As Bulgarian and Romanian price levels for petrol and diesel are the lowest in the region, they play no role as destinations for illegal imports. In particular, Serbia raised the price of diesel such that its illegal export to neighbouring countries would be hardly profitable.

Smuggling of tobacco products

High differences in cigarette prices between the Western Balkan countries and the neighbouring EU countries make the contraband of tobacco products a highly profitable activity. The cheapest pack of cigarettes in the FYROM would cost only EUR 0.60 in comparison to EUR 2.04 paid in Bulgaria.* On 9 July, the Bulgarian border police of Zlatarevo stopped and checked a Ford Transit and a Fiat Scudo in the border region to the FYROM and Serbia. In the cargo compartments, they found 880 000 cigarettes with FYROM excise labels (Fig. 24). The Bulgarian border police arrested four men, all Bulgarian citizens from the nearby village of Petrich, and opened preliminary proceedings.



Figure 24. **A total of 880 000 smuggled cigarettes were concealed in a Ford Transit and a Fiat Scudo driven by Bulgarians**

* KPMG/PMI Project Star 2011 Results

© Bulgarian Ministry of Interior




Figure 25. Price differentials between the cost of petrol in Member States and third countries along the eastern borders of the EU and Western Balkans region



* reportingproject.net/occrp/index.php/en/ccwatch/cc-watch-briefs/1641-bosnia-confiscated-gold-hints-at-bigger-smuggling-problem

** www.bullionstreet.com/news/turkey-with-295.5-tonnes-of-gold-tops-southeast-europe/3105

During an operation conducted by Bosnian authorities in September, an illegal import of gold in the value of EUR 50 000 was confiscated at the border to Serbia.* The volume of precious metals traded between Turkey and the Western Balkan countries is traditionally large. Especially the historically inflation-ridden populations of Yugoslavia prefer to rely on tangible assets as a financial security. Turkey is the world's third largest producer and a net exporter of gold jewellery. Greece and Bulgaria are large importers of Turkish gold, but also the FYROM, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Albania receive significant amounts.** However, Bosnia and Herzegovina registered only legal gold imports of EUR 3 million (corresponding to 60kg), which means that large amounts are illegally shipped across the EU members Bulgaria and Greece or through the airport of Sarajevo.

Source: Organized Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, 21 September 2012

4.10.3. Eastern Mediterranean route

Smuggling of tobacco products

During Q3 2012, the border section between Bulgaria and Turkey accounted for the majority of detections of smuggling of tobacco products as part of JO Focal Points Land 2012 (Fig. 21). The smugglers were exclusively Bulgarian nationals. Both cigarettes as well as loose tobacco are smuggled with great frequency both by individual smugglers and also as part of larger shipments concealed in lorries. The overall number of incidents of smuggling of tobacco products declined from Q2 to Q3 2012. However, the relative distribution of incidents and significance of the Bulgarian-Turkish border as a hotspot for tobacco smuggling remains unchanged.

Smuggling of drugs

The Eastern Mediterranean route is a typical entry route for the smuggling of heroin from Central Asia to Europe. During Q3 2012, there were detections of significant amounts of heroin concealed in vehicles attempting to cross the Bulgarian-Turkish border. Heroin smuggled along this route typically originates from Central Asia, particularly Afghanistan,

and enters the EU at the external border with Turkey. It is suspected that drug trafficking along this route is closely linked to organised crime groups in the Western Balkans region and the seizures of drugs during the reporting period involving nationals of Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia seem to reinforce this assessment. OCGs in the Western Balkans both smuggle themselves and facilitate smuggling activities by other OCGs such as those associated with Turkish organised crime.

Smuggling of precious metals

Both undeclared silver and gold concealed in passenger vehicles continued to be detected on entry to the EU at the Bulgarian-Turkish border. There were several reported cases during Q3 2012 continuing the trend of the previous quarters. Focal Points Land reported the detection of 14kg of smuggled gold, silver, jewellery and coins in five cases. In one incident, two Turkish citizens travelling in a car driven by a Bulgarian illegally imported 6kg of gold and silver and cash in the value of more than EUR 74 000.


4.10.4. Western Mediterranean and West African routes

Smuggling of drugs

The trafficking of drugs constitutes a significant challenge to the security of the external borders along the Western Mediterranean and West African routes. Regular detections of sizeable amounts of drugs on individual travellers and in vehicles as well as some spectacular seizures of massive amounts of high grade cocaine indicate that these are important entry routes for illicit narcotics into Europe. The size and quality of seized drugs as well as resources employed in smuggling attempts clearly establish a link to highly sophisticated organised crime groups operating on an international level.

JO Indalo took place from May to October 2012 in the Western Mediterranean Sea. During Q3 2012, assets deployed as part of the Joint Operation seized drugs with a value of over EUR 220 million and arrested 55 suspected drug traffickers in 32 incidents. In this region, the smuggling of Moroccan hashish in speed boats with high-powered engines crossing the sea from Morocco to Spain is the most common *modus operandi*. JO Indalo was the first EU inter-agency cooperation involving Frontex, Europol and CeCLAD-M.

On 15 August, the Spanish Special Operations Group (GEO) was able to seize a record amount of 3.3 tonnes of cocaine on a ship manned by a Bulgarian crew off the Spanish coast near the port of Cadiz. Spanish authorities arrested 23 Bulgarian crew members on board the 130m ship and seized more than 100 packages of cocaine (Fig. 26). The vessel was registered by the Bulgaria-based Seaborne Trading Company and is believed to have taken on board the cocaine in the Caribbean Sea before crossing the Atlantic with the intention of off-loading the drug packages just within Spanish territorial



© BTA, policia.es

Figure 26. **Significant seizure of a 3.2 ton cocaine shipment off the coast of Cadiz, Spain by Spanish authorities. Left: The shipment contained over 100 packages of high-grade cocaine; Right: The 130m SV Nikolay was sailing under the Bulgarian flag**

waters. Bulgaria's special anti-mafia prosecution unit ordered the arrest and subsequently charged the owners of the vessel's company of registration. Ten other suspected associates of the Bulgarian criminal group, of Spanish and Colombian nationality, tasked with retrieving the packages from the coastal waters of Spain were arrested in Madrid and Galicia following the seizure of the vessel.

This *modus operandi* is common among drug traffickers complicating the detection of smuggling vessels by law-enforcement authorities. However, connections between Bulgarian-based organised criminal groups and the Colombian cartels providing much of the cocaine sold in the European market is a previously unknown phenomenon. The location of the accomplices arrested on the Spanish mainland in connection with the



© Frontex, JO EPN Minerva 2012

Figure 27. **A total of 362 balls of hashish found attached to a 70-year-old Spanish woman's body in Tarifa during JO EPN Minerva**

seized vessel indicates that the destination of the vessel and the location of planned handover of the drug shipment were most likely off the north-western coast of Spain rather than the sea region near Cadiz where the vessel was stopped by the Spanish coast guard. The degree of organisation involved with criminal groups in Spain, Bulgaria and Colombia points to a trend of increased cooperation between organised criminal groups on the international plane beyond language barriers and traditional scope of criminal activity.

Prior to its journey from South America to Spain the vessel was active in the Gulf of Guinea, a region, which has recently been associated with the smuggling of drugs, oil, arms and other illicit goods.

During the reporting period, Joint Operation EPN Minerva reported a large number of detections of hashish on individual smugglers crossing from Morocco into Spain at Algeciras and Ceuta. The majority of smugglers were of Spanish or Moroccan nationalities; however, other European nationalities such as French, Dutch and Romanian were also detected smuggling hashish, albeit in much lower numbers.

In total, there were 209 detections of drug smuggling during JO EPN Minerva, which ran throughout July, August and September. During the Joint Operation 35kg of cocaine and 4 968kg of hashish were confiscated and a total of 260 persons were prosecuted (approx. 61% Moroccan, 26% Spanish and 13% other nationals).

Many of the smugglers shared a common profile and were identified as males of around 22 years of age. However, profiling by age range and gender is not entirely reliable as the age of the smugglers overall varied from 14 to 70 years. In one memorable case, a 70 year-old Spanish woman was found to be carrying 362 balls of hashish concealed on her body (Fig. 27).

Drug smugglers used commonly encountered *modi operandi* and techniques depending on the amount of smuggled drugs. Individual smugglers or mules attempted to transport primarily hashish attached to the body, swallowed or hidden in body cavities or hidden in clothing or accessories (belts, shoes, etc.). Tactical risk analysis, behaviour analysis and spotting were successfully used to identify potential smugglers and make thorough searches of their persons and belongings.

Larger shipments of drugs were transported hidden in lorries (tool box, fuel tank) and hidden in cars (tyres or in secret compartments). The detections were primarily made by sniffing dogs trained for drug detection. Closed

compartments especially filled with strong smell (garbage, fuel, clothes, etc.) prevented the effective use of dogs and presented obstacles to the detection of concealed drug shipments.

Smuggling of counterfeit products

As part of the same operation (JO EPN Minerva), there were regular detections of counterfeit products of luxury brands and sports articles smuggled by individuals in passenger cars. The smuggling of football shirts for the teams of FC Barcelona and Real Madrid as well as counterfeit Gucci, Prada and Louis Vuiton articles was particularly popular. The frequency of detections, as well as the considerable number of items detected as part of each shipment, ranging from 100 to over 500 items, indicates a flourishing trade in counterfeit products and marks the BCPs at Ceuta and Algeciras as significant entry points for counterfeit goods in the region.

Stolen vehicles detected on exit

There were a number of detections of stolen vehicles as part of JO EPN Minerva during the reporting period. Detections of stolen vehicles on exit to Morocco were more common than those entering the EU via Spain. However, on several occasions false detections were made due to outdated data in SIS showing recovered vehicles as stolen as well as settled disputes with rental companies still outstanding in the system.

4.10.5. Central Mediterranean route

The Central Mediterranean route is typically associated with irregular migration originating in North Africa. However, the route continues to be used by criminal networks for the smuggling of cocaine and hashish, trafficking in human beings and the smuggling of tobacco and counterfeit goods. During Q3

2012 this area was not covered by a Frontex-coordinated operation.

Trafficking in human beings

As police operations conducted in Q3 showed, trafficking in human beings is a widely present phenomenon in many European countries. Italian, German and Spanish law-enforcement measures have recently focused on victims trafficked through Nigerian organised crime networks. For example, in the beginning of July, the German Federal Police arrested five members of an organised crime network that was involved in trafficking Nigerian women for sexual exploitation. Members of the group already living in Germany facilitated the visa procedure by claiming towards the competent authorities that they wish to invite acquaintances from Nigeria to specific occasions such as family celebrations. Nigeria-based accomplices of the respective organised crime group simultaneously equipped their victims with false documents. The young women thus appeared as legitimate travellers when they arrived at EU border controls, especially if they were accompanied by 'madams', older women who sometimes travel together with the victims. Once they arrived in Germany, they were confronted with high 'debts' of up to EUR 70 000, which they would have to repay to their facilitators working as prostitutes.

Also in July, the Italian Guardia di Finanza of Spezia undertook 20 arrests in the course of an investigation against Nigerian human traffickers. The network operated in different geographic locations: one component of the criminal network selected young women in Nigeria, whereas another group organised the trip through the Saharan desert through Niger to Libya. From Libya, the victims embarked on boats to Lampedusa, where, upon arrival, the young women were equipped with anonymous SIM cards to stay in contact with the organisers. From there, the female Nigerians were assigned to different places for




Figure 28. **Detection of heroin concealed in suitcases and backpacks at Ljubljana Airport (LJU) during October 2012**
Left: Opened plastic bag filled with heroin; Right: X-ray picture revealing heroin-filled plastic bag concealed in suitcase's double walls

prostitution, through which they had to pay off a 'debt' of about EUR 60 000–70 000 to the local accomplices of the group. The particularity of this case is the use of a *modus operandi* consisting of migration on land and the subsequent crossing of the sea border, which tends to be used by migrant smugglers.

According to UNODC, around 5 700 West African victims are brought to Europe every year for sexual exploitation. In 2009, the organisation estimated that this criminal business generates an annual turnover of approximately USD 285 million.*

4.10.6. Air borders

All types of cross-border criminal activity are encountered at air borders. However, border guards posted at airports across the EU are likely to encounter attempts of smuggling of drugs, tobacco products and counterfeit goods as well as trafficking in human beings.

Smuggling of drugs

The attempted smuggling of drugs is a daily occurrence at major international airports and

border guards encounter individual smugglers or 'mules', who smuggle drugs on or in their bodies, as well as concealed drug shipments in packages and air freight containers.

During October 2012, according to open sources, Slovenian border police arrested three Tanzanian nationals for the smuggling of heroin at Ljubljana Airport (LJU) in three separate incidents. The suspects had travelled to Slovenia from Frankfurt (FRA) and Zurich (ZRH) and were found to be carrying heroin concealed in their luggage in hidden compartments in their suitcases and backpacks (Fig. 28). The total amount of heroin seized during the three arrests added up to 11kg of heroin. The suspects attempted to thwart detection by sniffer dogs by covering the drug packages with strong smelling substances such as paprika and chilli, a method frequently employed by drug smugglers, but were ultimately found out during X-ray checks carried out on their luggage. The Tanzanian nationals are thought to have been 'paid mules' and it is assumed that the heroin was not destined for sale in Slovenia, but rather for distribution in other EU Member States.

* UNODC (2009):
 Transnational Trafficking
 and the Rule of Law in
 West Africa

5. Statistical annex

LEGEND

Symbols and abbreviations: **n.a.** not applicable
: data not available

Source: FRAN and EDF-RAN data as of 10 November 2012, unless otherwise indicated

Note: 'Member States' in the tables refer to FRAN Member States, including both 27 EU Member States and three Schengen Associated Countries



Annex Table 1: **Illegal border-crossing between BCPs**

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2011			2012		2012 Q3			per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
All Borders									
Afghanistan	4 606	9 323	7 301	2 153	4 529	4 518	-52	-0.2	20
Syria	274	602	614	715	2 024	3 923	552	94	18
Algeria	1 066	1 613	2 570	1 275	2 000	1 494	-7.4	-25	6.8
Pakistan	2 821	5 629	5 874	1 045	1 650	1 491	-7.4	-9.6	6.7
Bangladesh	1 799	1 370	1 192	1 407	2 435	1 386	1.2	-43	6.3
Somalia	1 035	604	799	1 017	1 673	1 283	112	-23	5.8
Albania	1 156	1 411	1 554	1 177	1 797	1 254	-11	-30	5.7
Tunisia	4 489	3 573	291	493	832	1 109	-69	33	5.0
Not specified	7 506	2 104	808	321	525	771	-63	47	3.5
Eritrea	252	318	352	270	461	575	81	25	2.6
Others	16 269	11 983	6 970	3 762	5 166	4 289	-64	-17	19
Total All Borders	41 273	38 530	28 325	13 635	23 092	22 093	-43	-4.3	100
Land Borders									
Afghanistan	3 986	8 355	6 711	1 775	3 963	3 584	-57	-9.6	25
Syria	188	400	578	676	1 918	3 321	730	73	23
Albania	1 144	1 379	1 539	1 176	1 736	1 214	-12	-30	8.3
Pakistan	2 136	5 154	5 548	915	1 189	1 006	-80	-15	6.9
Bangladesh	763	1 176	1 080	1 392	2 348	959	-18	-59	6.6
Algeria	760	1 069	2 164	1 227	1 481	878	-18	-41	6.0
Not specified	580	1 131	737	307	463	554	-51	20	3.8
Somalia	279	380	686	464	567	421	11	-26	2.9
Iraq	189	326	372	156	387	363	11	-6.2	2.5
Palestine	100	141	285	267	363	309	119	-15	2.1
Others	3 643	3 601	4 764	2 848	3 387	1 952	-46	-42	13
Total Land Border	13 768	23 112	24 464	11 203	17 802	14 561	-37	-18	100
Sea Borders									
Tunisia	4 298	3 374	96	357	685	1 008	-70	47	13
Afghanistan	620	968	590	378	566	934	-3.5	65	12
Somalia	756	224	113	553	1 106	862	285	-22	11
Algeria	306	544	406	48	519	616	13	19	8.2
Syria	86	202	36	39	106	602	198	468	8.0
Pakistan	685	475	326	130	461	485	2.1	5.2	6.4
Eritrea	112	25	5	39	223	434	1636	95	5.8
Bangladesh	1 036	194	112	15	87	427	120	391	5.7
Egypt	658	425	544	186	533	422	-0.7	-21	5.6
Nigeria	3 105	3 156	62	12	67	258	-92	285	3.4
Others	15 843	5 831	1 571	675	937	1 484	-75	58	20
Total Sea Border	27 505	15 418	3 861	2 432	5 290	7 532	-51	42	100

Annex Table 2: **Clandestine entries at BCPs**

Detections at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2011			2012		2012 Q3			
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
Place of Detection									
Land	29	40	63	67	106	151	278	42	92
Sea	31	24	21	36	20	13	-46	-35	7.9
Top Ten Nationalities									
Afghanistan	3	18	30	50	52	47	161	-9.6	29
Turkey	6	14	1	5	1	23	64	2 200	14
Algeria	11	13	6	8	10	12	-7.7	20	7.3
Albania	1	1	5	3	3	10	900	233	6.1
Palestine	7	2	1	0	0	10	400	<i>n.a.</i>	6.1
Syria	1	0	5	1	4	9	<i>n.a.</i>	125	5.5
Croatia	0	1	4	0	1	8	700	700	4.9
Morocco	4	2	4	3	10	7	250	-30	4.3
Serbia	0	1	2	4	10	6	500	-40	3.7
Somalia	2	0	0	1	1	5	<i>n.a.</i>	400	3.0
Others	25	12	26	28	34	27	125	-21	16
Total	60	64	84	103	126	164	156	30	100



Annex Table 3: **Facilitators**

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

	2011			2012		2012 Q3			per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
Place of Detection									
Inland	1 521	1 013	1 114	1 489	1 254	1 019	0.6	-19	60
Land	159	195	159	216	177	272	39	54	16
Sea	65	117	93	129	116	117	0	0.9	6.8
Not specified	27	30	46	53	46	111	270	141	6.5
Air	80	88	108	82	70	97	10	39	5.7
Land Intra EU	89	103	94	138	122	96	-6.8	-21	5.6
Top Ten Nationalities									
Not specified	62	48	88	88	77	146	204	90	8.5
Italy	138	116	134	202	94	98	-16	4.3	5.7
Morocco	93	86	91	90	95	91	5.8	-4.2	5.3
Romania	77	68	58	136	55	79	16	44	4.6
Spain	66	92	111	140	144	77	-16	-47	4.5
France	133	76	64	95	99	70	-7.9	-29	4.1
Turkey	40	66	47	83	50	69	4.5	38	4.0
Serbia	24	25	43	40	33	68	172	106	4.0
Albania	74	41	59	73	37	65	59	76	3.8
Pakistan	84	51	38	59	82	62	22	-24	3.6
Others	1 150	877	881	1 101	1 019	887	1.1	-13	52
Total	1 941	1 546	1 614	2 107	1 785	1 712	11	-4.1	100

Annex Table 4: Illegal stay

Detections reported by place of detection and top ten nationalities

Place of Detection	2011			2012		2012 Q3		per cent of total	
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago prev. qtr		
Place of Detection									
Inland	70 063	69 572	76 512	72 520	68 906	68 696	-1.3	-0.3	79
Air	7 452	9 361	8 985	8 687	8 380	9 645	3.0	15	11
Land	4 353	5 259	5 214	4 731	4 766	5 632	7.1	18	6.5
Land Intra EU	2 772	2 032	1 639	1 347	1 427	1 393	-31	-2.4	1.6
Sea	1 981	1 519	1 325	1 040	1 084	1 090	-28	0.6	1.3
Between BCP	129	292	159	130	212	97	-67	-54	0.1
Not specified	0	2	0	0	3	9	350	200	
Top Ten Nationalities									
Afghanistan	5 822	6 777	7 750	6 345	6 179	6 249	-7.8	1.1	7.2
Pakistan	2 838	3 720	3 587	3 752	5 087	4 983	34	-2.0	5.8
Morocco	5 497	5 026	5 575	6 047	5 683	4 720	-6.1	-17	5.5
Syria	836	1 046	1 192	1 396	2 020	3 995	282	98	4.6
Algeria	3 623	3 925	4 010	4 247	4 077	3 698	-5.8	-9.3	4.3
Ukraine	2 906	3 788	3 737	3 202	3 033	3 648	-3.7	20	4.2
Russian Federation	2 281	3 173	2 427	2 363	2 414	3 519	11	46	4.1
Tunisia	7 682	5 289	6 360	4 705	4 440	3 238	-39	-27	3.7
Serbia	2 269	2 015	3 701	2 880	2 461	3 101	54	26	3.6
Albania	2 524	2 382	3 085	3 167	3 627	2 854	20	-21	3.3
Others	50 472	50 896	52 410	50 351	45 757	46 557	-8.5	1.7	54
Total	86 750	88 037	93 834	88 455	84 778	86 562	-1.7	2.1	100



Annex Table 5: **Refusals of entry**

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and top ten nationalities

	2011			2012		2012 Q3			
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
All Borders									
Ukraine	3 861	4 499	3 921	3 788	3 994	5 857	30	47	18
Georgia	686	558	1 136	567	1 692	3 284	489	94	10
Russian Federation	2 465	2 710	2 214	1 839	2 335	2 982	10	28	9.2
Albania	4 513	3 550	2 941	2 261	3 737	2 872	-19	-23	8.9
Serbia	1 549	1 643	1 639	1 388	1 222	1 539	-6.3	26	4.8
Belarus	1 501	1 549	1 615	1 106	1 116	1 384	-11	24	4.3
Turkey	761	1 145	672	578	625	1 122	-2.0	80	3.5
Croatia	1 072	766	867	1 032	1 048	1 058	38	1.0	3.3
Morocco	1 112	1 211	1 014	1 058	1 081	708	-42	-35	2.2
ŷYROM	817	794	672	508	655	574	-28	-12	1.8
Others	11 739	11 900	12 320	10 510	10 739	10 898	-8.4	1.5	34
Total All Borders	30 076	30 325	29 011	24 635	28 244	32 278	6.4	14	100
Land Borders									
Ukraine	3 561	4 191	3 608	3 503	3 723	5 517	32	48	28
Georgia	635	496	1 065	493	1 620	3 214	548	98	16
Russian Federation	1 431	1 794	1 510	1 289	1 630	2 188	22	34	11
Albania	3 057	1 884	1 161	1 192	2 587	1 718	-8.8	-34	8.8
Belarus	1 462	1 504	1 574	1 080	1 086	1 348	-10	24	6.9
Serbia	1 255	1 384	1 358	1 200	1 034	1 317	-4.8	27	6.7
Croatia	1 013	713	815	979	1 002	1 006	41	0.4	5.1
Turkey	374	828	299	205	243	735	-11	202	3.8
ŷYROM	667	680	537	400	506	482	-29	-4.7	2.5
Bosnia and Herzegovina	402	424	343	347	346	457	7.8	32	2.3
Others	1 708	1 931	1 488	1 381	1 485	1 602	-17	7.9	8.2
Total Land Border	15 565	15 829	13 758	12 069	15 262	19 584	24	28	100
Air Borders									
Albania	736	796	944	617	638	582	-27	-8.8	5.5
Brazil	1 204	1 079	1 056	1 003	841	540	-50	-36	5.1
United States	562	605	557	461	484	534	-12	10	5.0
Russian Federation	386	459	348	373	389	510	11	31	4.8
Nigeria	357	393	388	374	435	477	21	9.7	4.5
Not specified	352	397	508	435	458	450	13	-1.7	4.2
China	254	336	256	305	258	345	2.7	34	3.2
Turkey	328	282	331	355	352	322	14	-8.5	3.0
Algeria	236	233	504	269	356	299	28	-16	2.8
Ukraine	247	252	284	273	229	271	7.5	18	2.5
Others	7 620	7 263	7 863	6 758	6 423	6 314	-13	-1.7	59
Total Air Border	12 282	12 095	13 039	11 223	10 863	10 644	-12	-2	100
Sea Borders									
Albania	720	870	836	452	512	572	-34	12	28
Russian Federation	648	457	356	177	316	284	-38	-10	14
Philippines	85	254	230	130	371	241	-5.1	-35	12
Morocco	96	98	75	138	114	168	71	47	8.2
Ukraine	53	56	29	12	42	69	23	64	3.4
Turkey	59	35	42	18	30	65	86	117	3.2
Kiribati	0	1	6	36	23	61	6 000	165	3.0
Syria	33	42	19	7	56	55	31	-1.8	2.7
India	38	42	44	26	89	50	19	-44	2.4
Not specified	61	34	29	40	117	43	26	-63	2.1
Others	436	512	548	307	449	442	-14	-1.6	22
Total Sea Border	2 229	2 401	2 214	1 343	2 119	2 050	-15	-3.3	100

Annex Table 6: Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by reasons for refusal and top ten nationalities

	Refused persons Total	2012 Q3 – Reasons for refusals of entry (see description below)										Total Reasons
		A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	n.a.	
Top Ten Nationalities												
Ukraine	4 003	12	23	1 056	8	2 238	194	292	139	21	30	4 013
Georgia	2 573	1	6	1 968	2	23	0	4	581	0	3	2 588
Russian Federation	1 945	156	1	1 204	104	154	21	143	126	64	37	2 010
Albania	1 826	91	182	67	22	356	108	355	1 461	99	74	2 815
Serbia	1 018	24	7	131	3	42	249	134	469	13	6	1 078
Belarus	939	0	1	491	0	172	11	173	68	28	4	948
Croatia	693	158	8	184	1	54	243	57	307	207	19	1 238
Turkey	693	53	6	486	6	74	11	16	41	8	17	718
Brazil	379	2	9	21	14	64	14	46	42	5	191	408
Morocco	376	265	35	89	23	113	6	17	143	16	6	713
Others	7 375	610	320	2 199	203	1 369	273	491	527	155	1 664	7 811
Total	21 820	1 372	598	7 896	386	4 659	1 130	1 728	3 904	616	2 051	24 340

Descriptions of the reasons for refusal of entry:

- A** has no valid travel document(s);
- B** has a false/counterfeit/forged travel document;
- C** has no valid visa or residence permit;
- D** has a false/counterfeit/forged visa or residence permit;
- E** has no appropriate documentation justifying the purpose and conditions of stay;
- F** has already stayed for three months during a six months period on the territory of the Member States of the European Union;
- G** does not have sufficient means of subsistence in relation to the period and form of stay, or the means to return to the country of origin or transit;
- H** is a person for whom an alert has been issued for the purposes of refusing entry in the SIS or in the national register;
- I** is considered to be a threat for public policy, internal security, public health or the international relations of one or more Member States of the European Union.



Annex Table 7: Refusals of entry

Refusals of entry at the external borders reported by border type and reasons for refusal

	2011			2012		2012 Q3			per cent of total	Highest share
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		
All Borders										
										Nationality
C) No valid visa	7 147	8 982	7 803	5 981	8 325	11 506	28	38	33	Georgia (22%)
E) No justification	6 584	6 331	6 888	6 108	5 703	6 771	6.9	19	19	Ukraine (47%)
H) Alert issued	5 338	4 480	3 970	3 353	3 286	5 236	17	59	15	Albania (36%)
Reason not available	3 296	3 344	3 038	2 540	2 693	3 037	-9.2	13	8.6	United States (15%)
G) No subsistence	3 174	2 799	2 965	2 512	3 402	2 713	-3.1	-20	7.7	Albania (24%)
A) No valid document	2 172	2 186	1 908	1 791	1 998	2 136	-2.3	6.9	6.0	Morocco (20%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 256	1 333	1 337	1 479	1 143	1 640	23	43	4.6	Serbia (23%)
I) Threat	707	581	838	762	816	1 006	73	23	2.8	Croatia (36%)
B) False document	676	675	752	913	1 006	831	23	-17	2.3	Albania (30%)
D) False visa	398	403	527	374	374	511	27	37	1.4	Russian Federation (21%)
Total All Borders	30 748	31 114	30 026	25 813	28 746	35 387	14	23	100	
Land Borders										
										Nationality
C) No valid visa	4 411	5 874	4 760	3 689	5 528	8 497	45	54	39	Georgia (30%)
H) Alert issued	3 921	3 005	2 523	2 168	2 183	4 115	37	89	19	Albania (33%)
E) No justification	2 454	2 452	2 192	2 184	2 259	3 891	59	72	18	Ukraine (79%)
G) No subsistence	2 098	1 867	1 977	1 730	2 487	1 782	-4.6	-28	8.1	Albania (31%)
F) Over 3 month stay	1 064	1 137	1 137	1 221	925	1 443	27	56	6.6	Serbia (26%)
A) No valid document	1 039	1 037	749	913	896	984	-5.1	9.8	4.5	Morocco (40%)
I) Threat	540	428	606	475	529	727	70	37	3.3	Croatia (50%)
B) False document	60	138	80	310	464	329	138	-29	1.5	Albania (75%)
D) False visa	81	141	179	75	109	192	36	76	0.9	Russian Federation (49%)
Total Land Border	15 668	16 079	14 203	12 765	15 380	21 960	37	43	100	
Air Borders										
										Nationality
Reason not available	3 152	3 200	2 939	2 466	2 568	2 901	-9.3	13	26	United States (16%)
E) No justification	3 983	3 732	4 475	3 815	3 316	2 590	-31	-22	23	Albania (8.5%)
C) No valid visa	2 250	2 386	2 456	1 991	2 050	2 389	0.1	17	21	Russian Federation (12%)
G) No subsistence	963	829	872	731	821	852	2.8	3.8	7.6	Brazil (7.6%)
H) Alert issued	804	747	803	721	644	634	-15	-1.6	5.7	Albania (28%)
A) No valid document	526	627	673	600	589	629	0.3	6.8	5.6	Unknown (32%)
B) False document	575	519	642	568	518	442	-15	-15	4.0	Unknown (19%)
D) False visa	246	246	331	277	246	295	20	20	2.6	Egypt (13%)
I) Threat	158	145	220	276	267	259	79	-3.0	2.3	Russian Federation (13%)
F) Over 3 month stay	180	193	194	257	213	191	-1.0	-10	1.7	United States (14%)
Total Air Border	12 837	12 624	13 605	11 702	11 232	11 182	-11	-0.4	100	
Sea Borders										
										Nationality
C) No valid visa	486	722	587	301	742	600	-17	-19	28	Philippines (30%)
A) No valid document	607	522	486	278	513	522	0	1.8	25	Russian Federation (37%)
H) Alert issued	613	728	644	464	454	470	-35	3.5	22	Albania (75%)
E) No justification	147	147	221	109	128	263	79	105	12	Albania (56%)
Reason not available	144	144	99	74	125	130	-9.7	4.0	6.2	United States (14%)
G) No subsistence	113	103	116	51	94	50	-51	-47	2.4	Albania (76%)
B) False document	41	18	30	35	22	29	61	32	1.4	Morocco (55%)
D) False visa	71	16	17	22	18	24	50	33	1.1	Morocco (58%)
I) Threat	9	8	12	11	20	18	125	-10	0.9	Albania (89%)
F) Over 3 month stay	12	3	6	1	4	4	33	0	0.2	Turkey (75%)
Total Sea Border	2 243	2 411	2 218	1 346	2 120	2 110	-12	-0.5	100	

Annex Table 8: **Applications for asylum**

Applications for international protection reported by top ten nationalities

	2011			2012		2012 Q3			
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
Top Ten Nationalities									
Syria	1 517	2 750	2 555	2 447	3 545	7 498	173	112	10
Afghanistan	7 067	8 552	7 626	6 306	6 736	7 151	-16	6.2	9.9
Serbia	1 673	1 770	5 771	3 353	1 691	4 576	159	171	6.3
Russian Federation	2 733	3 643	3 730	2 697	2 911	4 442	22	53	6.1
Pakistan	2 530	3 778	3 904	3 126	3 540	3 966	5.0	12	5.5
Somalia	3 705	3 288	3 714	2 820	3 964	3 570	8.6	-9.9	4.9
Iran	2 376	3 012	3 276	2 488	2 669	3 271	8.6	23	4.5
Not specified	1 505	1 460	4 172	3 881	2 999	2 999	105	0	4.1
Eritrea	3 040	2 191	2 053	2 129	2 288	2 880	31	26	4.0
Iraq	3 380	4 159	3 503	2 660	2 579	2 863	-31	11	4.0
Others	32 048	32 810	31 570	24 947	26 669	29 076	-11	9.0	40
Total	61 574	67 413	71 874	56 854	59 591	72 292	7.2	21	100



Annex Table 9: **Document fraud**

False documents detected at BCPs reported by border type and top ten claimed nationalities

	2011			2012		2012 Q3			Highest share	
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr		per cent of total
Border Type										Nationality Claimed
Air	1 096	1 093	1 196	1 240	1 204	1 114	1.9	-7.5	55	Syria (6.6%)
Land	453	571	494	740	1 060	810	42	-24	40	Albania (60%)
Sea	113	167	145	103	97	90	-46	-7.2	4.5	Spain (23%)
Unknown	0	0	0	0	1	0	n.a.	-100	0	
Top Ten Nationalities Claimed										Nationality Document
Albania	40	49	75	353	908	498	916	-45	25	Greece (83%)
Syria	16	23	33	31	59	91	296	54	4.5	Germany (29%)
Iran	41	118	84	79	68	79	-33	16	3.9	Italy (16%)
Ukraine	170	243	144	151	72	75	-69	4.2	3.7	Poland (49%)
Afghanistan	43	30	22	53	51	67	123	31	3.3	United Kingdom (28%)
Congo	18	9	14	11	32	66	633	106	3.3	France (33%)
Congo (Dem. Rep.)	63	94	100	72	48	60	-36	25	3	Congo (Dem. Rep.) (35%)
Bangladesh	33	14	18	21	50	59	321	18	2.9	Italy (69%)
Turkey	41	53	50	53	44	55	3.8	25	2.7	Turkey (42%)
Egypt	12	22	20	23	17	55	150	224	2.7	Germany (27%)
Others	1 185	1 176	1 275	1 236	1 013	909	-23	-10	45	Italy (14%)
Total	1 662	1 831	1 835	2 083	2 362	2 014	10	-15	100	

Annex Table 10: **Document fraud**

False documents detected at BCPs reported by type of document and type of fraud

Document Type	2011			2012		2012 Q3		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago		
PASSPORTS	644	723	721	705	647	699	-3	8	United Kingdom (8.7%)
Forged	195	228	285	268	288	328	44	14	United Kingdom (7.0%)
Authentic	168	199	220	192	151	188	-5.5	25	France (12%)
False-No More Details	170	165	135	133	98	91	-45	-7.1	United Kingdom (15%)
Counterfeit	89	119	74	98	99	74	-38	-25	Turkey (19%)
Stolen Blank	17	11	7	14	11	18	64	64	Germany (50%)
Pseudo	5	1	0	0	0	0	-100	n.a.	
ID CARDS	243	284	257	238	245	171	-40	-30	Italy (20%)
Counterfeit	115	113	110	131	112	99	-12	-12	Italy (19%)
Authentic	46	84	77	71	47	38	-55	-19	Spain (24%)
False-No More Details	49	50	39	12	23	14	-72	-39	Italy (43%)
Forged	22	24	19	11	44	12	-50	-73	Bulgaria (33%)
Stolen Blank	9	12	12	12	18	7	-42	-61	Italy (43%)
Pseudo	2	1	0	1	1	1	0	0	Italy
VISA	191	178	176	183	170	151	-15	-11	Italy (25%)
Counterfeit	119	123	112	118	95	82	-33	-14	France (33%)
Forged	21	16	18	28	22	40	150	82	Italy (58%)
Authentic	9	8	3	8	10	12	50	20	Italy (75%)
False-No More Details	38	22	37	17	27	10	-55	-63	Czech Republic (30%)
Stolen Blank	4	9	6	11	16	7	-22	-56	Germany (43%)
Pseudo	0	0	0	1	0	0	n.a.	n.a.	
RESIDENCE PERMITS	285	297	384	345	308	307	3	0	Greece (20%)
Counterfeit	132	150	179	172	142	160	6.7	13	Italy (28%)
Authentic	69	56	85	71	49	52	-7.1	6.1	France (33%)
Stolen Blank	53	61	71	59	67	52	-15	-22	Greece (58%)
Forged	15	19	24	27	34	24	26	-29	Greece (58%)
False-No More Details	16	10	24	16	15	19	90	27	Germany (47%)
Pseudo	0	1	1	0	1	0	-100	-100	
STAMPS	244	279	225	577	957	626	124	-35	Greece (65%)
Counterfeit	171	195	160	502	931	584	199	-37	Greece (69%)
Forged	2	11	8	0	26	42	282	62	Hungary (21%)
False-No More Details	71	73	57	75	0	0	-100	n.a.	
OTHER	55	70	72	35	35	60	-14	71	Italy (32%)
Counterfeit	36	30	52	16	17	47	57	176	Cyprus (40%)
Authentic	4	5	8	9	9	10	100	11	Italy (70%)
Forged	10	32	5	2	5	3	-91	-40	Spain (33%)
False-No More Details	3	0	6	0	1	0	n.a.	-100	
Pseudo	2	2	0	2	3	0	-100	-100	
Stolen Blank	0	1	1	6	0	0	-100	n.a.	
Total	1 419	1 547	1 578	1 845	2 117	1 843	19	-13	



Annex Table 11A: Document fraud

Top ten combinations nationality of document and document fraud, by document type

Document Type	2011			2012		2012 Q3		per cent of total	Highest share	
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago			prev. qtr
PASSPORTS	644	723	721	705	647	699	-3.3	8.0	Iran (8.3%)	
GBR-Forged	12	7	4	12	25	23	229	-8.0	3.3	Afghanistan (74%)
FRA-Authentic	21	20	26	20	13	22	10	69	3.1	Iran (18%)
GBR-Authentic	16	12	12	13	9	19	58	111	2.7	Somalia (37%)
FRA-Forged	9	20	25	5	23	18	-10	-22	2.6	Iran (33%)
SWE-Authentic	5	6	13	6	10	16	167	60	2.3	Iran (25%)
BGD-Forged	4	4	4	6	11	15	275	36	2.1	Bangladesh
LBN-Forged	0	1	3	6	1	14	1300	1300	2.0	Lebanon
ITA-Counterfeit	15	5	3	2	21	14	180	-33	2.0	Somalia (57%)
COD-Forged	4	5	3	5	4	14	180	250	2.0	Congo (Dem. Rep.) (93%)
TUR-Counterfeit	10	16	18	7	9	14	-13	56	2.0	Turkey (50%)
Others	548	627	610	623	521	530	-15	1.7	76	Iran (8.1%)
ID CARDS	243	284	257	238	245	171	-40	-30	Turkey (9.4%)	
ITA-Counterfeit	21	33	27	42	46	19	-42	-59	11	Eritrea (32%)
ROU-Counterfeit	25	7	19	18	12	13	86	8.3	7.6	Romania (62%)
BEL-Counterfeit	3	6	2	6	5	12	100	140	7.0	Syria (17%)
GRC-Counterfeit	6	6	15	9	16	10	67	-38	5.8	Syria (50%)
ESP-Authentic	23	37	37	41	20	9	-76	-55	5.3	Spain (22%)
BGR-Counterfeit	12	8	6	6	7	8	0	14	4.7	Turkey (50%)
FRA-Authentic	1	11	9	5	4	7	-36	75	4.1	Guinea (14%)
PRT-Counterfeit	4	2	4	4	6	6	200	0	3.5	Brazil (33%)
ITA-False-No More Details	12	16	8	3	9	6	-63	-33	3.5	Spain (33%)
BEL-Authentic	1	10	6	1	3	5	-50	67	2.9	Turkey (20%)
Others	135	148	124	103	117	76	-49	-35	44	Turkey (11%)
Visa	191	178	176	183	170	151	-15	-11	Bangladesh (14%)	
FRA-Counterfeit	32	39	31	40	44	27	-31	-39	18	Afghanistan (30%)
ITA-Forged	4	1	2	7	10	23	2200	130	15	Bangladesh (61%)
DEU-Counterfeit	8	18	20	17	14	22	22	57	15	Egypt (59%)
ITA-Authentic	0	0	0	5	7	9	n.a.	29	6.0	Bangladesh (67%)
ESP-Counterfeit	6	2	9	14	3	9	350	200	6.0	Afghanistan (22%)
TUR-Counterfeit	2	6	4	3	2	5	-17	150	3.3	Ukraine
FRA-Forged	7	6	6	8	5	5	-17	0	3.3	Côte d'Ivoire (60%)
ITA-Counterfeit	17	1	5	19	9	4	300	-56	2.6	Sri Lanka (75%)
DEU-Stolen Blank	1	1	1	7	0	3	200	n.a.	2.0	Afghanistan
GRC-Counterfeit	8	2	0	2	5	3	50	-40	2.0	Tunisia (33%)
Others	106	102	98	61	71	41	-60	-42	27	Turkey (20%)

Total: see Table 11B

Annex Table 11B: Document fraud (cont.)

Top ten combinations Nationality of document and document fraud, by document type

Document Type	2011			2012		2012 Q3		per cent of total	Highest share
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago		
RESIDENCE PERMITS	285	297	384	345	308	307	3.4	-0.3	Congo (13%)
ITA-Counterfeit	52	44	33	47	63	44	0	-30	Morocco (16%)
FRA-Counterfeit	6	6	1	10	15	37	517	147	Congo (43%)
GRC-Stolen Blank	18	10	25	21	47	29	190	-38	Pakistan (45%)
BEL-Counterfeit	32	56	78	21	20	22	-61	10	Syria (27%)
DEU-Stolen Blank	19	42	39	24	18	17	-60	-5.6	Syria (47%)
FRA-Authentic	6	9	9	9	9	17	89	89	Mali (35%)
GRC-Forged	1	5	0	9	17	14	180	-18	Egypt (43%)
DNK-Counterfeit	0	0	0	2	0	12	n.a.	n.a.	Congo (92%)
ESP-Authentic	39	26	39	33	21	12	-54	-43	Senegal (25%)
DEU-False-No More Details	5	2	9	7	1	9	350	800	Dominican Republic (33%)
Others	107	97	151	162	97	94	-3.1	-3.1	Syria (14%)
STAMPS	244	279	225	577	957	626	124	-35	Albania (77%)
GRC-Counterfeit	3	5	1	254	646	405	8000	-37	Albania (99%)
ALB-Counterfeit	6	0	28	70	199	69	n.a.	-65	Albania
POL-Counterfeit	97	117	90	78	34	29	-75	-15	Ukraine
ITA-Counterfeit	6	20	4	9	12	16	-20	33	Sri Lanka (38%)
HUN-Counterfeit	8	10	6	9	5	12	20	140	Serbia (42%)
DEU-Counterfeit	2	1	2	5	8	10	900	25	Syria (40%)
HUN-Forged	0	0	0	0	2	9	n.a.	350	Serbia (67%)
FRA-Counterfeit	1	3	3	20	2	9	200	350	Côte d'Ivoire (33%)
HRV-Forged	0	0	0	0	0	8	n.a.	n.a.	Russian Federation (50%)
POL-Forged	0	0	0	0	4	8	n.a.	100	Ukraine (88%)
Others	121	123	91	132	45	51	-59	13	Ukraine (33%)
OTHER	55	70	72	35	35	60	-14	71	Bangladesh (27%)
CYP-Counterfeit	1	0	0	0	4	19	n.a.	375	Nepal (37%)
ITA-Counterfeit	18	9	13	2	7	12	33	71	Bangladesh (75%)
ITA-Authentic	0	1	2	5	5	7	600	40	Bangladesh
LVA-Counterfeit	0	0	0	0	0	3	n.a.	n.a.	Congo (Dem. Rep.)
GHA-Counterfeit	0	0	0	0	0	3	n.a.	n.a.	Ghana
CZE-Counterfeit	0	0	0	3	1	3	n.a.	200	Egypt (67%)
HUN-Counterfeit	0	3	0	0	0	2	-33	n.a.	Hungary
BEL-Authentic	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	Guinea
ALB-Counterfeit	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	Albania
IDN-Forged	0	0	0	0	0	1	n.a.	n.a.	Indonesia
Others	36	57	57	25	18	8	-86	-56	Nigeria (38%)
Total	1 662	1 831	1 835	2 083	2 362	2 014	10	-15	



Annex Table 12: **Return decisions issued**

Decisions issued by top ten nationalities

	2011			2012		2012 Q3			
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
Top Ten Nationalities									
Pakistan	5 382	8 569	9 073	5 854	5 782	7 097	-17	23	10
Afghanistan	6 423	7 243	9 208	6 421	7 198	6 321	-13	-12	8.9
Bangladesh	2 074	1 924	2 427	3 495	3 382	4 596	139	36	6.5
Morocco	2 914	2 392	3 465	4 214	4 022	3 744	57	-6.9	5.3
Albania	2 411	1 506	2 140	3 568	4 149	3 615	140	-13	5.1
Syria	596	743	820	1 026	1 370	3 561	379	160	5.0
Algeria	2 916	2 667	4 573	3 696	3 955	3 269	23	-17	4.6
Tunisia	1 260	1 475	1 638	3 103	2 761	2 498	69	-9.5	3.5
Ukraine	1 980	2 229	2 460	2 163	2 160	2 445	9.7	13	3.4
India	1 996	2 091	2 579	3 088	2 467	2 360	13	-4.3	3.3
Others	27 764	26 550	28 927	33 276	30 645	31 623	19	3.2	44
Total	55 716	57 389	67 310	69 904	67 891	71 129	24	4.8	100

Annex Table 13: **Effective returns**

People effectively returned to third countries by top ten nationalities

	2011			2012		2012 Q3			
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	per cent of total
Top Ten Nationalities									
Albania	2 887	3 386	3 597	3 028	3 071	2 903	-14	-5.5	7.5
Russian Federation	1 583	1 605	1 555	1 470	1 539	2 170	35	41	5.6
Ukraine	1 474	1 861	1 963	1 473	1 906	2 106	13	10	5.5
Serbia	1 302	1 207	1 209	1 683	1 881	1 989	65	5.7	5.2
India	1 604	1 926	2 271	2 388	2 204	1 973	2.4	-10	5.1
Morocco	1 712	1 582	1 837	2 078	2 020	1 893	20	-6.3	4.9
Pakistan	1 297	1 547	2 193	2 366	2 490	1 831	18	-26	4.8
Tunisia	2 452	2 579	3 176	1 621	1 841	1 782	-31	-3.2	4.6
Nigeria	1 111	1 257	1 459	1 094	1 259	1 163	-7.5	-7.6	3
China	903	1 241	1 444	1 598	1 388	1 146	-7.7	-17	3
Others	18 751	19 448	20 881	19 845	20 832	19 497	0.3	-6.4	51
Total	35 076	37 639	41 585	38 644	40 431	38 453	2.2	-4.9	100

Annex Table 14: **Effective returns by type of return**

People effectively returned to third countries by type of return and top ten nationalities

TYPE OF RETURN	2011			2012		2012 Q3			per cent of total
	Q2	Q3	Q4	Q1	Q2	Q3	% change on year ago	prev. qtr	
FORCED									
Forced	19 462	20 203	23 452	19 625	21 273	18 893	-6.5	-11	49
Enforced by Member State	16 844	17 464	20 742	17 077	18 423	14 971	-14	-19	39
Not specified	2 370	2 383	2 266	2 211	2 241	3 477	46	55	9.0
Enforced by Joint Operation	248	356	444	337	609	445	25	-27	1.2
VOLUNTARY									
Voluntary	12 501	14 936	15 658	16 123	16 572	15 867	6.2	-4.3	41
Others	6 643	8 494	8 807	8 586	9 577	8 466	-0.3	-12	22
Not specified	2 589	2 911	2 876	3 283	3 011	4 002	37	33	10
IOM Assisted	3 269	3 531	3 975	4 254	3 984	3 399	-3.7	-15	8.8
Not specified	3 113	2 500	2 475	2 896	2 586	3 693	48	43	9.6
Total	35 076	37 639	41 585	38 644	40 431	38 453	2.2	-4.9	
TOP TEN NATIONALITIES									
FORCED									
Albania	2 791	3 265	3 436	2 871	2 864	2 579	-21	-10	6.7
Tunisia	2 088	2 067	2 783	1 277	1 511	1 575	-24	4.2	4.1
Pakistan	901	968	1 494	1 574	1 759	997	3.0	-43	2.6
India	755	696	766	843	872	899	29	3.1	2.3
Morocco	656	649	856	870	847	830	28	-2.0	2.2
Nigeria	711	721	874	586	774	707	-1.9	-8.7	1.8
Serbia	625	644	770	741	785	659	2.3	-16	1.7
Afghanistan	647	703	1 053	891	950	606	-14	-36	1.6
Algeria	422	552	609	624	615	581	5.3	-5.5	1.5
Moldova	140	222	265	300	371	572	158	54	1.5
Others	9 726	9 716	10 546	9 048	9 925	8 888	-8.5	-10	23
Total Forced Returns	19 462	20 203	23 452	19 625	21 273	18 893	-6.5	-11	49
VOLUNTARY									
Russian Federation	1 250	1 278	1 224	1 132	1 171	1 753	37	50	4.6
Ukraine	1 005	1 380	1 502	1 124	1 483	1 707	24	15	4.4
Serbia	671	562	437	938	1 093	1 322	135	21	3.4
India	832	1 223	1 500	1 536	1 328	1 038	-15	-22	2.7
Pakistan	384	561	659	770	708	680	21	-4.0	1.8
fYROM	448	564	404	377	442	670	19	52	1.7
China	449	685	798	903	759	563	-18	-26	1.5
Iraq	594	522	625	657	569	483	-7.5	-15	1.3
Brazil	657	637	979	758	989	417	-35	-58	1.1
Kosovo*	429	405	385	400	389	394	-2.7	1.3	1.0
Others	5 782	7 119	7 145	7 528	7 641	6 840	-3.9	-10	18
Total Voluntary Returns	12 501	14 936	15 658	16 123	16 572	15 867	6.2	-4.3	41

* This designation is without prejudice to positions on status, and is in line with UNSCR 1244 and the ICJ Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence



Sources and Methods

For the data concerning detections at the external borders, some of the border types are not applicable to all FRAN Member States. This pertains to data on all FRAN indicators since the data are provided disaggregated by border type. The definitions of detections at land borders are therefore not applicable (excluding borders with non-Schengen principalities) for Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. For Cyprus, the land border refers to the Green Line demarcation with the area not under the effective control of the government of the Republic of Cyprus. For sea borders, the definitions are not applicable for land-locked Member States including Austria, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Luxembourg, Slovakia and Switzerland.

In addition, data on detections of illegal border-crossing at land, air and sea BCPs (1B) are not available for Iceland, Ireland and Spain and in Greece, these detections are included in the data for Indicator 1A. Data for Norway only includes detections of illegal border-crossing at land and sea BCPs (1B), not between BCPs (1A).

In Italy, detections of illegal border-crossing at sea BCPs are only reported for intra-EU border-crossing from Greece. Data on detections of illegal border-crossing between sea BCPs (1A) are not available for Ireland.

Data on apprehension (FRAN Indicator 2) of facilitators is not available for Ireland. For Italy, the data are not disaggregated by border type, but are reported as total apprehensions (not specified). Data for Italy and Norway also include the facilitation of illegal stay and work. For Romania, the data include land intra-EU detections on exit at the border with Hungary.

For the data concerning detections of illegal stay (FRAN Indicator 3), data on detections at exit are not available for Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain and the UK.

Data on refusals of entry (FRAN Indicator 4) at the external EU borders are not disaggregated by reason of refusal for Ireland and the UK. Refusals of entry at the Spanish land borders at Ceuta and Melilla (without the issuance of a refusal form) are reported separately and are not included in the presented FRAN data.

The data on applications for international protection (FRAN Indicator 5) are not disaggregated by place of application (type of border on entry or inland applications) for Austria, the Czech Republic and Slovenia. For these countries, only the total number of applications is reported. For France, only asylum applications at the external borders are reported, not inland applications. For Switzerland, requests for asylum at the Swiss Embassies abroad are also reported and considered as inland applications in the FRAN data. For the UK, data reported for applications at air BCPs also include applications at sea BCPs.



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For Public Release

Risk Analysis Unit

Reference number: 374

Warsaw, January 2013