Summary

Restricted document outlines official proposals and recommendations for future EU actions in Libya

July 2017

This summary highlights some of the key arguments, proposals and information contained in a restricted report on Libya drafted by the European External Action Service and sent to Member States’ representatives in the Council of the EU’s Political and Security Committee (PSC). The report has also been discussed by two other Council working parties: the Committee on Civilian Aspects of Crisis Management (CivCom) and the Politico-Military Group (PMG). They have endorsed the majority of the recommendations made in the report, which revolve around a further extension of the mandate, until December 2018, of three activities: the Mediterranean military mission EUNAVFOR MED/Operation, the EU Border Assistance Mission Libya (EUBAM Libya) and the work of the EU Planning and Liaison Cell (EUPLC), based in Brussels. The next step is for the PSC to make its own recommendations; it will discuss the report on 4 July (see the meeting agenda here).

Read the report: Strategic Review on EUBAM Libya, EUNAVFOR MED Op Sophia & EU Liaison and Planning Cell (9202/17, 15 May 2017, RESTREINT/RESTRICTED, pdf) and the CivCom/PMG follow-up: Joint CivCom Advice and PMG Recommendations on Strategic Review on EUBAM Libya, EUNAVFOR MED OP Sophia & EU Liaison and Planning Cell (10714/17, 29 June 2017, LIMITE, pdf)
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1. Key recommendations and proposals

The chief proposal of the report is that the EU’s three main missions in and around Libya – EUNAVFOR MED/Operation Sophia, EU Border Assistance Mission Libya (EUBAM) and the EU Planning and Liaison Cell (EUPLAC) – all have their mandates extended until December 2018:

“Due to the protracted progress in Libya, it is recommended that Op Sophia, EUBAM Libya and the EULPC be extended until the common expiry date of 31 December 2018 in order to allow the EU the flexibility to capitalise on opportunities as they arise.” (para. 260, p.68)

“the conditions for a new civilian CSDP mission are not yet ripe and that efforts must continue to help shape Libyan ownership and the EU preparedness to establish a new mission once conditions are in place. The review recommends that Op Sophia, EUBAM Libya and the EULPC be extended until the common expiry date of 31 December 2018 and that their existing core mandates be maintained.” (para. 9, p.6)

“a lasting security solution should increasingly seek to focus effect in the South and also link, where appropriate, to existing CSDP missions and further efforts on regionalisation with Sahel G5 countries. This reflects also Libyan interests which appear more focused in acquiring the capacity to control their land borders and thus the inflow of people rather than the outflow across their maritime borders.” (para. 21, p.9)

“Activities carried out by Op Sophia and EUBAM Libya form central elements in the implementation of the Malta Declaration Implementation Plan, and the missions will play a key role going forward, taking additional action to more effectively manage irregular flows through the Central Mediterranean.” (para. 24, p.10)

2. Purpose of the review

“The strategic review analyses the progress of Op Sophia and EUBAM Libya in the framework of the IC’s activities and the EU comprehensive approach in Libya. It further assesses the achievements of EU political and strategic objectives, the tasks defined in the operational documents, and also identifies opportunities for continued engagement. This strategic review also explores the future for the EULPC, and proposes options for all three activities from a holistic viewpoint.” (para. 26, p.10)

Limited input from Libyan institutions and organisations:

“Opportunities to engage meaningfully with Libyan actors in the preparation of this review have been constrained by the current limited capacity of the Presidency Council (PC) and difficulties in identifying legitimate Libyan interlocutors who have the necessary authority to affect decision-making. Nonetheless, all three CSDP activities, supported by the EEAS and EU Delegation to Libya, are establishing contacts with key Libyan security actors, most notably in terms of coastguard, police and border security domains. In this regard, Libyan appetite for EU support is starting to emerge but will need to be developed and further formalised through the PC.” (para. 27, p.10-11)
3. General information

a. On the Libyan coastguard(s)

“53. In generic terms, there are 2 Libyan coastguards. The first organisation is the police coastguard, which is more formally termed the General Administration for Coastal Security (GACS) and is administered by the MoI and has links to the Ministry of Transport for port security matters. The second organisation is the Libyan naval coastguard, which is more formally termed the Libyan coastguard and port security (LCGPS), or more simply the Libyan coastguard. This organisation is administered by the Libyan navy under the MoD.

54. The Libyan coastguard and the police coastguard have overlapping functions inside of territorial waters. The police coastguard is a law enforcement entity operating within the 12 Nautical Mile (NM) zone and along the coast, whereas the Libyan coastguard is responsible for surveillance of territorial waters, search and rescue (SAR) and combating illegal activities at sea including irregular migration, pollution and fishing beyond territorial waters. On paper both coastguards comprise some 3 000 personnel each but their capacities differ, particularly in terms of operational vessels.”

Questions have been raised over which institutions the EU is actually supporting in Libya, for example in a recent UN report (http://statewatch.org/news/2017/jun/un-report-libya.htm). The Libyan Coastguard is the institution normally mentioned in EU statements and documents. It is formally part of the Navy which is, formally at least, ultimately accountable to the Government of National Accord, backed by the UN and the EU.

In a draft response to questions from an MEP over which institutions the EU is supporting in Libya (http://statewatch.org/news/2017/jun/eu-council-draft-reply-mep-question-libyan-coastguard-10302-17.pdf), the Council states:

“In line with the 3 February 2017 Malta Declaration, priority has been given at EU and Member States level to the training, equipment and support to the Libyan Coastguard and the Libyan Maritime Police.”

The Malta Declaration, meanwhile, said that priority will be given to: “training, equipment and support to the Libyan national coast guard and other relevant agencies,” without specifying what exactly those agencies were. And the EEAS’ “strategic review” makes no mention whatsoever of the Libyan Maritime Police.

In this context, a statement made by the recent UN report on Libya does not seem so surprising: it noted that while a briefing from officials on the activities of EU naval mission EUNAVFOR MED was “anticipated” by the UN group of experts working on the report, that briefing “had not taken place”.

b. The EU’s interests and activities extend far beyond Libya

The EU has recently “regionalised” its security missions in the Sahel, considered necessary because:

“Reducing the pressure on Libya’s southern land border (both internally and externally) has been identified as a key action by the EU in tackling irregular migration and stability within the region.” (p.25)
At the same time:

“A recent EEAS visit to Tunisia also underlined the potential for strengthening bilateral cooperation on defence and crisis management. Egypt and Tunisia are both cooperating with Op Sophia with a view to agreeing on the provision of Role III hospital facilities. Development of coastguard capacities in both countries could provide a continuity of surveillance capacities with Libya that is currently absent. The potential use of both Egypt and Tunisia to host aspects of EU-led capacity-building in support of Libya could also be explored as part of further regional cooperation with the EU.” (para. 81, p.23)

4. EUNAVFOR MED/Operation Sophia

“The fact that circumstances do not currently allow Op Sophia to operate inside Libyan sovereign space continues to limit the operation’s ability to have a more comprehensive intelligence picture and reduces in particular its ability to disrupt the smugglers’ business model. Enhanced cooperation with other actors is therefore required to mitigate existing limitations. This also includes increasing efforts to enable the Libyan coastguard to disrupt the smugglers’ networks.” (para. 97, p.28)

a. What effect has the seizure and destruction of smugglers’ boats had?

“To date, Op Sophia has been able to dispose of more than 400 assets used by smugglers and traffickers, including 74 large wooden boats. Whilst reportedly barely seaworthy, these wooden boats are in relatively short supply and are particularly useful for the smugglers as they are able to embark up to 800 persons and thereby generate significant profits per voyage. Denial of these wooden vessels to the smugglers is having a marked effect, which is unfortunately compensated for by a steady supply of cheaper rubber boats increasing smugglers’ profits.” (para. 99, p.28)

These rubber boats are also more dangerous for those travelling on them, as argued in a Statewatch analysis published in December 2016 (http://www.statewatch.org/analyses/no-302-operation-sophia-deterrent-effect.pdf). And although the operation has rescued 34,500 since October 2015:

“Given the density of maritime traffic in this part of the Mediterranean, rescues would take place regardless of the presence of Op Sophia, which since its launch has only rescued 11,8% of the total number of migrants.”

The EU is moving ahead with its attempts to understand what the Libyan authorities want:

“A joint EEAS/DG Home non-paper first drafted in July 2016 is being updated to reflect what is known about the current capabilities and needs of the Libyan naval and police coastguards and how the EU could develop those capabilities through the various instruments at its disposal and within what timeframe. In parallel, activities proposed respectively by Op Sophia and the Seahorse programme [an information-sharing network for border agencies], both engaged with the Libyan coastguard and navy, are duly de-conflicted to ensure complementarity.” (para. 115, p.33)

b. Training of the Libyan coastguard

“To date, Op Sophia has been able to formally complete an initial package of sea-based training for an initial group of 93 trainees, including 39 personnel for 3 patrol boat crews. An arrangement was signed between the OHQ and Guardia di Finanza on 30 January 2017 to allow practical training of
Libyan personnel on board Guardia di Finanza patrol boats for familiarisation purposes, in view of the planned delivery of the 4 units currently based in Naples.” (para. 120, p.34)

It was reported by Reuters on 26 June that: “When Libya's coastguard received the first of a long-awaited batch of patrol boats from Italy last month, two of the four vessels still had mechanical problems and one broke down on the way to Tripoli.” (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-libya-idUSKBN19H0MB)

**c. The future of EUNAVFOR MED: intervention in Libyan waters?**

The paper notes that for the time being, the possibility of securing an invitation from the Libyan Government of National Accord and a UN Security Council Resolution, both necessary for EUNAVFOR MED to operate in Libyan territorial waters, is unlikely. However:

“Securing consent from the GNA in the current context in Libya is likely to remain challenging but continued EU support to strengthen a Libyan Coastguard capacity could provide helpful leverage to create conditions of trust. It could also further develop Libyan capacity to deal with the problem in the continued absence of Op Sophia’s ability to operate inside Libyan territorial waters.” (para. 127, p.35)

And:

“In this respect, the ability to share operational information with the Libyan coastguard, in line with their forthcoming connection to the Seahorse network and the establishment of a Libyan MRCC with the support of the European Commission and Italy (Italian coastguard) could lay the foundations for operational cooperation and potentially joint patrols in due course.” (para. 128, p.35-6)

**d. Redefining “migrant smuggling and trafficking” as a crime against humanity**

Attempts are ongoing to have “migrant smuggling and human trafficking [defined] as a crime against humanity” in order to give the EU and the Member States “more tools” in their attempts to find a solution on what to do with persons who would be arrested during future operations in Libyan territorial waters:

“Current arrangements regarding the legal finish of all persons apprehended or rescued by Op Sophia are processed in accordance with Italian criminal law. However, this arrangement applies only for suspects encountered on the high seas. In the event that Op Sophia would be authorized to operate in Libyan territorial waters, legal arrangements allowing the transfer and prosecution by competent authorities would be required. The issue is widely recognized as a major hindrance for the implementation of the mandate and discussions with MS to date have not allowed the identification of a satisfactory solution. It [sic] this respect, the current efforts made by the operation in reaching international consensus for defining migrant smuggling and human trafficking as a crime against humanity would help in this issue as it would give more tools to the legal process – universal jurisdiction, arresting, transferring, prosecuting and sentencing.” (emphasis added, para. 129, p.36)
e. Keeping the EU’s public image well-polished

On “strategic communications/perception”, the report notes:

“136. The migration crisis that has been affecting the EU over the past two years has now taken on a strategic dimension with significant domestic political implications for member states and the cohesion of the EU. In this context, it is clear that perception will continue to play a significant role and requires careful handling. This has particular relevance when emphasizing Op Sophia’s focus on the smugglers’ business model, interaction with NGOs and adherence to human rights.

137. The operation's responsibilities to conduct search and rescue operations when one of its assets is required to do so by the IMRCC remains particularly sensitive. The key challenge in strategic communication for the EU’s handling of irregular migration is to demonstrate convincingly that we can control the flow and are not overwhelmed by it. Op Sophia is a small but important and visible component of the effort to address this challenge. An update to the operation's Information Strategy is required following this review.

138. Shared Awareness and Deconfliction in the Mediterranean (SHADE) offers a useful forum to interact with NGOs and encourage cooperative dialogue, particularly in regards to the presence of NGO vessels in the vicinity of Libyan territorial waters. Significant strategic communication efforts are also required with regards to current and forthcoming efforts to support the building of a stronger Libyan coastguard capacity through the training of personnel, delivery of assets and handling ultimately of migrants in detention centres in Libya. The latter issue requires coordination with such actors as IOM, UNHCR and the relevant Libyan authorities and have significant reputational implications for the EU.” (emphasis added, p.37-8)

f. Proposal for the future of EUNAVFOR MED/Operation Sophia

A number of proposals are made for the future of EUNAVFOR MED, including under the heading of “transition strategy”:

“The current political and legal obstacles to disrupt the business model of smugglers and traffickers ashore, limits the action of Op Sophia to containing the phenomenon. Whilst it is self-evident that the root causes cannot be addressed at sea, it is assessed nonetheless that this containment function has contributed to improving maritime security in the central Mediterranean and remains vital as part of an integrated approach.” (para. 150, p.43)

Since October 2015 (when EUNAVFOR MED began) to the end of April 2017 (two weeks before the report was published), 7,000 people are known to have died in the Mediterranean, according to the IOM’s Missing Migrants project. 2016 was the deadliest year on record, with 5,143 people known to have died.

It is recommended that a choice is made to:

“Continue the operation as it is, and prolong its mandate until 31 December 2018 to enhance 1) focus on maritime security operations on the high seas 2) information sharing with law enforcement agencies 3) cooperation with the Libyan authorities through training and information sharing and 4) support the establishment of a monitoring mechanism.” (p.45)
The objective of EUBAM Libya is:

"set out in Council Decision 2016/207 on 15 February 2016… ‘EUBAM Libya will assist in a comprehensive civilian security sector reform planning process, with a view to preparing for a possible civilian capacity building and assistance crisis management mission’ with the task to ‘inform EU planning for a possible civilian capacity building and assistance crisis management mission in the field of security sector reform, co-operating closely with, and contributing to, UNSMIL efforts, liaising with the legitimate Libyan authorities and other relevant security interlocutors’."

(Para. 154, p.46)

Its current mandate expires on 22 August 2017 and it is currently based in Tunis due to the security situation in Libya. 18 staff are working for the mission in three areas – border management, law enforcement and criminal justice and it works closely with UNSMIL, the EU Liaison and Planning Committee (EULPC) and the EU Delegation in Tunis “as well as other EU and non-EU actors,” whilst “increasing ‘engaging and assisting’ the legitimate Libyan government in a number of areas.”

### a. Border management

“161. The Libyan authorities in charge of border management and security have agreed with the Mission to reconvene the EUBAM-Libya Border Management Working Group; a bilateral format at the operational level between the Mission and Libyan institutional stakeholders which served as the main coordination platform up until 2014 and where Frontex is contributing with its expertise. The group is currently developing a “white paper” focusing on how best to coordinate the work of all state agencies involved in border management aspects.

162. The Mission is engaging with IOM and Libyan counterparts to agree on EUBAM’s support for the development of training for law enforcement agencies operating at the ports of disembarkation. It would focus on key aspects of the identification process, in particular with regard to interview and debriefing techniques, human rights, data collection, and filing in order to support an effective and auditable process. The newly appointed EMLO, based in the EU Delegation Tunisia and dedicating part of his work to Libya, will be an important point of contact in this regard.

163. EUBAM is exploring potential support to the MoI coastal police (more formally termed the General Administration for Coastal Security (GACS)). The Mission will assess the capacity and needs of the coastal police, in coordination with other Libyan- and international actors, including the Department for Countering Irregular Migration, and Op Sophia. Capacity-delivery undertaken by Italy will be an important factor in this regard.” (p.47-8)

EUBAM has also helped establish a working group on southern Libya, “chaired by the head of the National Team on Security and Border Management and including representatives of the three Brigades of the Salvador Triangle and the Military Council.” There is also discussion on possible coordination with EUCAP Sahel Niger, EUCAP Sahel Mali and Frontex:

“where and when possible, including on exchange of information of migrant flows, smuggling networks and lessons learned. The CSDP missions in the region are also party to the Africa-Frontex intelligence community (AFIC) which provides them direct access to information and intelligence from the sub-Saharan countries.” (Para. 166, p.48)
b. Law enforcement

EUBAM Libya has the lead role in coordinating the development of law enforcement for the Government of National Accord in relation to organised crime, counter-terrorism, intelligence-gathering, public order and general policing:

“UNSMIL has entrusted EUBAM Libya with taking the lead in the Police Technical Working Group (PWG) which acts as an adequate platform to coordinate international efforts on capacity building in the law-enforcement sector, integrating organised crime and CT aspects, including relevant intelligence aspects.” (para. 167, p.50)

EUBAM Libya has “an exchange platform on criminal investigation with Libya and international non-governmental organisations, the UN and Member States… [it] includes senior Libya representatives, most notably the Supreme Judicial Council,” while on counter-terrorism there is cooperation “relevant Libyan law enforcement agencies under the MoI, such as the General Investigation Department (GID), the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) and the Central Security Forces” (paras. 168-9, p.50).

c. Criminal justice

EUBAM Libya is “is engaged with the Libyan Minister of Justice in setting up a Criminal Justice reform working group and potentially a sub-working group on penitentiary and rehabilitation,” and “is providing initial advice on the need for reinforcing the criminal justice chain (prosecution offices, public defenders offices, etc.),” as well as “developing relations with civil society, including with an emerging "Female Lawyer's Association".” (p.51)

d. Challenges to the mission and possible future activities

“One-day visits to Tripoli have been useful in developing the mission’s work, and thus: “A more regular presence in Tripoli, including a security concept, is currently being discussed with MS.” (p.51)

“180. Mapping efforts, conducted to date, highlight the dramatic fragmentation and fundamental lack of capacity across all state institutions under the MoI and MoJ. The more the Mission engages with Libyans and the IC, the more the potential need for additional capacity delivery becomes evident. This highlights the need for a phased approach, both in time, space and scope, to take into account limited Libyan absorption capacities and the long-term engagement likely to be required.” (p.51)

“189. The MoI coastal police do not have an adequate operational capability to carry out its coastal surveillance activities. No operational concept is currently in place (even though EUBAM worked closely with the coastal police in 2013-2014), outlining operational deployment tasks, use and coordination of human and technical resources, and maritime and law enforcement training needs.” (p.52)

“191. The Mission can currently only engage with the legitimate Libyan authorities on the ground. This omits non-State security actors which are the de facto authority in the majority of Libya. This risks creating significant tensions with some relevant tribal, political and security actors who feel excluded from this sensitive process.” (p.53)

It is considered that there is the possibility for:
“a new civilian CSDP Mission [which] could support Libyan efforts inter alia through advice and capacity-building in the fields of police and criminal justice including on counterterrorism, border management, countering irregular migration, the smuggling of migrants and the trafficking of human beings, as part of broader support to security sector reform.” (para. 196, p.53)

A number of ways for providing this support are then suggested. On border management:

“198. Longer term efforts could aim to develop a border management system where the performance of each Libyan individual border agency is improved and where inter-agency cooperation and coordination mechanisms, both at national and international level, are introduced to achieve open, but controlled and secure, borders. This could also require support to be provided for the design and implementation of a National IBM Strategy.” (p.54)

“201. EUBAM could further explore the support to IOM for the development of training for law enforcement agencies operating at the ports of disembarkation.

202. The Mission could continue assessing the capacity and needs of the MoI coastal police, in coordination with other Libyan- and international actors, with the aim of providing law enforcement capacity building, in full complementarity with efforts carried out by Op Sophia, SEAHORSE and bilateral MS support.” (p.54)

“205. Cooperation with Frontex could be further enhanced, in the field of training, in the participation of AFIC activities and through associating a Frontex expert to EUBAM Libya once conditions allow.” (p.55)

On law enforcement:

“206. Engaging through the support of Libyan organisations to disrupt and destroy organised crime networks supports Libyan stability and is a key objective for the EU. For a durable long-term solution, increasing focus could especially be applied on the southern borders to complement efforts at sea by Op Sophia.” (p.55)

“209. The Mission could assist the MoI with the view to advising them on the development of “areas of legality” in Tripoli, including the development of model police stations and model public order units, delineation of responsibilities across law enforcement/rule of law sector entities, as well as command and control arrangements.

210. The Mission could support the MoI in definition and set-up of the police component of the PG [Presidential guard] by providing advice in particular on the possible responsibilities/structure/SOPs of such entity. The possibility to use the EUROGENDFOR in training a future police component of the PG could also be further explored, including the possibility to provide such training regionally.” (p.56)

On criminal justice:

“213. In the area of Criminal Justice, long-term priority could be given to the reform of the Penal Code and the Code of Criminal Procedure to encompass violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including crimes under international law, and to ensure that procedures are consistent with international human rights standards.” (p.56)

“215. Special focus could be given to both the implementation of Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its Protocols (such as ‘the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, especially Women and Children') into Libyan domestic criminal justice system and the abolishment of domestic legislation in violation of international human rights and standards of asylum and refugee law.” (p.56)

“221. Building upon the recent increased operational engagement through “engaging and assisting”, these activities could be further pursued within the Mission’s next mandate with the aim of addressing some of the symptoms of Libya’s instability, especially irregular migration, while continuing strategic and operational planning and shaping Libyan ownership and buy-in for a future possible civilian CSDP mission. The Libyan authorities have expressed their appreciation for EUBAM’s efforts so far and their openness to further support. Engagement and coordination with other EU and CSDP and non-EU entities, in Libya and in the region, should continue, not the least with UNSMIL as the coordinator for international support.” (p.57, emphasis added)

“223. The possibility of engaging with non-state actors should be considered as well as it could contribute to a more sustainable and inclusive solution in the long term.” (p.57, emphasis added)

e. Recommendations for the future

The issue of the EU’s public image once again comes to the fore:

“the political and security challenges facing both Libya and Europe and the reputational risk at stake for the EU does not make a closure of EUBAM Libya a possibility either and hence is not suggested as an option.” (para. 227, p.58)

It is recommended that the mission is extended until December 2018, that planning for a future civilian CSDP mission continues, and that increased “engagement and assistance” is offered on border management, law enforcement and criminal justice. This includes: “Support IOM to develop a migrant registration system through advice on training for law enforcement agencies operating at the ports of migrant disembarkation in Libya,” and: “Support the development of capacity delivery to the Ministry of Interior coastal police in coordination with other international actors involved.” (p.60)

These new tasks would require more money and staff for the mission.

6. EU Planning and Liaison Cell (EUPLC)

The EUPLC operates within the European External Action Service and was set up in April 2015 “in order to provide greater awareness of Libya security issues and aid planning for both the EU and UNSMIL.” It has eight staff, provided by the Member States, and its current “terms of reference” expire in October 2017.

“236. The main achievements of the EULPC in 2016 have been; the drafting of the Tripoli Security Plan; the Strategic Planning Directive for support to the GNA; the Code of Conduct for the removal of AGs from Tripoli, and more recently conceptual support to the creation of the Tripoli Protection Force, the PG, Libyan requests for exemption to the arms embargo and planning for UNSMIL’s return to Tripoli (Op ULYSSES).” (p.61)

It is noted that: “the Cell has used its proximity to Libyan interlocutors to act as the principal channel of engagement between Op Sophia and senior leadership of the Libyan coastguard” (para.237, p.62), and:
“Recently more focus has been given to intelligence/information gathering and analysis. This latter function is also important in helping provide the EU Delegation with a comprehensive overview of key Libyan interlocutors and could further support the return under a light footprint of EUBAM Libya.” (para. 238, p.62)

The EUPLC plays a key role in the EU’s interventions in Libya:

“242. Due to its high level of situational awareness and knowledge of politico-security dynamics the EULPC remains a critical actor in shaping the Brussel’s decision making process. The EULPC has a unique position not least since it has a permanent liaison officer working directly with UNSMIL and is well-connected to both Libyan and international actors” (p.63)

Under the heading “exit strategy”, the proposal is for the EUPLC to continue working as long as considered necessary:

“246. The EULPC is providing a vital military planning and intelligence capacity for UNSMIL and the EU on Libya. Its capacity should be retained until the security situation in Libya is suitably permissive (and sustained) to no longer warrant such capacity.” (p.63)

For the time being:

“The recommended option is to maintain the Status Quo in the interim period but to transform the Cell’s personnel to SNE [seconded national expert] status as soon as possible, including through the securing of a technical agreement with UNSMIL.” (para. 247, p.65)