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SIRIS 3
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NOTE

From: General Secretariat of the Council
To: Delegations
Subject: Frontex Vulnerability Assessments of European border control 2025

Delegations will find enclosed the Frontex Vulnerability Assessments of European border control 2025.

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Chapter 3

Better border control capacities: where recommended measures brought positive change

Following completion of the 2025 Baseline Assessments, the milestone of 500 recommended measures to Member States is within reach. While formally issued by the Frontex Executive Director, the measures are formulated in close cooperation with Member States, consulting on their scope and timelines. Once parameters are agreed, the implementation commences, led by Member States' actions and initiative and monitored by Frontex. Four fifths – or 80% – of all recommended measures ever issued under VA have already been successfully implemented. This impressive rate translates to concrete improvements on the ground and is much higher than comparable implementation statuses under the Schengen Evaluation and Monitoring mechanism. In this chapter we invite you to discover how VA measures have helped Member States to bring about real change at the borders.

Many recommended measures address strategic, national-level vulnerabilities. Yet, almost half target vulnerabilities identified at **specific locations along the external border** – particular border-crossing

points and border sections. Even though these locations are not always necessarily key passenger hubs or critical border sections, mitigation of their vulnerabilities still improves the security of the Schengen area at the most granular level.

Let's have a closer look at three locations exemplifying a positive evolution of capacities at the borders supported by implementation of recommended measures – Melilla land BCP, Venice air BCP and the land border between Greece and Türkiye. Besides common challenges affecting border control across Europe, each BCP and border section is unique and faces its own set of challenges. For this reason, the selected locations should not be considered as absolute role models for the functioning of border control. Instead, they serve as examples highlighting the positive changes enacted at these locations thanks to Member States' efforts and targeted cooperation in the framework of Vulnerability Assessment recommendations.

All three locations were targeted by multiple recommended measures in order

to address vulnerabilities affecting various aspects of border control throughout eight Vulnerability Assessment cycles. Implementation of recommended measures resulted in strengthened capacities at these locations. The successful long-term mitigation of vulnerabilities was confirmed in recent Vulnerability Assessments.

Example 1 – border checks at Melilla land BCP

A gradual improvement of border check capacities has been observed at Melilla land BCP bordering Morocco, where VA recommendations had an effect on systematic database consultations and enhanced document fraud detection capacity.

Initially, BA 2018 data indicated that a very low number of persons subject to border checks were checked in the Schengen Information System (SIS) and the Visa Information System (VIS) at Melilla land BCP. Two measures, recommending improvements in the consultation rates of these databases and in staffing and infra-

structure, were issued to Spain. Spain implemented a broad mix of mitigating action: it provided additional training, installed new document readers, enhanced internal information exchange, and established regular follow-ups on SIS consultation numbers and equipment performance. The effects of these cumulative changes started to show in improved statistics reported since BA 2023, culminating in all passengers being checked in 2024.

More recently, BA 2023 pointed to a vulnerability in the second line at Melilla land BCP, as no checks were conducted after first-line control and no document fraud was detected at the BCP. A subsequent measure recommended deployment of a sufficient number of document experts and provision of refresher training on document fraud detection at the BCP. Following implementation of the measure, the number of second-line checks increased exponentially in 2024, and multiple decisions to refuse entry were issued, in a few instances leading to the detection of fraudulent travel documents.

The wide range of improvements made in border check capacity at this BCP resulted in a more thorough scanning of persons crossing the external border and the prevention of entry of those not eligible to enter the Schengen area.

Example 2 – border checks at Venice air BCP

At the European air borders, Venice airport is one of the BCPs that demonstrated considerable improvements in multiple areas of border control. Over the years, Vulnerability Assessments have noted improvements in consultation rates of SIS and VIS databases, accommodation capacity for asylum seekers and persons refused entry, availability of document experts, and reductions in waiting times for passengers queuing for border checks.

In terms of compulsory consultations of security databases, assessments between 2018 and 2019 identified considerable weaknesses at Venice airport. While the reported rate of SIS checks surpassed the passenger flow five times, pointing to issues with the reported data, reported VIS checks covered only a very limited number of passengers requiring a visa on entry to the Schengen area. Two measures were issued to Italy, recommending systematic SIS and VIS checks. During their implementation, Italy succeeded in increasing the number of deployed border guards and the use

of e-gates. Subsequent BAs then revealed that all passengers are now being checked in the SIS database. In terms of VIS checks, the ratio of VIS queries to passengers subject to such checks has steadily grown. In 2024, the majority of travellers requiring checks were checked.

The increase in staffing had a positive impact not only on the rate of database consultations. According to BA 2019, there was very limited availability of document experts at the airport. A measure issued following this assessment recommended three Italian airports, including Venice, to increase the availability of such experts. As a result, multiple border guards were trained in document fraud detection, including up to the level of advanced document expert. Later assessments evidenced major improvements, and in 2024, numerous document experts were available.

As regards the airport's accommodation capacity for asylum seekers and persons refused entry, BA 2018 identified that holding capacity was exceeded every day of the year. Following a recommended measure, by 2022, Italy succeeded in upgrading its infrastructure. By 2024, capacity had increased threefold. It currently fully satisfies operational needs and capacity is no longer exceeded.

These improved capacities at Venice airport resulted in an improved experience for passengers going through border checks. While BA 2020 had pointed to long waiting times, thanks to increased staffing and intensified use of e-gates the waiting time for border checks has been cut in half.

Example 3 – border surveillance and screening/registration on the Greek-Turkish land border

Border checks are not the only area where overall border control has been improved after VA recommendations were implemented by Member States. The following case from the Greek-Turkish land border shows how improvements have been made in surveillance as well as screening and registration capacities.

BA 2018 identified a vulnerability in the availability of surveillance equipment on the border. A subsequent Rapid Vulnerability Assessment conducted on the northern part of the Greek-Turkish land border confirmed the vulnerability, pointing to a shortage of patrol cars. A measure recommended Greece to deploy more cars to this border section. BA 2021, which assessed the first full year after implementa-


tion of the measure, concluded that many more cars had been made available. The Schengen evaluation in 2021 also concluded that the situation on the land border with Türkiye had improved considerably. The positive trend continues, as the number of patrol cars reported on this section in 2024 was almost double that of BA 2021.

The same Rapid Vulnerability Assessment in 2018 indicated that an insufficient number of officers was trained in screening and debriefing and their access to the reception centre was limited. A measure was recommended aimed at mitigating these vulnerabilities. Subsequently, Greece reported that it had trained additional officers at the national level, deployed additional officers on the northern Greek-Turkish land border section, and improved working conditions locally. At the national level, progress is being made in terms of availability of staff trained in screening and debriefing, with an increase noted in 2024.

Finally, a major improvement was made in the area of security checks of persons making illegal border-crossings between BCPs. BA 2019 indicated that a considerable percentage of persons crossing the Greek-Turkish land border illegally were not checked in security databases after apprehension. A recommendation aiming to address this issue was completed by 2020, and Greece introduced a new mechanism to ensure checks are performed and internal monthly reports are produced. In BA 2021, these reports showed that all persons crossing the border illegally were checked in security databases. This commendable result continues according to the latest data reported for 2024.

Capacities at this border section increased, ensuring that the land border is thoroughly monitored. The progress was also noted by the Schengen Evaluation verification visit in 2024, indicating considerable improvements had been made by establishing an automated border surveillance system composed of cameras, detection radars, and operation centres supported by a special intervention team.

These three very distinct places on the Schengen area's external border tell a story of gradual improvement benefitting particular Member States and the EU as a whole. The determined efforts of Member States and their cooperation with Frontex in the framework of Vulnerability Assessment recommendations can bear fruit and lead to long-term improvements to border control, increasing the EU's capacity and readiness to face challenges at its external borders.



Conclusion

Where we stand with European border control

In 2026, Vulnerability Assessments will commemorate their tenth anniversary. With the ninth cycle of Vulnerability Assessments on record and, as illustrated by the examples in this report, the value of this dedicated quality control mechanism for border control is indisputable. The decrease in identified vulnerabilities and the falling numbers of recommended measures underline the significant progress made by Member States in recent years. Since the inception of Vulnerability Assessment, Frontex has identified multiple vulnerabilities, which have been mitigated by the Member States via jointly crafted recommended measures. Better rates of **security checks at border-crossing points**, continuously improving **surveillance infrastructure** at the most critical border sections, and increasingly fit-for-purpose **contingency plans** have all contributed to enhancing capacities at the EU's external borders and increasing security within the Schengen area.

Yet, the dynamic situation at the borders calls for continued vigilance and readiness to respond to new risks. Along the Eastern borders, Member States proved their capacity to confront new hybrid threats. On the South-Eastern borders, gradual progress in

increasing capacities to prevent irregular entries to the Schengen area is observed. Along the Mediterranean coasts and on the sea, Member States' immense efforts to detect and intercept migrant boats continue to be challenged by shifting maritime migratory routes.

Although in general, capacities at the borders keep growing, some vulnerabilities have persisted for years. Vulnerability Assessment, while more granular and having a much shorter reaction time than Schengen Evaluations, ultimately requires willingness from Member States to engage in swift remedial action. The persistent vulnerabilities featured in this report exemplify cases which benefit from the attention of a wider audience than Member States' border-control authorities. Impediments to hosting the Standing Corps, long overdue improvements to border infrastructure, repeatedly not reporting data for VA purposes, and insufficiently developed contingency plans clearly point to the need for decision-makers to show stronger resolve.

The VA results presented in this report must be seen in the broader context of an ever more precise **European situational picture** based on the Eurosur architecture and shaped by an intelligence-driven ap-

proach. To ensure that this approach is gaining further momentum, apart from a comprehensive access to border-relevant data, a shared understanding of the use of **intelligence** as an enabler for informed decision-making within the European Integrated Border Management framework is essential for both trust and coherence. Intelligence for border management – not to be confused with intelligence for national security purposes – thus needs to be understood as an integrated part of the **EU capability infrastructure** in its own right: a consideration that should be increasingly reflected in the applicable legal framework.

As the work continues on ensuring the EU's external borders are ready to face new challenges, the successes of joint efforts regularly shown in Vulnerability Assessments demonstrate that lasting progress has been, can be, and will continue to be made. With continued support from all partners, the number of vulnerabilities on our external borders is bound to further decrease. The examples given in this report prove that with trustful cooperation, Member States and Frontex perpetuate positive change, increasing security for our citizens and safeguarding the benefits of the Schengen area.

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FRONTEX - VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENTS OF EUROPEAN BORDER CONTROL 2025

Annex I Methodology

Vulnerability Assessment (VA) is an activity conducted by the **European Border and Coast Guard Agency (Frontex)** to assess the capacity and readiness of Member States to face current and upcoming challenges at the external borders, including disproportionate migratory pressure. VA is also tasked with identifying possible immediate consequences at the external borders and subsequent consequences for the functioning of the Schengen area. The ultimate objective of VA is to contribute to an efficient and uniform border control at the external borders of the European Union, by identifying and subsequently eliminating any discovered vulnerabilities. On the basis of the assessments, the Frontex Executive Director can recommend measures to be taken by the Member States.

The Common Vulnerability Assessment Methodology is developed in close collaboration with experts from the Member States and the European Commission. The latest version, adopted by the Management Board of Frontex on 29 October 2024, reflects the experience gained by the Member States and the Agency on the conduct of the vulnerability assessments since 2019, the year of the previous revision. The 2024 revision makes the methodology future-proof to new developments in border control. The text now includes a definition of the term vulnerability, foresees the possibility to be flanked by guidelines as technical documents, incorporates updates in objective criteria and improvements to the VA processes.

The methodology is structured around the annual Baseline Assessments, which are

performed each year for all Member States. They constitute a regular assessment of Member States' border-control capacities vis-à-vis existing and anticipated threats.

In addition to the Baseline Assessments, the methodology envisages targeted assessments to address potential new developments and challenges. These targeted assessments comprise VA Simulation Assessments and Rapid Vulnerability Assessments.

VA Simulation Exercises help gain additional information if the Baseline Assessment raises some doubts. Strategic-level exercises focus on contingency planning. Selected Member States are confronted with a hypothetical scenario involving large-scale migratory flow. Operational-level exercises are realistic drills to assess the performance related to specific border-control tasks, such as the capacity to detect document fraud, trafficking in human beings, travelling terrorists or smuggling of firearms.

Rapid Vulnerability Assessments focus on selected border-control capacities and help to quickly assess them in areas affected by emerging threats.

All Vulnerability Assessments are performed individually for Member States against objective criteria, which establish a commonly agreed set of general requirements for border control. The objective criteria comprise key border-control activities, including:

- cross-cutting general issues influencing border control (such as budget, human resources, and training);
- border surveillance capacity;

- the capacity to ensure effective first-line, second-line and security checks at border-crossing points while providing for a smooth traffic flow;
- screening, first registration, reception and accommodation capacities in the border area;
- contingency planning for dealing with irregular migration flows;
- the capacity to effectively refer asylum applicants and members of vulnerable groups;
- the capacity to prevent and detect cross-border crime;
- risk analysis capacity;
- the capacity to contribute to the EBCG Standing Corps and to host European support.

VA is a quality-control mechanism for border control. The scope of VA is defined in Article 32 of Regulation 2019/1896. According to the Schengen Borders Code, border control consists of border checks, surveillance and risk analysis. Elements related to cross-border crime are an aspect of border control. The assessments cover certain border-management tasks but not the full scope of the Integrated Border Management. For instance, the mandate of VA does not extend to the assessment of adequacy of accommodation facilities for asylum seekers. Likewise, the assessment of Member States' capacities in the area of return is not part of the VA mandate.

Annex II

Vulnerabilities in border control identified in 2025 Vulnerability Assessments

This annex provides information on the vulnerabilities identified in Baseline Assessments and VA Simulation Exercises conducted in the latest Vulnerability Assessment cycle.

Baseline Assessments

Member State	Objective criteria	Vulnerabilities identified in the past VA cycle
Austria	Contingency planning	Vulnerability in the contingency planning capacity
	Cross-border crime	Vulnerability in the capacity to detect and prevent cross-border crime at the air BCPs of Austria
	General	Vulnerability in FRAN/EUROSUR data collection and reporting
Belgium	Contingency planning	Vulnerability in the non-existence of Belgium's national contingency plan to deal with sudden large-scale irregular migration
	Risk analysis	Vulnerability in Belgium's risk analysis system
Bulgaria	Border surveillance	Vulnerability in Bulgaria's capacity to detect and intercept illegal border-crossings (on exit) at the land border section with Serbia
	Contingency planning	Vulnerability related to the lack of regular updates and testing of national contingency plans
	Contribution to the EBCG	Vulnerability in the capacity to contribute to the European Border and Coast Guard (Category 2)
Croatia	Cross-border crime	Vulnerability in the capacity to prevent and detect cases of travelling terrorists and other 'subjects of interest' at two land BCPs (Kapitan Andrevo and Lesovo)
	Contingency planning	Vulnerability in Croatia's Contingency Plan to deal with sudden large-scale illegal immigration and other challenges at the external borders, especially at its land border with Bosnia and Herzegovina
	General	Vulnerability in the quality of data reported for FRAN/EUROSUR on intentions to apply for international protection and on EURODAC hits
Cyprus	Border checks	Vulnerability in the availability of sufficient human resources to conduct border checks at Larnaka and Pafos airports
	Border checks	Vulnerability in the availability of sufficiently trained staff to detect sophisticated document fraud at Pafos and Larnaka airports
	Border checks	Vulnerability in the capacity to conduct systematic database consultations against Interpol SLTD at the Cypriot airports
	Border checks	Vulnerability in the capacity to conduct systematic database consultations against Interpol SLTD at Lemesos seaport
	Contribution to the EBCG	Vulnerability in the capacity to contribute to the technical equipment pool
	Cross-border crime	Vulnerability in the capacity to detect cross-border crime due to the lack of a sufficient number of adequately trained/competent officers in this area
	Risk analysis	Vulnerability in the proper functioning of the Cypriot risk analysis system
Czechia	Contingency planning	Vulnerability in the scope and in the testing of the national contingency planning in Czechia
	Cross-border crime	Vulnerability in the capacity to detect cross-border crime at Czechia's external air borders
	Screening and registration	Vulnerability in the capacity to conduct screening and debriefing
Denmark	Contribution to the EBCG	Vulnerability in the capacity to host European support
	Cross-border crime	Vulnerability in the prevention and detection of cross-border crime at Copenhagen sea BCP
	General	Vulnerability in data quality, particularly in the availability of data to assess Denmark's capacity in the areas of checks, surveillance means, surveillance & NCC, systems and staff Vulnerability in the national capability development planning Vulnerability in the quality of data reported within FRAN/EUROSUR on detections of illegal stay on the move
Estonia	General	Vulnerability within the Defence Forces (Navy) in the area of setting up a system to ensure relevant training on border-control functions for its staff
France	Screening and registration	Vulnerability in the capacity to register persons detected for illegal border-crossing in EURODAC database
	Border checks	Vulnerability in the capacity to perform the mandatory systematic and security checks at the French border with Andorra
	Border checks	Vulnerability in the ability to detect clandestine entries at Marseille sea BCP
	Border surveillance	Vulnerability in preventing illegal exits to the UK
	Contribution to the EBCG	Vulnerability with regard to the capacity to contribute to the Standing Corps
General	Vulnerability in the French central-level overview of border management and thus in the capacity of strategic planning and management of resources for border-control activities	

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Member State	Objective criteria	Vulnerabilities identified in the past VA cycle
Germany	Border checks	Vulnerability in the capacity to perform the mandatory systematic VIS database checks at all German air BCPs
	Contribution to the EBCG	Vulnerability in the capacity to contribute to the European Border and Coast Guard
	General	Vulnerability in Germany's central-level overview of its main authority charged with border control - the Federal Police - that would allow strategic planning and management of resources for border-control activities Vulnerability in the quality of the data provided for the purpose of Baseline Assessment
Greece	Border checks	Vulnerability in the infrastructure of Kipi BCP
		Vulnerability in the infrastructure to conduct border checks at Kastanies BCP, which will only be compounded when the Entry/Exit System will become operational in autumn 2025
		Vulnerability in the capacity to detect sophisticated document fraud at the Greek BCPs on the border with Türkiye
		Vulnerability in the capacity to detect sophisticated document fraud at the BCPs on the land border with North Macedonia
		Vulnerability in the capacity to conduct thorough border checks at Saglada BCP
		Vulnerability in the capacity to detect persons hiding in vehicles attempting to leave the country via the BCPs along the land border with Albania
		Vulnerability in the capacity to detect sophisticated document fraud at the BCPs along the land border with Albania
	Border surveillance	Vulnerability in the capacity to detect sophisticated document fraud at air BCPs, in particular at Athens airport
		Vulnerability in the capacity to obtain passenger information in advance at Greek air borders
		Vulnerability in the capacity to conduct border surveillance at the land border with North Macedonia
Contingency planning	Vulnerability in the capacities of the Hellenic Police to perform border surveillance at the land border with Albania	
Screening and registration	Vulnerability in the absence of a formally adopted national contingency plan	
Risk analysis	Vulnerability in the capacity to timely register migrants after apprehension at the Eastern Aegean and Crete Island border sections	
Hungary	Border checks	Vulnerability in the full implementation of CIRAM 2.0 within the Greek risk analysis system of the Hellenic Police
	Border surveillance	Vulnerability in strategic planning and thus the capacity to ensure appropriate human resources to conduct border checks on the HUN-SRB border
		Vulnerability in the capacity to properly assess the staffing needs of own border police staff for Zahony BCP, Beregsurany BCP, and Zahony rail BCP
	Cross-border crime	Vulnerability in performing security checks on migrants presumably detected after having crossed the green border with Serbia, due to national legislation
General	Vulnerability in the capacity to manage staffing levels for border surveillance and to provide a sufficient number of staff specialised in surveillance activities on Hungary's borders with Serbia and Ukraine	
Iceland	Border checks	Vulnerability in the capability to prevent and detect cross-border crime at the external borders
	General	Vulnerability in the capacity to properly calculate staffing levels, ensure appropriate human resource capacity to conduct border-control activities and provide a multi-annual staff planning
		Vulnerability in the quality of data reported for FRAN/EUROSUR on detections of illegal stay on the move
Italy	Border checks	Vulnerability in Iceland's capacity to maintain the collection of key statistical data on border checks at Keflavik air BCP
	Contribution to the EBCG	Vulnerability in Iceland's capacity to maintain the collection of key statistical data on border checks at Reykjavik sea BCP
	Screening and registration	Vulnerability in the availability and delivery of specialised training courses for border guards
Latvia	Border checks	Vulnerability in the capacity to perform systematic checks, on entry and exit, at Bari sea BCP
	General	Vulnerability in the capacity to contribute to the the EBCG Standing Corps Category 2
Malta	Border surveillance	Vulnerability in the quality of the data concerning national human resources available for screening and debriefing
	Contingency planning	Vulnerability in the functioning of the NCC
	Contribution to the EBCG	Vulnerability in the availability of sufficient human resources to conduct land border surveillance at the Latvian border with the Russian Federation
	Screening and registration	Vulnerability in the availability of staff
	Risk analysis	Vulnerability in the capacity of the national surveillance system to cater for a comprehensive maritime situational picture
The Netherlands	Border checks	Vulnerability in the contingency plan to manage large migratory flows
	Contribution to the EBCG	Vulnerability in the capacity to contribute to the Technical Equipment Pool
	Risk analysis	Vulnerability in the registration capacity in the event of large-scale migratory flows
The Netherlands	Border checks	Vulnerability in the functioning of the national risk analysis system
	General	Vulnerability in the functioning of the national risk analysis system

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Member State	Objective criteria	Vulnerabilities identified in the past VA cycle
Norway	Border checks	Vulnerability in the accommodation capacity in holding facilities (e.g. for persons refused entry and asylum applicants) at the land BCP of Storskog
		Vulnerability in the accommodation capacity in holding facilities for persons refused entry and asylum applicants at the air BCPs of Sola, Sandefjord, Tromsø and Stjørdal
		Vulnerability in the accommodation capacity in holding facilities for persons refused entry and asylum applicants at the sea of BCPs of Tromsø and Stavanger
Poland	Contingency planning	Vulnerability in the functioning of the national contingency plan
	Screening and registration	Vulnerability in the capacity to perform registration in the EURODIAC system
Portugal	Border checks	Vulnerability in the capacity to detect sophisticated document fraud at Portuguese sea BCPs of Porto de Lisboa and Funchal
		Vulnerability in the availability and turnover of terrestrial means for border surveillance, in particular patrol vehicles
	Border surveillance	Vulnerability in the surveillance capacity in the Portuguese Autonomous Region of the Azores
	Cross-border crime	Vulnerability in the capacity to detect and counter cross-border crime
	Screening and registration	Vulnerability in national registration and screening capacity
Romania	Contribution to the EBCG	Vulnerability with regard to the capacity to contribute to the Standing Corps
Slovakia	Border checks	Vulnerability in maintaining sufficient capacity for handling systematic checks, in line with the current planning
		Border surveillance
	General	Vulnerability in the functioning of the NCC
Slovenia	Border checks	Vulnerability on conducting VIS checks at sea BCP Koper
	Border surveillance	Vulnerability on the capacity to ensure a full situational picture at the National Coordination Centre (NCC) located in Dolga-Vas
Spain	Border checks	Vulnerability in the overall capacity to conduct checks at the BCP of La Seo de Urgel
		Vulnerability in the capacity to perform systematic border checks at the BCP of La Línea de la Concepción
		Vulnerability in the capacity to implement an adequate level of database consultations on exit at Spain's air BCPs
		Vulnerability in the proper functioning of the existing IT infrastructure necessary to conduct systematic database consultations at air BCPs
	Border surveillance	Vulnerability in the efficiency of the maritime surveillance system, in particular in reaction capability, at the sea border sections of Alicante, Almería, Cádiz, Murcia and the Balearic Islands
		Vulnerability in the availability of staff for surveillance at the land border section with Andorra
	Contingency planning	Vulnerability in the national contingency planning
Contribution to the EBCG	General	Vulnerability in the Spanish contribution to the EBCG Standing Corps
		Vulnerability in the Spain's reporting within Frontex Risk Analysis Network (FRAN)
	Border checks	Vulnerability in the infrastructure at air BCP Halmstad
Sweden	Contribution to the EBCG	Vulnerability in the contribution to Category 2 of the EBCG Standing Corps
		Vulnerability in the capacity to host European support
	General	Vulnerability in the quality of data reported for FRAN/EUROSUR on detections of illegal stay on the move
Risk analysis	Vulnerability in the availability and functioning of the national risk analysis system	

Simulation Exercises

Member State	Objective criteria	Vulnerabilities identified in the past VA cycle
Bulgaria	Cross-border crime	Vulnerability in the capacity to prevent and detect cases of travelling terrorists and other 'subjects of interest' at the two land BCPs
		Vulnerability in the capacity to prevent and detect cases of travelling terrorists and other 'subjects of interest' at the two land BCPs
Hungary	Border checks	Vulnerability in the training of Border Police and Customs on security and safety of work during the first-line check
		Vulnerability in training of Border Police officers and proper approach in vehicle search (lack of harmonized procedures between Custom and Border Police in BCP Rószke during the second-line vehicle inspection)
	Cross-border crime	Vulnerability in the capacity to detect firearms smuggling at the two land BCPs due to training limitations and lack of dedicated risk profiles at BCP Zahony
Iceland	Border checks	Vulnerability in document fraud detection capacity in the first-line border checks at Keflavik air BCP
Italy	General	Vulnerability related to the lack of specialised training and updates on risk profiles for the officers responsible for screening, registration and debriefing activities at Porto Empedocle and Pozzallo hotspots
Poland	Contingency planning	Vulnerability in the functioning of the national contingency plan that pose a risk to delay the response when capacities are quickly needed to increase the level of response in the operational area/s

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Member State	Objective criteria	Vulnerabilities identified in the past VA cycle
Portugal	Border checks	Vulnerability in the capacity to detect fraudulent documents in the first line at Lisbon airport Vulnerability in the capacity to detect fraudulent documents in the second line at Lisbon airport Vulnerability in the capacity to detect fraudulent documents in the first line at Porto airport
	General	Vulnerability in the quality of refresher courses carried out to maintain and update the knowledge on document fraud detection at Lisbon airport Vulnerability in the quality of refresher courses carried out to maintain and update the knowledge on document fraud detection at Porto airport

No vulnerabilities identified in the past VA cycle

- Finland
- Lithuania
- Luxembourg
- Switzerland

Annex III

Implementation status of measures recommended to the Member States

This annex provides concise information on the **status of implementation** of measures recommended by the Frontex Executive Director to the Member States in response to vulnerabilities identified in Vulnerability Assessments.

Each of the recommended measures has **one** of the following **statuses**:

- **Ongoing** – measures currently being implemented by the Member States (bold text indicates measures recommended in the latest VA cycle);
- **Extended** – measures currently being implemented by the Member States for which a decision on an extension of the time limit for implementation has been granted by the Frontex Executive Director;
- **Risk of delay** – measures currently being implemented by the Member States for which a risk of delay in implementation has been identified and notified in line with Art. 32(9) of the EBCG Regulation;
- **Escalated** – measures which were not implemented by the Member States in the set time limit and which were either escalated for the attention of the Frontex Management Board or were subsequently notified by the Frontex Management Board to the European Commission and the Council of the European Union in line with Art. 32(10) of the EBCG Regulation;
- **Closed** – measures which were implemented by the Member States and were closed by the Frontex Executive Director in the latest VA cycle (measures closed in past cycles are not featured in this annex and can be consulted in the past editions of the report).

Member State	Status	Measures recommended to Member States	Time limit for Implementation	Support of Frontex
Austria	ongoing	Address vulnerability in cross-border crime detection by taking action as regards training at national level.	31-05-2028	
	extended	Address vulnerability in contingency planning by taking action as regards overall capacity at national level.	31-05-2026	
	closed	Address vulnerability in general cross-cutting issues in border control by taking action as regards data quality at national level.	31-01-2025	yes
Belgium	closed	Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards databases consultation at all air BCPs.	31-10-2024	
Bulgaria	ongoing	Address vulnerability in cross-border crime detection by taking action as regards training at land BCPs Kapitan Andreevo and Lesovo.	31-07-2026	yes
		Address vulnerability in border surveillance by taking action as regards staff and equipment at Bulgarian land border with Serbia.	30-04-2027	
		Address vulnerability in contribution to the EBCG by taking action as regards staff at national level.	31-03-2027	
		Address vulnerability in border surveillance by taking action as regards equipment at Bulgarian borders.	28-02-2026	
		Address vulnerability in general cross-cutting issues in border control by taking action as regards data quality at national level.	31-05-2026	
		Address vulnerability in referral mechanism by taking action as regards staff and training at national level.	31-10-2026	
	extended	Address vulnerability in border surveillance by taking action as regards staff and equipment at Bulgarian land border with Türkiye.	31-12-2025	
		Address vulnerability in screening and registration capacity by taking action as regards accommodation capacity at Bulgarian land borders with Serbia and Türkiye.	31-01-2026	
		Address vulnerability in contingency planning by taking action as regards overall capacity at national level.	31-10-2025	
	closed	Address vulnerability in border surveillance by taking action as regards equipment at Bulgarian borders.	31-10-2025	
		Address vulnerability in general cross-cutting issues in border control by taking action as regards training at national level.	30-11-2024	
		Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards staff and databases consultation at land BCP Kalotina.	31-10-2025	
		Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards staff and databases consultation at land BCP Kapitan Andreevo.	31-05-2025	
		Address vulnerability in screening and registration capacity by taking action as regards training at Bulgarian land borders with Serbia and Türkiye.	31-05-2025	
		Address vulnerability in cross-border crime detection by taking action as regards training at national level.	28-02-2025	

Member State	Status	Measures recommended to Member States	Time limit for Implementation	Support of Frontex	
Croatia	ongoing	Address vulnerability in general cross-cutting issues in border control by taking action as regards data quality at national level. Address vulnerability in contingency planning by taking action as regards overall capacity at national level.	30-11-2026 31-10-2025	yes	
	closed	Address vulnerability in border surveillance by taking action as regards overall capacity at Croatian land borders with Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Montenegro. Address vulnerability in border surveillance by taking action as regards staff at Croatian sea borders.	30-09-2024 31-12-2024	yes	
Cyprus	ongoing	Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards databases consultation at air BCPs Larnaka and Pafos and sea BCP Lemesos.	31-12-2026		
Czechia	ongoing	Address vulnerability in contingency planning by taking action as regards overall capacity at national level. Address vulnerability in cross-border crime detection by taking action as regards training at air BCP Prague Ruzyně.	31-01-2027 31-10-2025		
	extended	Address vulnerability in screening and registration capacity by taking action as regards training at national level.	31-12-2025		
	closed	Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards staff at air BCP Prague Ruzyně.	31-10-2025		
Denmark	ongoing	Address vulnerability in general cross-cutting issues in border control by taking action as regards data quality at national level. Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards equipment at air BCP Copenhagen.	31-12-2026 30-11-2025		
	risk of delay	Address vulnerability in general cross-cutting issues in border control by taking action as regards data quality at national level. Address vulnerability in general cross-cutting issues in border control by taking action as regards training at national level. Address vulnerability in contribution to the EBCG by taking action as regards overall capacity at national level.	30-11-2025 31-07-2025 31-08-2025		
		closed	Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards training at air BCPs Aarhus, Aalborg, Esbjerg, Copenhagen. Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards training at sea BCP Copenhagen. Address vulnerability in cross-border crime detection by taking action as regards staff, training and equipment at sea BCP Copenhagen. Address vulnerability in risk analysis by taking action as regards overall capacity at national level. Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards training at air BCP Copenhagen. Address vulnerability in general cross-cutting issues in border control by taking action as regards staff at national level.	31-07-2025 31-07-2025 31-07-2025 15-09-2024 31-10-2025 15-09-2025	yes yes yes
		extended	Address vulnerability in general cross-cutting issues in border control by taking action as regards training at sea border section.	31-01-2026	
	Estonia	closed	Address vulnerability in border surveillance by taking action as regards staff at Estonian land border with the Russian Federation. Address vulnerability in contingency planning by taking action as regards overall capacity at national level.	31-12-2024 15-11-2024	
		closed	Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards databases consultation at land BCP Vartiust. Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards databases consultation at air BCPs Helsinki Vantaa and Tampere Pirkkala.	31-05-2025 31-05-2025	
	France	ongoing	Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards equipment at sea BCP Marseille. Address vulnerability in general cross-cutting issues in border control by taking action as regards overall capacity at national level. Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards databases consultation at air BCPs Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Paris Orly and land BCPs Cheriton Coquelles, Paris Nord, Gare de St. Pancras.	28-02-2026 30-06-2026 30-11-2025	
extended		Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards databases consultation at land BCPs Cheriton Coquelles, Gare de St. Pancras, Paris Nord. Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards databases consultation at air BCPs Lille, Lyon, Marseille, Paris Charles de Gaulle, Paris Orly. Address vulnerability in contribution to the EBCG by taking action as regards staff at national level. Address vulnerability in general cross-cutting issues in border control by taking action as regards overall capacity at all air BCPs.	31-01-2026 31-01-2026 28-02-2026 30-06-2026		
		risk of delay	Address vulnerability in border checks by taking action as regards training for document fraud detection at air BCP Paris Charles de Gaulle.	31-07-2026	yes

